The “2019 Automatic Speaker Verification Spoofing And Countermeasures Challenge” (ASVspoof) competition aimed to facilitate the design of highly accurate voice spoofing attack detection systems. the competition did not emphasize model complexity and latency requirements; such constraints are strict and integral in real-world deployment. Hence, most of the top performing solutions from the competition all used an ensemble approach, and combined multiple complex deep learning models to maximize detection accuracy - this kind of approach would sit uneasily with real-world deployment constraints. To design a lightweight system, we combined the notions of skip connection (from ResNet) and max feature map (from Light CNN), and evaluated the accuracy of the system using the ASVspoof 2019 dataset. With an optimized constant Q transform (CQT) feature, our single model achieved a replay attack detection equal error rate (EER) of 0.37% on the evaluation set, surpassing the top ensemble system from the competition that achieved an EER of 0.39%.

Android allows 20 consecutive fail attempts on unlocking a device. This makes it difficult for pure guessing attacks to crack user patterns on a stolen device before it permanently locks itself. We investigate the effectiveness of combining Markov model-based guessing attacks with smudge attacks on unlocking Android devices within 20 attempts. Detected smudges are used to pre-compute all the possible segments and patterns, significantly reducing the pattern space that needs to be brute-forced. Our Markov-model was trained using 70% of a real-world pattern dataset that consists of 312 patterns. We recruited 12 participants to draw the remaining 30% on Samsung Galaxy S4, and used smudges they left behind to analyze the performance of the combined attack. Our results show that this combined method can significantly improve the performance of pure guessing attacks, cracking 74.17% of patterns compared to just 13.33% when the Markov model-based guessing attack was performed alone---those results were collected from a naive usage scenario where the participants were merely asked to unlock a given device. Even under a more complex scenario that asked the participants to use the Facebook app for a few minutes---obscuring smudges were added as a result---our combined attack, at 31.94%, still outperformed the pure guessing attack at 13.33%. Obscuring smudges can significantly affect the performance of smudge-based attacks. Based on this finding, we recommend that a mitigation technique should be designed to help users add obscurity, e.g., by asking users to draw a second random pattern upon unlocking a device.