Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Jim Aarestad
dblp:19/9086
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2012
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Systems, architecture and hardware · 2 · 1 first-authorComputer networks · 1Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Hardware security and side channels · 67% Security and privacy of machine learning · 33% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
2 papers |
Electronic design automation · 49% Integrated circuit design · 39% Performance modeling and evaluation · 12% |
Topics — the 6 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Integrated circuit design › semiconductor devices
silicon-on-insulator |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Characterizing within-die and die-to-die delay variations introduced by process variations and SOI history effect · DAC 2011 |
Electronic design automation
timing analysis |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Characterizing within-die and die-to-die delay variations introduced by process variations and SOI history effect · DAC 2011 |
Hardware security and side channels
hardware trojan |
0.1 | 1 | 2010 | Detecting Trojans Through Leakage Current Analysis Using Multiple Supply Pad IDDQ s · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2010 |
Hardware security and side channels › hardware trojan
hardware trojan detection |
0.1 | 1 | 2010 | Detecting Trojans Through Leakage Current Analysis Using Multiple Supply Pad IDDQ s · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2010 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › poisoning attack defense
trojan detection |
0.1 | 1 | 2010 | Detecting Trojans Through Leakage Current Analysis Using Multiple Supply Pad IDDQ s · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2010 |
Electronic design automation › hardware verification and test › fault testing
IDDQ testing |
0.0 | 1 | 2010 | Detecting Trojans Through Leakage Current Analysis Using Multiple Supply Pad IDDQ s · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2010 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
regression-based statistical analysis · 0.2flush delay measurement · 0.1iddq measurement · 0.1IDDQ measurement · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | Modular FPGA-based software defined radio for CubeSatsabstractIn this paper, we present an adaptive digital communication system using field programmable gate array (FPGA) technology. This system adapts the Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) to better suit the space and power limitations of the CubeSat satellite form factor and the Space Plug-and-Play Avionics (SPA) protocol. The result is a highly-adaptive, plug and play software-defined radio (SDR) that is easily incorporated into any CubeSat design. Steven J. Olivieri, Jim Aarestad, L. Howard Pollard, Alexander M. Wyglinski, Craig Kief, Richard Scott Erwin |
ICC | 2 |
| 2011 | Characterizing within-die and die-to-die delay variations introduced by process variations and SOI history effectabstractVariations in delay caused by within-die and die-to-die process variations and SOI history effect increase timing margins and reduce performance. In order to develop mitigation techniques to reduce the detrimental effects of delay variations, particularly those that occur within-die, new methods of measuring delay variations within actual products are needed. The data provided by such techniques can also be used for validating models, i.e., can assist with model-to-hardware correlation. In this paper, we propose a flush delay technique for measuring both regional delay variations and SOI history effect and validate the method using a test structure fabricated in a 65 nm SOI process. Jim Aarestad, Charles Lamech, James F. Plusquellic, Dhruva Acharyya, Kanak Agarwal 0001 |
DAC | 1 |
| 2011 | REBEL and TDC: Two embedded test structures for on-chip measurements of within-die path delay variationsabstractAs feature printability becomes more challenging in advanced technology nodes, measuring and characterizing process variation effects on delay and power is becoming increasingly important. In this paper, we present two embedded test structures (ETS) for carrying out path delay measurement in actual product designs. Of the two structures proposed here, one is designed to be incorporated into a customer's scan structures, augmenting selected functional units with the ability to perform accurate path delay measurements. We refer to this ETS as REBEL (regional delay behavior). It is designed to leverage the existing scan chain as a means of reducing area overhead and performance impact. For cases in which very high resolution of delay measurements is required, a second standalone structure is proposed which we refer to as TDC for time-to-digital converter. Beyond characterizing process variations, these ETSs can also be used for design debug, detection of hardware Trojans and small delay defects and as physical unclonable functions. Charles Lamech, Jim Aarestad, James F. Plusquellic, Reza M. Rad, Kanak Agarwal 0001 |
ICCAD | 2 |
| 2010 | Detecting Trojans Through Leakage Current Analysis Using Multiple Supply Pad IDDQ sabstractHardware Trojans have emerged as a new threat to the security and trust of computing systems. Hardware Trojans are deliberate and malicious modifications to the logic function implemented within digital and mixed signal chips. In contrast to software Trojans, it is not possible to simply "scan the hard drive" to eradicate a hardware Trojan. Hardware Trojans can be designed to shutdown the chip at some predetermined time and/or when some specific signal or data pattern is received. They may also be designed to remain hidden while leaking confidential information covertly to the adversary. Determining whether a hardware Trojan has been inserted into a chip is extremely difficult for a variety of reasons, e.g., nanometer feature sizes and chip design complexity combine to make optical inspection difficult or impossible. This paper presents experimental results demonstrating the effectiveness of a Trojan detection method that is based on the analysis of a chip's Jddqs (steady-state current), which are measured simultaneously from multiple places on the chip. The proposed method also incorporates a technique for virtually eliminating process and test environment variations effects which act to reduce detection sensitivity of traditional testing approaches. Used together, resolution enhancements of up to a 1000 x are possible over conventional single power supply current measurement techniques. A regression-based statistical technique is applied to the data collected from a set of chips fabricated in a 65-nm process to illustrate the detection capabilities and limitations of this type of approach. Jim Aarestad, Dhruva Acharyya, Reza M. Rad, James F. Plusquellic |
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. | 1 |