Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Luca Melis
dblp:20/5104
· DBLP profile ↗
12ranked-venue papers
2as first author
6since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-1946-6578ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 6 · 5 since 2021Security and privacy · 3 · 2 first-authorDatabases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 3 · 1 since 2021Computer networks · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
8 papers |
Privacy and data protection · 84% Security and privacy of machine learning · 14% Malware analysis · 2% | |
| Artificial intelligence
5 papers |
Representation and self-supervised learning · 30% Trustworthy machine learning · 30% Reinforcement learning · 26% | |
| Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper |
Data integration and cleaning · 100% | |
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% |
Topics — the 25 heaviest of 28, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Privacy and data protection
differential privacy |
2.7 | 5 | 2025 | Auditing $f$-differential privacy in one run · ICML 2025 Federated Linear Contextual Bandits with User-level Differential Privacy · ICML 2023 Differentially Private Query Release Through Adaptive Projection · ICML 2021 |
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy › relaxed differential privacy
f-differential privacy |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Auditing $f$-differential privacy in one run · ICML 2025 |
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy
privacy auditing |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Auditing $f$-differential privacy in one run · ICML 2025 |
Machine learning › Representation and self-supervised learning › representation learning › unsupervised representation learning › self-supervised representation learning
masked autoencoder |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | ReMasker: Imputing Tabular Data with Masked Autoencoding · ICLR 2024 |
Machine learning › Representation and self-supervised learning › representation learning › unsupervised representation learning › self-supervised representation learning
masked modeling |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | ReMasker: Imputing Tabular Data with Masked Autoencoding · ICLR 2024 |
Data integration and cleaning › missing data
missing value imputation |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | ReMasker: Imputing Tabular Data with Masked Autoencoding · ICLR 2024 |
Data integration and cleaning › missing data › missing value imputation
tabular data imputation |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | ReMasker: Imputing Tabular Data with Masked Autoencoding · ICLR 2024 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning › bandit
contextual bandit |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Federated Linear Contextual Bandits with User-level Differential Privacy · ICML 2023 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning › bandit › contextual bandit
federated linear contextual bandits |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Federated Linear Contextual Bandits with User-level Differential Privacy · ICML 2023 |
Privacy and data protection › privacy analysis › privacy models
user-level differential privacy |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Federated Linear Contextual Bandits with User-level Differential Privacy · ICML 2023 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › algorithmic mechanism design
online mechanism design |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Federated Linear Contextual Bandits with User-level Differential Privacy · ICML 2023 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial robustness |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Adversarial Robustness with Non-uniform Perturbations · NeurIPS 2021 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › adversarial robustness
adversarial training |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Adversarial Robustness with Non-uniform Perturbations · NeurIPS 2021 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Adversarial Robustness with Non-uniform Perturbations · NeurIPS 2021 |
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy
differentially private query answering |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Differentially Private Query Release Through Adaptive Projection · ICML 2021 |
Machine learning › Generative modeling › generative model
differentially private generative model |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Differentially Private Mixture of Generative Neural Networks · IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng. 2019 |
Privacy and data protection › privacy-preserving machine learning
collaborative learning |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative Learning · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019 |
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy › synthetic data generation
differentially private generative model |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Differentially Private Mixture of Generative Neural Networks · IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng. 2019 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
federated learning |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative Learning · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
membership inference |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative Learning · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › privacy attack
property inference attack |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative Learning · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019 |
Privacy and data protection › privacy-preserving machine learning
training data privacy |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative Learning · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2019 |
Machine learning › Probabilistic and Bayesian machine learning › structured models › latent variable model › discrete latent variable model
generative mixture models |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Differentially Private Mixture of Generative Neural Networks · ICDM 2017 |
Privacy and data protection
privacy-preserving data analysis |
0.2 | 1 | 2016 | Efficient Private Statistics with Succinct Sketches · NDSS 2016 |
Malware analysis
malware classification |
0.1 | 1 | 2021 | Adversarial Robustness with Non-uniform Perturbations · NeurIPS 2021 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
upper and lower regret bounds · 2.0hedge · 2.0self-supervised learning · 1.5masked autoencoding · 1.5robustness certification · 1.0non-uniform perturbation · 1.0f-DP curve analysis · 0.9randomized rounding · 0.5projection mechanism · 0.5adaptive projection · 0.5mixture models · 0.4mixture model · 0.4generative neural networks · 0.4generative neural network · 0.4differentially private kernel k-means · 0.3differentially private gradient descent · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Auditing $f$-differential privacy in one runabstractEmpirical auditing has emerged as a means of catching some of the flaws in the implementation of privacy-preserving algorithms. Existing auditing mechanisms, however, are either computationally inefficient -- requiring multiple runs of the machine learning algorithms —- or suboptimal in calculating an empirical privacy. In this work, we present a tight and efficient auditing procedure and analysis that can effectively assess the privacy of mechanisms. Our approach is efficient; Similar to the recent work of Steinke, Nasr and Jagielski (2023), our auditing procedure leverages the randomness of examples in the input dataset and requires only a single run of the target mechanism. And it is more accurate; we provide a novel analysis that enables us to achieve tight empirical privacy estimates by using the hypothesized $f$-DP curve of the mechanism, which provides a more accurate measure of privacy than the traditional $\epsilon,\delta$ differential privacy parameters. We use our auditing procure and analysis to obtain empirical privacy, demonstrating that our auditing procedure delivers tighter privacy estimates. Saeed Mahloujifar, Luca Melis, Kamalika Chaudhuri |
ICML | 2 |
| 2024 | ReMasker: Imputing Tabular Data with Masked AutoencodingabstractWe present ReMasker, a new method of imputing missing values in tabular data by extending the masked autoencoding framework. Compared with prior work, ReMasker is extremely simple -- besides the missing values (i.e., naturally masked), we randomly "re-mask" another set of values, optimize the autoencoder by reconstructing this re-masked set, and apply the trained model to predict the missing values; and yet highly effective -- with extensive evaluation on benchmark datasets, we show that ReMasker performs on par with or outperforms state-of-the-art methods in terms of both imputation fidelity and utility under various missingness settings, while its performance advantage often increases with the ratio of missing data. We further explore theoretical justification for its effectiveness, showing that ReMasker tends to learn missingness-invariant representations of tabular data. Our findings indicate that masked modeling represents a promising direction for further research on tabular data imputation. The code is publicly available. Tianyu Du, Luca Melis, Ting Wang 0006 |
ICLR | 2 |
| 2023 | Federated Linear Contextual Bandits with User-level Differential PrivacyabstractThis paper studies federated linear contextual bandits under the notion of user-level differential privacy (DP). We first introduce a unified federated bandits framework that can accommodate various definitions of DP in the sequential decision-making setting. We then formally introduce user-level central DP (CDP) and local DP (LDP) in the federated bandits framework, and investigate the fundamental trade-offs between the learning regrets and the corresponding DP guarantees in a federated linear contextual bandits model. For CDP, we propose a federated algorithm termed as $\texttt{ROBIN}$ and show that it is near-optimal in terms of the number of clients $M$ and the privacy budget $\varepsilon$ by deriving nearly-matching upper and lower regret bounds when user-level DP is satisfied. For LDP, we obtain several lower bounds, indicating that learning under user-level $(\varepsilon,\delta)$-LDP must suffer a regret blow-up factor at least $\min\{1/\varepsilon,M\}$ or $\min\{1/\sqrt{\varepsilon},\sqrt{M}\}$ under different conditions. Ruiquan Huang, Luca Melis, Milan Shen, Meisam Hejazinia, Jing Yang 0002 |
ICML | 3 |
| 2022 | Towards Fair Federated Recommendation Learning: Characterizing the Inter-Dependence of System and Data HeterogeneityabstractFederated learning (FL) is an effective mechanism for data privacy in recommender systems that runs machine learning model training on-device. While prior FL optimizations tackled the data and system heterogeneity challenges, they assume the two are independent of each other. This fundamental assumption is not reflective of real-world, large-scale recommender systems — data and system heterogeneity are tightly intertwined. This paper takes a data-driven approach to show the inter-dependence of data and system heterogeneity in real-world data and quantifies its impact on the overall model quality and fairness. We design a framework, RF2, to model the inter-dependence and evaluate its impact on state-of-the-art model optimization techniques for federated recommendation tasks. We demonstrate that the impact on fairness can be severe under realistic heterogeneity scenarios, by up to 15.8–41 × compared to a simple setup assumed in most (if not all) prior work. The result shows that modeling realistic system-induced data heterogeneity is essential to achieving fair federated recommendation learning. Kiwan Maeng, Haiyu Lu, Luca Melis, John Nguyen, Michael G. Rabbat, Carole-Jean Wu |
RecSys | 3 |
| 2021 | Differentially Private Query Release Through Adaptive ProjectionabstractWe propose, implement, and evaluate a new algo-rithm for releasing answers to very large numbersof statistical queries likek-way marginals, sub-ject to differential privacy. Our algorithm makesadaptive use of a continuous relaxation of thePro-jection Mechanism, which answers queries on theprivate dataset using simple perturbation, and thenattempts to find the synthetic dataset that mostclosely matches the noisy answers. We use a con-tinuous relaxation of the synthetic dataset domainwhich makes the projection loss differentiable,and allows us to use efficient ML optimizationtechniques and tooling. Rather than answering allqueries up front, we make judicious use of ourprivacy budget by iteratively finding queries forwhich our (relaxed) synthetic data has high error,and then repeating the projection. Randomizedrounding allows us to obtain synthetic data in theoriginal schema. We perform experimental evalu-ations across a range of parameters and datasets,and find that our method outperforms existingalgorithms on large query classes. Sergül Aydöre, Michael Kearns, Krishnaram Kenthapadi, Luca Melis, Aaron Roth 0001, Amaresh Ankit Siva |
ICML | 5 |
| 2021 | Adversarial Robustness with Non-uniform PerturbationsabstractRobustness of machine learning models is critical for security related applications, where real-world adversaries are uniquely focused on evading neural network based detectors. Prior work mainly focus on crafting adversarial examples (AEs) with small uniform norm-bounded perturbations across features to maintain the requirement of imperceptibility. However, uniform perturbations do not result in realistic AEs in domains such as malware, finance, and social networks. For these types of applications, features typically have some semantically meaningful dependencies. The key idea of our proposed approach is to enable non-uniform perturbations that can adequately represent these feature dependencies during adversarial training. We propose using characteristics of the empirical data distribution, both on correlations between the features and the importance of the features themselves. Using experimental datasets for malware classification, credit risk prediction, and spam detection, we show that our approach is more robust to real-world attacks. Finally, we present robustness certification utilizing non-uniform perturbation bounds, and show that non-uniform bounds achieve better certification. Ece Naz Erdemir, Jeffrey Bickford, Luca Melis, Sergül Aydöre |
NeurIPS | 3 |
| 2019 | Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative LearningabstractCollaborative machine learning and related techniques such as federated learning allow multiple participants, each with his own training dataset, to build a joint model by training locally and periodically exchanging model updates. We demonstrate that these updates leak unintended information about participants' training data and develop passive and active inference attacks to exploit this leakage. First, we show that an adversarial participant can infer the presence of exact data points -- for example, specific locations -- in others' training data (i.e., membership inference). Then, we show how this adversary can infer properties that hold only for a subset of the training data and are independent of the properties that the joint model aims to capture. For example, he can infer when a specific person first appears in the photos used to train a binary gender classifier. We evaluate our attacks on a variety of tasks, datasets, and learning configurations, analyze their limitations, and discuss possible defenses. Luca Melis, Congzheng Song, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Vitaly Shmatikov |
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy | 1 |
| 2019 | Fast privacy-preserving network function outsourcingabstractIn this paper, we present the design and implementation of SplitBox, a system for privacy-preserving processing of network functions outsourced to cloud middleboxes—i.e., without revealing the policies governing these functions. SplitBox is built to provide privacy for a generic network function that abstracts the functionality of a variety of network functions and associated policies, including firewalls, virtual LANs, network address translators (NATs), deep packet inspection , and load balancers. We present a scalable design aiming to provide high throughput and low latency, by distributing functionalities to a few virtual machines (VMs), while providing provably secure guarantees. We implement SplitBox inside FastClick, an extension of the Click modular router, using Intel’s DPDK to handle packet I/O. We evaluate our prototype experimentally to find its bottlenecks and stress-test its different components, vis-à-vis two widely used network functions, i.e., firewall and VLAN tagging. Our evaluation shows that, on commodity hardware, SplitBox can process packets close to line rate (i.e., 8.9Gbps) with up to 50 traversed policies. Hassan Jameel Asghar, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Guillaume Jourjon, Mohamed Ali Kâafar, Laurent Mathy, Luca Melis, Craig Russell, Mang Yu |
Comput. Networks | 6 |
| 2019 | LOGAN: Membership Inference Attacks Against Generative ModelsabstractAbstract Generative models estimate the underlying distribution of a dataset to generate realistic samples according to that distribution. In this paper, we present the first membership inference attacks against generative models: given a data point, the adversary determines whether or not it was used to train the model. Our attacks leverage Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), which combine a discriminative and a generative model, to detect overfitting and recognize inputs that were part of training datasets, using the discriminator’s capacity to learn statistical differences in distributions. We present attacks based on both white-box and black-box access to the target model, against several state-of-the-art generative models, over datasets of complex representations of faces (LFW), objects (CIFAR-10), and medical images (Diabetic Retinopathy). We also discuss the sensitivity of the attacks to different training parameters, and their robustness against mitigation strategies, finding that defenses are either ineffective or lead to significantly worse performances of the generative models in terms of training stability and/or sample quality. Jamie Hayes, Luca Melis, George Danezis, Emiliano De Cristofaro |
Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol. | 2 |
| 2019 | Differentially Private Mixture of Generative Neural Networks
Gergely Ács, Luca Melis, Claude Castelluccia, Emiliano De Cristofaro |
IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng. | 2 |
| 2017 | Differentially Private Mixture of Generative Neural NetworksabstractGenerative models are used in an increasing number of applications that rely on large amounts of contextually rich information about individuals. Owing to possible privacy violations, however, publishing or sharing generative models is not always viable. In this paper, we introduce a novel solution for privately releasing generative models and entire high-dimensional datasets produced by these models. We model the generator distribution of the training data by a mixture of k generative neural networks. These are trained together and collectively learn the generator distribution of a dataset. Data is divided into k clusters, using a novel differentially private kernel k-means, then each cluster is given to separate generative neural networks, such as Restricted Boltzmann Machines or Variational Autoencoders, which are trained only on their own cluster using differentially private gradient descent. We evaluate our approach using the MNIST dataset and a large Call Detail Records dataset, showing that it produces realistic synthetic samples, which can also be used to accurately compute arbitrary number of counting queries. Gergely Ács, Luca Melis, Claude Castelluccia, Emiliano De Cristofaro |
ICDM | 2 |
| 2016 | Efficient Private Statistics with Succinct Sketches
Luca Melis, George Danezis, Emiliano De Cristofaro |
NDSS | 1 |