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Peter Gammie

dblp:20/6956 · DBLP profile ↗
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10ranked-venue papers
6as first author
0since 2021 · last 2015
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 7 · 5 first-authorTheory of computation · 4 · 2 first-authorSecurity and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers
Program verification · 69% Runtime systems and virtual machines · 25% Operating systems · 6%
Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%
Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Automated reasoning and model checking · 67% Logic in computer science · 33%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Memory systems · 100%

Topics — the 10 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Program verification
mechanized verification
0.422015
Relaxing safely: verified on-the-fly garbage collection for x86-TSO · PLDI 2015
seL4: From General Purpose to a Proof of Information Flow Enforcement · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2013
Runtime systems and virtual machines
garbage collection
0.212015
Relaxing safely: verified on-the-fly garbage collection for x86-TSO · PLDI 2015
Program verification
safety verification
0.212015
Relaxing safely: verified on-the-fly garbage collection for x86-TSO · PLDI 2015
Systems and software security › information flow control
information flow enforcement
0.212013
seL4: From General Purpose to a Proof of Information Flow Enforcement · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2013
Systems and software security
operating system security
0.212013
seL4: From General Purpose to a Proof of Information Flow Enforcement · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2013
Memory systems › memory consistency
x86-TSO
0.112015
Relaxing safely: verified on-the-fly garbage collection for x86-TSO · PLDI 2015
Operating systems › kernel › kernel design
microkernel
0.012013
seL4: From General Purpose to a Proof of Information Flow Enforcement · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2013
Automated reasoning and model checking › model checking
epistemic model checking
0.012004
MCK: Model Checking the Logic of Knowledge · CAV 2004
Logic in computer science
modal logic
0.012004
MCK: Model Checking the Logic of Knowledge · CAV 2004
Automated reasoning and model checking
model checking
0.012004
MCK: Model Checking the Logic of Knowledge · CAV 2004

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

machine-checked proof · 0.4intransitive noninterference proof · 0.3formal verification · 0.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2015 Relaxing safely: verified on-the-fly garbage collection for x86-TSO
abstract
We report on a machine-checked verification of safety for a state-of-the-art, on-the-fly, concurrent, mark-sweep garbage collector that is designed for multi-core architectures with weak memory consistency. The proof explicitly incorporates the relaxed memory semantics of x86 multiprocessors. To our knowledge, this is the first fully machine-checked proof of safety for such a garbage collector. We couch the proof in a framework that system implementers will find appealing, with the fundamental components of the system specified in a simple and intuitive programming language. The abstract model is detailed enough for its correspondence with an assembly language implementation to be straightforward.
Peter Gammie, Antony L. Hosking, Kai Engelhardt
PLDI1
2013 seL4: From General Purpose to a Proof of Information Flow Enforcement
abstract
In contrast to testing, mathematical reasoning and formal verification can show the absence of whole classes of security vulnerabilities. We present the, to our knowledge, first complete, formal, machine-checked verification of information flow security for the implementation of a general-purpose microkernel; namely seL4. Unlike previous proofs of information flow security for operating system kernels, ours applies to the actual 8, 830 lines of C code that implement seL4, and so rules out the possibility of invalidation by implementation errors in this code. We assume correctness of compiler, assembly code, hardware, and boot code. We prove everything else. This proof is strong evidence of seL4's utility as a separation kernel, and describes precisely how the general purpose kernel should be configured to enforce isolation and mandatory information flow control. We describe the information flow security statement we proved (a variant of intransitive noninterference), including the assumptions on which it rests, as well as the modifications that had to be made to seL4 to ensure it was enforced. We discuss the practical limitations and implications of this result, including covert channels not covered by the formal proof.
Toby C. Murray, Daniel Matichuk, Matthew Brassil, Peter Gammie, Timothy Bourke, Sean Seefried, Corey Lewis, Gerwin Klein
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy4
2012 Noninterference for Operating System Kernels
Toby C. Murray, Daniel Matichuk, Matthew Brassil, Peter Gammie, Gerwin Klein
CPP4
2011 Provable Security: How Feasible Is It?
Gerwin Klein, Toby C. Murray, Peter Gammie, Thomas Sewell, Simon Winwood
HotOS3
2011 Verified Synthesis of Knowledge-Based Programs in Finite Synchronous Environments
Peter Gammie
ITP1
2011 seL4 Enforces Integrity
Thomas Sewell, Simon Winwood, Peter Gammie, Toby C. Murray, June Andronick, Gerwin Klein
ITP3
2011 Review: Lambda-Calculus and Combinators: An Introduction, Second Edition by J. R. Hindley and J. P. Seldin
Peter Gammie
J. Funct. Program.1
2011 Short note: Strict unwraps make worker/wrapper fusion totally correct
abstract
Abstract The worker/wrapper transformation is a general way of changing the type of a recursive definition, usually applied with an eye to increasing algorithmic efficiency. This note identifies an infelicity in the program transformations presented by Gill & Hutton (The worker/wrapper transformation, J. Funct. Program ., vol. 19, 2009, pp. 227–251) and proposes a new totally correct worker/wrapper fusion rule.
Peter Gammie
J. Funct. Program.1
2009 Peter Van Roy and Seif Haridi. Concepts, Techniques, and Models of Computer Programming. The MIT Press, 2004. ISBN: 0262220695 Price $70. 930pp
Peter Gammie
J. Funct. Program.1
2004 MCK: Model Checking the Logic of Knowledge
Peter Gammie, Ron van der Meyden
CAV1