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Kirill Nikitin 0001

dblp:203/4231 · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
2as first author
1since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0002-0926-6943ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 4 · 2 first-author · 1 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 72% Systems and software security · 19% Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 9%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
2 papers
Distributed systems · 100%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
private information retrieval
0.712023
Authenticated private information retrieval · USENIX Security Symposium 2023
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems › zero-knowledge proofs
succinct arguments
0.412020
Replicated state machines without replicated execution · SP 2020
Distributed systems › fault tolerance
byzantine fault tolerance
0.412020
Replicated state machines without replicated execution · SP 2020
Distributed systems › replication
state machine replication
0.412020
Replicated state machines without replicated execution · SP 2020
Systems and software security › software supply chain security
software update security
0.312017
CHAINIAC: Proactive Software-Update Transparency via Collectively Signed Skipchains and Verified Builds · USENIX Security Symposium 2017
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security
blockchain scalability
0.112020
Replicated state machines without replicated execution · SP 2020
Distributed systems
consensus
0.112017
CHAINIAC: Proactive Software-Update Transparency via Collectively Signed Skipchains and Verified Builds · USENIX Security Symposium 2017

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

succinct cryptographic proofs · 0.9verified builds · 0.6skipchains · 0.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 Authenticated private information retrieval
Simone Colombo 0002, Kirill Nikitin 0001, Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, David J. Wu 0001, Bryan Ford
USENIX Security Symposium2
2020 Replicated state machines without replicated execution
abstract
This paper introduces a new approach to reduce end-to-end costs in large-scale replicated systems built under a Byzantine fault model. Specifically, our approach transforms a given replicated state machine (RSM) to another RSM where nodes incur lower costs by delegating state machine execution: an untrusted prover produces succinct cryptographic proofs of correct state transitions along with state changes, which nodes in the transformed RSM verify and apply respectively.To realize our approach, we build Piperine, a system that makes the proof machinery profitable in the context of RSMs. Specifically, Piperine reduces the costs of both proving and verifying the correctness of state machine execution while retaining liveness-a distinctive requirement in the context of RSMs. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates that, for a payment service, employing Piperine is more profitable than naive reexecution of transactions as long as there are > 104nodes. When we apply Piperine to ERC-20 transactions in Ethereum (a real-world RSM with up to 105nodes), it reduces per-transaction costs by 5.4× and network costs by 2.7×.
Jonathan Lee 0003, Kirill Nikitin 0001, Srinath Setty
SP2
2019 Reducing Metadata Leakage from Encrypted Files and Communication with PURBs
abstract
Most encrypted data formats leak metadata via their plaintext headers, such as format version, encryption schemes used, number of recipients who can decrypt the data, and even the recipients’ identities. This leakage can pose security and privacy risks to users, e.g., by revealing the full membership of a group of collaborators from a single encrypted e-mail, or by enabling an eavesdropper to fingerprint the precise encryption software version and configuration the sender used.
Kirill Nikitin 0001, Ludovic Barman, Wouter Lueks, Matthew Underwood, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Bryan Ford
Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol.1
2017 CHAINIAC: Proactive Software-Update Transparency via Collectively Signed Skipchains and Verified Builds
Kirill Nikitin 0001, Eleftherios Kokoris-Kogias, Philipp Jovanovic, Nicolas Gailly, Linus Gasser, Ismail Khoffi, Justin Cappos, Bryan Ford
USENIX Security Symposium1
2017 Axiom: DTLS-Based Secure IoT Group Communication
abstract
This article presents Axiom, a DTLS-based approach to efficiently secure multicast group communication among IoT-constrained devices. Axiom provides an adaptation of the DTLS record layer, relies on key material commonly shared among the group members, and does not require one to perform any DTLS handshake. We made a proof-of-concept implementation of Axiom based on the tinyDTLS library for the Contiki OS and used it to experimentally evaluate performance of our approach on real IoT hardware. Results show that Axiom is affordable on resource-constrained platforms and performs significantly better than related alternative approaches.
Marco Tiloca, Kirill Nikitin 0001, Shahid Raza
ACM Trans. Embed. Comput. Syst.2