Two factor authentication (2FA) schemes provide strong user authentication guarantees and increase the security of a wide range of web services. However, 2FA schemes still largely remain vulnerable to phishing attacks in which attackers also phish users' second factor (e.g., their OTP tokens). We propose 2FA-PP, a phishing detection scheme that protects users' 2nd authentication factor from phishing attacks. 2FA-PP uses novel browser APIs that support direct communication between browsers and external devices (e.g., mobile phones) and enables the user's phone to check the domain to which the user is connected. The second factor is then only made available to the user if he is accessing the correct domain. 2FA-PP can be combined with different 2FA schemes, both interactive, based on OTP, QR codes and non-interactive, based on device pairing or proximity.

We show that the new hover (floating touch) technology, available in a number of today's smartphone models, can be abused by malicious Android applications to record all touchscreen input into applications system-wide. Leveraging this attack, a malicious application running on the system is able to capture sensitive input such as passwords and PINs, record all user's social interactions, as well as profile user's behavior. To evaluate our attack we implemented Hoover, a proof-of-concept malicious application that runs in the background and records all input to all foreground applications. We evaluated Hoover with 20 users, across two different Android devices and two input methods, stylus and finger. In the case of touchscreen input by finger, Hoover estimated the positions of users' clicks within an error of 100 pixels and keyboard input with an accuracy of 79%. Hoover captured users' input by stylus even more accurately, estimating users' clicks within 2 pixels and keyboard input with an accuracy of 98%. Differently from existing well-known side channel attacks, this is the first work that proves the security implications of the hover technology and its potential to steal all user inputs with high granularity. We discuss ways of mitigating this attack and show that this cannot be done by simply restricting access to permissions or imposing additional cognitive load on the users since this would significantly constrain the intended use of the hover technology.