We study content caching with recommendations in a wireless network where the users are connected through a base station equipped with a finite-capacity cache. We assume a fixed set of contents with unknown user preferences and content popularities. The base station can cache a subset of the contents and can also recommend subsets of the contents to different users in order to encourage them to request the recommended contents. Recommendations, depending on their acceptability, can thus be used to increase cache hits. We first assume that the users' recommendation acceptabilities are known and formulate the cache hit optimization problem as a combinatorial multi-armed bandit (CMAB). We propose a UCB-based algorithm to decide which contents to cache and recommend and provide an upper bound on the regret of this algorithm. Subsequently, we consider a more general scenario where the users' recommendation acceptabilities are also unknown and propose another UCB-based algorithm that learns these as well. We numerically demonstrate the performance of our algorithms and compare these to state-of-the-art algorithms.

To obtain good network performance in Long Term Evolution-Advanced (LTE-A) heterogeneous networks (HetNets), enhanced inter-cell interference coordination (eICIC) and further eICIC (FeICIC) have been proposed by LTE standardization bodies to address the entangled inter-cell interference and the user association problems. We propose the distributed algorithms based on the exact potential game framework for both eICIC and FeICIC optimizations. We demonstrate via simulations a 64% gain on energy efficiency (EE) achieved by eICIC and another 17% gain on EE achieved by FeICIC. We also show that FeICIC can bring other significant gains in terms of cell-edge throughput, spectral efficiency, and fairness among user throughputs. Moreover, we propose a downlink scheduler based on a cake-cutting algorithm that can further improve the performance of the optimization algorithms compared with conventional schedulers.

A combined base station association and power control problem is studied for the uplink of multichannel multicell cellular networks, in which each channel is used by exactly one cell (i.e., base station). A distributed association and power update algorithm is proposed and shown to converge to a Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game. We consider network models with discrete mobiles (yielding an atomic congestion game), as well as a continuum of mobiles (yielding a population game). We find that the equilibria need not be Pareto efficient, nor need they be system optimal. To address the lack of system optimality, we propose pricing mechanisms. It is shown that these mechanisms can be implemented in a distributed fashion.

We study the tradeoff between delivery delay and energy consumption in a delay-tolerant network in which a message (or a file) has to be delivered to each of several destinations by epidemic relaying. In addition to the destinations, there are several other nodes in the network that can assist in relaying the message. We first assume that, at every instant, all the nodes know the number of relays carrying the message and the number of destinations that have received the message. We formulate the problem as a controlled continuous-time Markov chain and derive the optimal closed-loop control (i.e., forwarding policy). However, in practice, the intermittent connectivity in the network implies that the nodes may not have the required perfect knowledge of the system state. To address this issue, we obtain an ordinary differential equation (ODE) (i.e., a deterministic fluid) approximation for the optimally controlled Markov chain. This fluid approximation also yields an asymptotically optimal open-loop policy. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the deterministic policy over finite networks. Numerical results show that this policy performs close to the optimal closed-loop policy.

We study the question of determining locations of base stations (BSs) that may belong to the same or to competing service providers. We take into account the impact of these decisions on the behavior of intelligent mobile terminals that can connect to the base station that offers the best utility. The signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) is used as the quantity that determines the association. We first study the SINR association-game: We determine the cells corresponding to each base stations, i.e., the locations at which mobile terminals prefer to connect to a given base station than to others. We make some surprising observations: 1) displacing a base station a little in one direction may result in a displacement of the boundary of the corresponding cell to the opposite direction; 2) a cell corresponding to a BS may be the union of disconnected subcells. We then study the hierarchical equilibrium in the combined BS location and mobile association problem: We determine where to locate the BSs so as to maximize the revenues obtained at the induced SINR mobile association game. We consider the cases of single frequency band and two frequency bands of operation. Finally, we also consider hierarchical equilibria in two frequency systems with successive interference cancellation.

We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multihop routes. If providers cooperate by jointly deploying and pooling their resources, such as spectrum and infrastructure (e.g., base stations) and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, may substantially increase through opportunistic utilization of resources. The potential of such cooperation can, however, be realized only if each provider intelligently determines with whom it would cooperate, when it would cooperate, and how it would deploy and share its resources during such cooperation. Also, developing a rational basis for sharing the aggregate payoffs is imperative for the stability of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using the theory of transferable payoff coalitional games. We show that the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the acquisition, deployment, and allocation of the channels and base stations (to customers), can be computed as the solution of a concave or an integer optimization. We next show that the grand coalition is stable in many different settings, i.e., if all providers cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the providers' aggregate payoff, while offering each a share that removes any incentive to split from the coalition. The optimal cooperation strategy and the stabilizing payoff shares can be obtained in polynomial time by respectively solving the primals and the duals of the above optimizations, using distributed computations and limited exchange of confidential information among the providers. Numerical evaluations reveal that cooperation substantially enhances individual providers' payoffs under the optimal cooperation strategy and several different payoff sharing rules.

We study in this paper the problem of sharing the cost of a multicast service in a wireless network. In a wireless network, multiple users can decode the same signal of the base station provided the received power exceeds a certain minimum threshold. In this work, the cost for broadcasting is taken to be the transmission power. We begin by proposing various schemes to share the cost, and study their properties. We then study the association problem where an user has options of either joining the multicast group or opting for a unicast connection at a given cost. Next, we extend the association problem to the scenarios with partial information - a user knows his own power requirement, but has to make decision without knowledge of the number of other users in the network and their requirements. The unicast alternative that each mobile has, results in limitations on the coverage (area covered by the multicast service) and the capacity (number of users connected to the multicast service). We derive the expected capacity and coverage as a function of the cost sharing mechanism. We finally extend the model to the case where users have the option of joining any one from a given set of multicast service providers. A user's power requirement depends on its association, but its cost share depends on the association profile of all the users. We study the joint problem of the cost allocation and the equilibrium association.

We study the trade-off between delivery delay and energy consumption in a delay tolerant network in which a message (or a file) has to be delivered to each of several destinations by epidemic relaying. In addition to the destinations, there are several other nodes in the network that can assist in relaying the message. We first assume that, at every instant, all the nodes know the number of relays carrying the packet and the number of destinations that have received the packet. We formulate the problem as a controlled continuous time Markov chain and derive the optimal closed loop control (i.e., forwarding policy). However, in practice, the intermittent connectivity in the network implies that the nodes may not have the required perfect knowledge of the system state. To address this issue, we obtain an ODE (i.e., fluid) approximation for the optimally controlled Markov chain. This fluid approximation also yields an asymptotically optimal open loop policy. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the deterministic policy over finite networks. Numerical results show that this policy performs close to the optimal closed loop policy.

Efficacy of commercial wireless networks can be substantially enhanced through large-scale cooperation among involved entities such as providers and customers. The success of such cooperation is contingent upon the design of judicious resource allocation strategies that ensure that the individuals' payoffs are commensurate to the resources they offer to the coalition. The resource allocation strategies depend on which entities are decision-makers and whether and how they share their aggregate payoffs. Initially, we consider the scenario where the providers are the only decision-makers and they do not share their payoffs. We formulate the resource allocation problem as a nontransferable payoff coalitional game and show that there exists a cooperation strategy that leaves no incentive for any subset of providers to split from the grand coalition, i.e., the core of the game is nonempty. To compute this cooperation strategy and the corresponding payoffs, we subsequently relate this game and its core to an exchange market setting and its equilibrium, which can be computed by several efficient algorithms. Next, we investigate cooperation when customers are also decision-makers and decide which provider to subscribe to based on whether there is cooperation. We formulate a coalitional game in this setting and show that it has a nonempty core. Finally, we extend the formulations and results to the cases where the payoffs are vectors and can be shared selectively.

We study in this paper the question of determining locations of base stations (BSs) that may belong to the same or to competing service providers, taking into account the impact of these decisions on the behavior of intelligent mobile terminals who can connect to the base station that offers the best utility. We first study the SINR association-game: we determine the cells corresponding to each base stations, i.e. the locations at which mobile terminals prefer to connect to a given base station than to other. The signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) is used as the quantity that determines the association. We make some surprising observations: (i) displacing a base station a little in one direction may result in a displacement of the boundary of the corresponding cell to the opposite direction; (ii) A cell corresponding to a BS may be the union of disconnected sub-cells. We then study the Stackelberg equilibrium in the combined BS location and mobile association problem: we determine where to locate the BSs so as to maximize the revenues obtained at the induced SINR mobile association game. We consider the cases of single frequency band and two frequency bands of operation. Finally, we also consider Stackelberg equilibria in two frequency systems with successive interference cancellation.

We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access service to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multi-hop routes. If providers cooperate, i.e., pool their resources, such as spectrum and base stations, and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, can potentially substantially increase through efficient utilization of resources and statistical multiplexing. The potential of such cooperation can however be realized only if each provider intelligently determines who it would cooperate with, when it would cooperate, and how it would share its resources during such cooperation. Also, when the providers share their aggregate revenues, developing a rational basis for such sharing is imperative for the stability of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using transferable payoff coalitional game theory. We first consider the scenario that locations of the base stations and the channels that each provider can use have already been decided apriori. We show that the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the allocations of the channels and the base stations to mobile customers, can be obtained as solutions of convex optimizations. We next show that the grand coalition is stable in this case, i.e. if all providers cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the providers' aggregate payoff, while offering each such a share that removes any incentive to split from the coalition. Next, we show that when the providers can choose the locations of their base stations and decide which channels to acquire, the above results hold in important special cases. Finally, we examine cooperation when providers do not share their payoffs, but still share their resources so as to enhance individual payoffs. We show that the grand coalition continues to be stable.