The simultaneous use of FPGAs by multiple tenants has recently been shown to potentially expose sensitive information without the victim's knowledge. For example, neighboring long wires in SRAM-based FPGAs have been shown to allow for clandestine data exfiltration. In this work, we explore distinct characteristics of this signal crosstalk that could be used to enhance or prevent information leakage. First, we develop a mechanism to characterize the crosstalk coupling that exists between neighboring wires at the femtosecond scale. Second, we show that it is possible to reverse engineer channel layouts by determining which pairs of routing resources/links in the channel exhibit coupling to each other even if this information is not provided by the FPGA vendor. To fully characterize these effects, we examine long wire coupling on different types of wires across three devices implemented in different technology nodes from 65 to 20 nm. We experimentally demonstrate that information leakage is apparent for all three FPGA families.

Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are used for a wide variety of computations in low-cost embedded systems. Although these systems often have modest performance constraints, their energy consumption must typically be limited. Many FPGA applications employ repetitive loops that cannot be straightforwardly split into parallel computations. Performing a loop sequentially generally requires high-speed clocks that consume considerable clock power and sometimes require clock generation using a phase-locked loop (PLL). Loop unrolling addresses the high-speed clock issue, but its use often leads to significant combinational glitch power. In this work, a computer-aided design (CAD) approach that unrolls loops for designs targeted to low-cost FPGAs is described. Our approach considers latency constraints in an effort to minimize energy consumption for loop-based computation. To reduce glitch power, a glitch-filtering approach is introduced that provides a balance between glitch reduction and design performance. Glitch-filter enable signals are generated and routed to the filters using resources best suited to the target FPGA. Our approach automatically inserts glitch filters and associated control logic into a design prior to processing with FPGA synthesis, place, and route tools. Our energy-saving loop-unrolling approach has been evaluated using five benchmarks often used in low-cost FPGAs. The energy-saving capabilities of the approach have been evaluated for an Intel Cyclone IV and a Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA using board-level power measurement. The use of unrolling and glitch filtering is shown to reduce energy by at least 65% for an Artix-7 device and 50% for a Cyclone IV device while meeting design latency constraints.

In this paper, a heuristic routing algorithm that is tuned for routing traffic in hybrid FPGA NoCs is presented. This multi-iteration routing algorithm requires a limited amount of hardware for prescheduled stream-based routing while allowing for bandwidth-optimized usage of NoC routing resources. By efficiently scheduling data streams, the remaining NoC bandwidth can be used for bursty, packet-switched traffic. We demonstrate our approach using a hybrid NoC and show an average 11% data stream bandwidth improvement for a collection of five benchmark traffic patterns.

As FPGA use becomes more diverse, the shared use of these devices becomes a security concern. Multi-tenant FPGAs that contain circuits from multiple independent sources or users will soon be prevalent in cloud and embedded computing environments. The recent discovery of a new attack vector using neighboring long wires in Xilinx SRAM FPGAs presents the possibility of covert information leakage from an unsuspecting user's circuit. The work described in this paper makes two contributions that dramatically extend this finding. First, we rigorously evaluate several Intel SRAM FPGAs and confirm that long wire information leakage is also prevalent in these devices. Second, we present the first successful attack on an unsuspecting circuit in an FPGA using information passively obtained from neighboring long-lines. Information obtained from a single AES S-box input wire combined with analysis of encrypted output is used to rapidly expose an AES key. This attack is performed remotely without modifying the victim circuit, using electromagnetic probes or power measurements, or modifying the FPGA in any way. We show that our approach is effective for three different FPGA devices. Our results demonstrate that the attack can recover encryption keys from AES circuits running at 10MHz, and has the capability to scale to much higher frequencies.

Many FPGA computations, including block ciphers, require repetitive loop operations that are difficult to parallelize. Sequential loop implementation leads to significant clock power while loop unrolling can lead to significant glitch power. In this paper, we provide a low overhead approach to unroll block ciphers and other loops in low-cost FPGAs to reduce energy consumption. A latch-based glitch filter is introduced for unrolled loops that reduces loop energy per operation by over an order of magnitude. Our filters and associated control for unrolled loops can be automatically instantiated as a macro for FPGA designs, allowing for easy designer use. We demonstrate our approach for SIMON-128 and AES-256 block ciphers implemented on a Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA.