EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Peter Gammie
dblp:20/6956
· DBLP profile ↗
10ranked-venue papers
6as first author
0since 2021 · last 2015
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 7 · 5 first-authorTheory of computation · 4 · 2 first-authorSecurity and privacy · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers |
Program verification · 69% Runtime systems and virtual machines · 25% Operating systems · 6% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Systems and software security · 100% | |
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Automated reasoning and model checking · 67% Logic in computer science · 33% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper |
Memory systems · 100% |
Topics — the 10 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Program verification
mechanized verification |
0.4 | 2 | 2015 | Relaxing safely: verified on-the-fly garbage collection for x86-TSO · PLDI 2015 seL4: From General Purpose to a Proof of Information Flow Enforcement · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2013 |
Runtime systems and virtual machines
garbage collection |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Relaxing safely: verified on-the-fly garbage collection for x86-TSO · PLDI 2015 |
Program verification
safety verification |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Relaxing safely: verified on-the-fly garbage collection for x86-TSO · PLDI 2015 |
Systems and software security › information flow control
information flow enforcement |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | seL4: From General Purpose to a Proof of Information Flow Enforcement · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2013 |
Systems and software security
operating system security |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | seL4: From General Purpose to a Proof of Information Flow Enforcement · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2013 |
Memory systems › memory consistency
x86-TSO |
0.1 | 1 | 2015 | Relaxing safely: verified on-the-fly garbage collection for x86-TSO · PLDI 2015 |
Operating systems › kernel › kernel design
microkernel |
0.0 | 1 | 2013 | seL4: From General Purpose to a Proof of Information Flow Enforcement · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2013 |
Automated reasoning and model checking › model checking
epistemic model checking |
0.0 | 1 | 2004 | MCK: Model Checking the Logic of Knowledge · CAV 2004 |
Logic in computer science
modal logic |
0.0 | 1 | 2004 | MCK: Model Checking the Logic of Knowledge · CAV 2004 |
Automated reasoning and model checking
model checking |
0.0 | 1 | 2004 | MCK: Model Checking the Logic of Knowledge · CAV 2004 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
machine-checked proof · 0.4intransitive noninterference proof · 0.3formal verification · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | Relaxing safely: verified on-the-fly garbage collection for x86-TSOabstractWe report on a machine-checked verification of safety for a state-of-the-art, on-the-fly, concurrent, mark-sweep garbage collector that is designed for multi-core architectures with weak memory consistency. The proof explicitly incorporates the relaxed memory semantics of x86 multiprocessors. To our knowledge, this is the first fully machine-checked proof of safety for such a garbage collector. We couch the proof in a framework that system implementers will find appealing, with the fundamental components of the system specified in a simple and intuitive programming language. The abstract model is detailed enough for its correspondence with an assembly language implementation to be straightforward. Peter Gammie, Antony L. Hosking, Kai Engelhardt |
PLDI | 1 |
| 2013 | seL4: From General Purpose to a Proof of Information Flow EnforcementabstractIn contrast to testing, mathematical reasoning and formal verification can show the absence of whole classes of security vulnerabilities. We present the, to our knowledge, first complete, formal, machine-checked verification of information flow security for the implementation of a general-purpose microkernel; namely seL4. Unlike previous proofs of information flow security for operating system kernels, ours applies to the actual 8, 830 lines of C code that implement seL4, and so rules out the possibility of invalidation by implementation errors in this code. We assume correctness of compiler, assembly code, hardware, and boot code. We prove everything else. This proof is strong evidence of seL4's utility as a separation kernel, and describes precisely how the general purpose kernel should be configured to enforce isolation and mandatory information flow control. We describe the information flow security statement we proved (a variant of intransitive noninterference), including the assumptions on which it rests, as well as the modifications that had to be made to seL4 to ensure it was enforced. We discuss the practical limitations and implications of this result, including covert channels not covered by the formal proof. Toby C. Murray, Daniel Matichuk, Matthew Brassil, Peter Gammie, Timothy Bourke, Sean Seefried, Corey Lewis, Gerwin Klein |
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy | 4 |
| 2012 | Noninterference for Operating System Kernels
Toby C. Murray, Daniel Matichuk, Matthew Brassil, Peter Gammie, Gerwin Klein |
CPP | 4 |
| 2011 | Provable Security: How Feasible Is It?
Gerwin Klein, Toby C. Murray, Peter Gammie, Thomas Sewell, Simon Winwood |
HotOS | 3 |
| 2011 | Verified Synthesis of Knowledge-Based Programs in Finite Synchronous Environments
Peter Gammie |
ITP | 1 |
| 2011 | seL4 Enforces Integrity
Thomas Sewell, Simon Winwood, Peter Gammie, Toby C. Murray, June Andronick, Gerwin Klein |
ITP | 3 |
| 2011 | Review: Lambda-Calculus and Combinators: An Introduction, Second Edition by J. R. Hindley and J. P. Seldin
Peter Gammie |
J. Funct. Program. | 1 |
| 2011 | Short note: Strict unwraps make worker/wrapper fusion totally correctabstractAbstract The worker/wrapper transformation is a general way of changing the type of a recursive definition, usually applied with an eye to increasing algorithmic efficiency. This note identifies an infelicity in the program transformations presented by Gill & Hutton (The worker/wrapper transformation, J. Funct. Program ., vol. 19, 2009, pp. 227–251) and proposes a new totally correct worker/wrapper fusion rule. Peter Gammie |
J. Funct. Program. | 1 |
| 2009 | Peter Van Roy and Seif Haridi. Concepts, Techniques, and Models of Computer Programming. The MIT Press, 2004. ISBN: 0262220695 Price $70. 930pp
Peter Gammie |
J. Funct. Program. | 1 |
| 2004 | MCK: Model Checking the Logic of Knowledge
Peter Gammie, Ron van der Meyden |
CAV | 1 |