Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Seth D. Schoen
dblp:19/2336
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 3 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Internet architecture and protocols · 77% Network management and operations · 23% | |
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Web and mobile security · 78% Hardware security and side channels · 17% Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 5% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Web and mobile security
web PKI |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Let's Encrypt: An Automated Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web · CCS 2019 |
Hardware security and side channels › physical attacks
cold boot attack |
0.1 | 1 | 2008 | Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys · USENIX Security Symposium 2008 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
key management |
0.0 | 1 | 2008 | Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys · USENIX Security Symposium 2008 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
system architecture design · 0.8measurement study · 0.8memory remanence analysis · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | Let's Encrypt: An Automated Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire WebabstractLet's Encrypt is a free, open, and automated HTTPS certificate authority (CA) created to advance HTTPS adoption to the entire Web. Since its launch in late 2015, Let's Encrypt has grown to become the world's largest HTTPS CA, accounting for more currently valid certificates than all other browser-trusted CAs combined. By January 2019, it had issued over 538~million certificates for 223~million domain names. We describe how we built Let's Encrypt, including the architecture of the CA software system (Boulder) and the structure of the organization that operates it (ISRG), and we discuss lessons learned from the experience. We also describe the design of ACME, the IETF-standard protocol we created to automate CA--server interactions and certificate issuance, and survey the diverse ecosystem of ACME clients, including Certbot, a software agent we created to automate HTTPS deployment. Finally, we measure Let's Encrypt's impact on the Web and the CA ecosystem. We hope that the success of Let's Encrypt can provide a model for further enhancements to the Web PKI and for future Internet security infrastructure. Josh Aas, Richard Barnes 0001, Benton Case, Zakir Durumeric, Peter Eckersley, Alan Flores-López, J. Alex Halderman, Jacob Hoffman-Andrews, James Kasten, Eric Rescorla, Seth D. Schoen, Brad Warren |
CCS | 11 |
| 2008 | Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys
J. Alex Halderman, Seth D. Schoen, Nadia Heninger, William Clarkson, William Paul, Joseph A. Calandrino, Ariel J. Feldman, Jacob Appelbaum, Edward W. Felten |
USENIX Security Symposium | 2 |
| 2005 | Compatibility, competition, and control in trusted computing environments
Seth D. Schoen |
Inf. Secur. Tech. Rep. | 1 |