Cloud file systems offer organizations a scalable and reliable file storage solution. However, cloud file systems have become prime targets for adversaries, and traditional designs are not equipped to protect organizations against the myriad of attacks that may be initiated by a malicious cloud provider, co-tenant, or end-client. Recently proposed designs leveraging cryptographic techniques and trusted execution environments (TEEs) still force organizations to make undesirable trade-offs, consequently leading to either security, functional, or performance limitations. In this paper, we introduceBFS, a cloud file system that leverages the security capabilities provided by TEEs to bootstrap new security protocols that deliver strong security guarantees, high-performance, and a transparent POSIX-like interface to clients.BFSdelivers stronger security guarantees and up to a$2.5\times$speedup over a state-of-the-art secure file system. Moreover, compared to the industry standard NFS,BFSachieves up to$2.2\times$speedups across micro-benchmarks and incurs$< 1\times$overhead for most macro-benchmark workloads.BFSdemonstrates a holistic cloud file system design that does not sacrifice an organizations’ security yet can embrace all of the functional and performance advantages of outsourcing.

Load balancing in software-defined networks (SDNs) is commonly realized with a centralized architecture. Dynamic load balancing relies on the SDN controller to periodically collect traffic statistics from network switches and make decisions in a timely manner. In this paper, we examine the extent to which an adversary that has compromised a switch can influence the load balancing algorithm by misreporting its own traffic statistics. We design an attack that allows an adversary to perform preliminary reconnaissance, which means learning network traffic distributions and setting attack parameters, and then accurately model and estimate the reward from misreporting while evading detection. Our evaluation offers three insights: 1) network traffic exhibits discernible patterns by reconnaissance; 2) the reconnaissance can be used to design misreporting attacks that can effectively draw unfair proportions of network traffic to the adversary under the guise of honest behavior; and 3) reconnaissance itself can be accelerated by misreporting to launch more targeted attacks.

The performance-driven design of SDN architectures leaves many security vulnerabilities, a notable one being the communication bottleneck between the controller and the switches. Functioning as a cache between the controller and the switches, the flow table mitigates this bottleneck by caching flow rules received from the controller at each switch, but is very limited in size due to the high cost and power consumption of the underlying storage medium. It thus presents an easy target for attacks. Observing that many existing defenses are based on simplistic attack models, we develop a model of intelligent attacks that exploit specific cache-like behaviors of the flow table to infer its internal configuration and state, and then design attack parameters accordingly. Our evaluations show that such attacks can accurately expose the internal parameters of the target flow table and cause measurable damage with the minimum effort.

The performance-driven design of SDN architectures leaves many security vulnerabilities, a notable one being the communication bottleneck between the controller and the switches. Functioning as a cache between the controller and the switches, the flow table mitigates this bottleneck by caching flow rules received from the controller at each switch, but is very limited in size due to the high cost and power consumption of the underlying storage medium. It thus presents an easy target for attacks. Observing that many existing defenses are based on simplistic attack models, we develop a model of intelligent attacks that exploit specific cache-like behaviors of the flow table to infer its internal configuration and state, and then design attack parameters accordingly. Our evaluations show that such attacks can accurately expose the internal parameters of the target flow table and cause measurable damage with the minimum effort.

While extending network programmability to a more considerable extent, P4 raises the difficulty of detecting and locating bugs, e.g., P4 program bugs and missed table rules, in runtime. These runtime bugs, without prompt disposal, can ruin the functionality and performance of networks. Unfortunately, the absence of efficient debugging tools makes runtime bug troubleshooting intricate for operators. This paper is devoted to on-the-fly debugging of runtime bugs for programmable data planes. We propose P4DB, a general debugging platform that empowers operators to debug P4 programs in three levels of visibility with rich primitives. By P4DB, operators can use the watch primitive to quickly narrow the debugging scope from the network level or the device level to the table level, then use the break and next primitives to decompose match-action tables and finely locate bugs. We implement a prototype of P4DB and evaluate the prototype on two widely-used P4 targets. On the software target, P4DB merely introduces a small throughput penalty (1.3% to 13.8%) and a little delay increase (0.6% to 11.9%). Notably, P4DB almost introduces no performance overhead on Tofino, the hardware P4 target.