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Christoph Hirnschall

dblp:195/6176 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2018
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorGraphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%
Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper
Recommender systems · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
incentive mechanism
0.312018
Learning User Preferences to Incentivize Exploration in the Sharing Economy · AAAI 2018
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › multi-armed bandit
incentivized exploration
0.312018
Learning User Preferences to Incentivize Exploration in the Sharing Economy · AAAI 2018

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

coordinated online learning · 0.7convex constrained learning · 0.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2018 Learning User Preferences to Incentivize Exploration in the Sharing Economy
abstract
We study platforms in the sharing economy and discuss the need for incentivizing users to explore options that otherwise would not be chosen. For instance, rental platforms such as Airbnb typically rely on customer reviews to provide users with relevant information about different options. Yet, often a large fraction of options does not have any reviews available. Such options are frequently neglected as viable choices, and in turn are unlikely to be evaluated, creating a vicious cycle. Platforms can engage users to deviate from their preferred choice by offering monetary incentives for choosing a different option instead. To efficiently learn the optimal incentives to offer, we consider structural information in user preferences and introduce a novel algorithm---Coordinated Online Learning (CoOL)---for learning with structural information modeled as convex constraints. We provide formal guarantees on the performance of our algorithm and test the viability of our approach in a user study with data of apartments on Airbnb. Our findings suggest that our approach is well-suited to learn appropriate incentives and increase exploration on the investigated platform.
Christoph Hirnschall, Adish Singla, Sebastian Tschiatschek, Andreas Krause 0001
AAAI1