Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Zhe Ye 0002
dblp:196/7198-2
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0002-6446-5072ORCID · conflict
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 100% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Program verification · 100% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper |
Distributed systems · 100% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Program verification
proof system |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Specular: Towards Secure, Trust-minimized Optimistic Blockchain Execution · SP 2024 |
Distributed systems
fault tolerance |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Specular: Towards Secure, Trust-minimized Optimistic Blockchain Execution · SP 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
interactive dispute resolution · 2.31-of-n-version programming · 2.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Specular: Towards Secure, Trust-minimized Optimistic Blockchain ExecutionabstractAn optimistic rollup (ORU) scales a blockchain’s throughput by delegating computation to an untrusted remote chain (L2), refereeing any state claim disagreements between mutually distrusting L2 operators via an interactive dispute resolution protocol. State-of-the-art ORUs employ a monolithic dispute resolution protocol that tightly couples an L1 referee with a specific L2 client binary—oblivious to the system’s higher-level semantics. We argue that this approach (1) magnifies monoculture failure risk, by precluding trust-minimized and permissionless participation using operator-chosen client software; (2) leads to an unnecessarily large and difficult-to-audit TCB; and, (3) suffers from a frequently-triggered, yet opaque upgrade process—both further increasing auditing overhead, and broadening the governance attack surface.To address these concerns, we outline a methodology for designing a secure and resilient ORU with a minimal TCB, by facilitating opportunistic 1-of-N-version programming. Due to its unique challenges and opportunities, we ground this work concretely in the context of the Ethereum ecosystem—where ORUs have gained significant traction. Specifically, we design a semantically-aware proof system, natively targeting the EVM and its instruction set. We present an implementation in a new ORU, Specular, that opportunistically leverages Ethereum’s existing client diversity with minimal source modification, demonstrating our approach’s feasibility. Zhe Ye 0002, Ujval Misra, Wenyang Zhou, Dawn Song |
SP | 1 |