EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Tomoya Kazumura
dblp:189/7670
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
0009-0002-5900-1721ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 91% Mathematical optimization · 9% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › market equilibrium
competitive equilibrium |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Strategy-proofness and competitive equilibrium with transferable utility: Gross substitutes revisited · EC 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › market design › combinatorial markets
gross substitutes |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Strategy-proofness and competitive equilibrium with transferable utility: Gross substitutes revisited · EC 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › market design
matching markets |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Strategy-proofness and competitive equilibrium with transferable utility: Gross substitutes revisited · EC 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
equilibrium analysis · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Strategy-proofness and competitive equilibrium with transferable utility: Gross substitutes revisitedabstractThe existence of competitive equilibria has been extensively studied in many economic models. In the literature of matching theory, attention has been paid to many-to-one matching models. These models consider matching between two types of agents, such as firms and workers, sellers and buyers, hospitals and doctors, or schools and students. In a many-to-one matching model with continuous transfers and quasilinear utilities, the gross substitutes condition (GS), which excludes the complementarity among workers in a firm's valuation, guarantees the existence of competitive equilibria. While GS is known to be a necessary condition in the maximal domain sense, competitive equilibria can exist even if GS is violated. Recent developments in this field have revealed that various conditions other than GS can guarantee the existence of competitive equilibria. For example, under the gross substitutes and complements condition (GSC), competitive equilibria exist even when certain types of complement. The concept of unimodular demand types includes both GS and GSC as special cases. Kenzo Imamura, Keisuke Bando, Tomoya Kazumura |
EC | 3 |