Kathrin Hövelmanns

dblp:203/4219 · DBLP profile ↗
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11ranked-venue papers
4as first author
9since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0002-5478-0140ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 11 · 4 first-author · 9 since 2021Theory of computation · 2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Starfighters-On the General Applicability of X-Wing
Deirdre Connolly, Kathrin Hövelmanns, Andreas Hülsing, Stavros Kousidis, Matthias Meijers
SP2
2025 Verifiable Decapsulation: Recognizing Faulty Implementations of Post-quantum KEMs
Lewis Glabush, Felix Günther 0001, Kathrin Hövelmanns, Douglas Stebila
CRYPTO (3)3
2025 (Un)breakable Curses - Re-encryption in the Fujisaki-Okamoto Transform
Kathrin Hövelmanns, Andreas Hülsing, Christian Majenz, Fabrizio Sisinni
EUROCRYPT (2)1
2025 Treating Dishonest Ciphertexts in Post-quantum KEMs - Explicit vs. Implicit Rejection in the FO Transform
Kathrin Hövelmanns, Mikhail A. Kudinov
PQCrypto (2)1
2024 Towards Post-quantum Secure PAKE - A Tight Security Proof for OCAKE in the BPR Model
Nouri Alnahawi, Kathrin Hövelmanns, Andreas Hülsing, Silvia Ritsch
CANS (2)2
2024 A Note on Failing Gracefully: Completing the Picture for Explicitly Rejecting Fujisaki-Okamoto Transforms Using Worst-Case Correctness
Kathrin Hövelmanns, Christian Majenz
PQCrypto (2)1
2022 Failing Gracefully: Decryption Failures and the Fujisaki-Okamoto Transform
Kathrin Hövelmanns, Andreas Hülsing, Christian Majenz
ASIACRYPT (4)1
2021 Tight Adaptive Reprogramming in the QROM
Alex Bredariol Grilo, Kathrin Hövelmanns, Andreas Hülsing, Christian Majenz
ASIACRYPT (1)2
2021 Faster Lattice-Based KEMs via a Generic Fujisaki-Okamoto Transform Using Prefix Hashing
abstract
Constructing an efficient CCA-secure KEM is generally done by first constructing a passively-secure PKE scheme, and then applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transformation. The original FO transformation was designed to offer security in a single user setting. A stronger notion, known as multi-user security, considers the attacker's advantage in breaking one of many user's ciphertexts. Bellare et al. (EUROCRYPT 2000) showed that standard single user security implies multi-user security with a multiplicative tightness gap equivalent to the number of users.
Julien Duman, Kathrin Hövelmanns, Eike Kiltz, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Gregor Seiler
CCS2
2019 Tighter Proofs of CCA Security in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
Nina Bindel, Michael Hamburg, Kathrin Hövelmanns, Andreas Hülsing, Edoardo Persichetti
TCC (2)3
2017 A Modular Analysis of the Fujisaki-Okamoto Transformation
Dennis Hofheinz, Kathrin Hövelmanns, Eike Kiltz
TCC (1)2