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Omar Sagga

dblp:189/1708 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
0000-0002-5554-027XORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 1Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 57% Network security · 43%
Computer networks
1 paper
Routing and switching · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Routing and switching
inter-domain routing
0.312017
MaxLength Considered Harmful to the RPKI · CoNEXT 2017
Routing and switching › inter-domain routing › inter-domain routing security
RPKI
0.312017
MaxLength Considered Harmful to the RPKI · CoNEXT 2017
Network security
routing security
0.312017
MaxLength Considered Harmful to the RPKI · CoNEXT 2017

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

network measurement · 0.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2019 Efficient Noninteractive Certification of RSA Moduli and Beyond
Sharon Goldberg, Leonid Reyzin, Omar Sagga, Foteini Baldimtsi
ASIACRYPT (3)3
2017 MaxLength Considered Harmful to the RPKI
abstract
User convenience and strong security are often at odds, and most security applications need to find some sort of balance between these two (often opposing) goals. The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), a security infrastructure built on top of interdomain routing, is not immune to this issue. The RPKI uses the maxLength attribute to reduce the amount of information that must be explicitly recorded in its cryptographic objects. MaxLength also allows operators to easily reconfigure their networks without modifying their RPKI objects. Our network measurements, however, suggest that the maxLength attribute strikes the wrong balance between security and user convenience. We therefore believe that operators should avoid using maxLength. We give operational recommendations and develop software that allow operators to reap many of the benefits of maxLength without its security costs.
Yossi Gilad, Omar Sagga, Sharon Goldberg
CoNEXT2