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Oliver J. Sutton

dblp:203/4297 · DBLP profile ↗
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8ranked-venue papers
4as first author
8since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0003-0184-4371ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 7 · 4 first-author · 7 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
2 papers
Language models and text generation · 58% Trustworthy machine learning · 33% Deep learning architectures and training · 9%
Network and information security
2 papers
Security and privacy of machine learning · 57% Cyber-physical and IoT security · 43%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › model security
model watermarking
0.912025
Staining and Locking Computer Vision Models Without Retraining · ICCV 2025
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
knowledge editing
0.812024
Stealth edits to large language models · NeurIPS 2024
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
language model editing
0.812024
Stealth edits to large language models · NeurIPS 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning › poisoning attack
model weight attack
0.812024
Stealth edits to large language models · NeurIPS 2024
Cyber-physical and IoT security
stealthy attack
0.812024
Stealth edits to large language models · NeurIPS 2024
Security and privacy of machine learning
model stealing
0.312025
Staining and Locking Computer Vision Models Without Retraining · ICCV 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

model staining · 1.7weight editing · 1.5jet-pack network block · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Staining and Locking Computer Vision Models Without Retraining
Oliver J. Sutton, George Leete, Alexander N. Gorban, Ivan Tyukin
ICCV1
2024 Weakly Supervised Learners for Correction of AI Errors with Provable Performance Guarantees
abstract
We present a new methodology for handling errors of Artificial Intelligence (AI) by introducing weakly supervised AI error correctors with a priori performance guarantees. These AI correctors are auxiliary maps whose role is to moderate the decisions of some previously constructed underlying classifier by either approving or rejecting its decisions. The rejection of a decision can be used as a signal to suggest abstaining from making a decision. A key technical focus of the work is in providing performance guarantees for these new AI correctors through bounds on the probabilities of incorrect decisions. These bounds are distribution agnostic and do not rely on assumptions on the data dimension. Our empirical example illustrates how the framework can be applied to improve the performance of an image classifier in a challenging real-world task where training data are scarce.
Ivan Tyukin, Tatiana Tyukina, Daniel van Helden, Zedong Zheng, Eugenij Moiseevich Mirkes, Oliver J. Sutton, Alexander N. Gorban, Penelope M. Allison
IJCNN6
2024 Stealth edits to large language models
abstract
We reveal the theoretical foundations of techniques for editing large language models, and present new methods which can do so without requiring retraining. Our theoretical insights show that a single metric (a measure of the intrinsic dimension of the model's features) can be used to assess a model's editability and reveals its previously unrecognised susceptibility to malicious *stealth attacks*. This metric is fundamental to predicting the success of a variety of editing approaches, and reveals new bridges between disparate families of editing methods. We collectively refer to these as *stealth editing* methods, because they directly update a model's weights to specify its response to specific known hallucinating prompts without affecting other model behaviour. By carefully applying our theoretical insights, we are able to introduce a new *jet-pack* network block which is optimised for highly selective model editing, uses only standard network operations, and can be inserted into existing networks. We also reveal the vulnerability of language models to stealth attacks: a small change to a model's weights which fixes its response to a single attacker-chosen prompt. Stealth attacks are computationally simple, do not require access to or knowledge of the model's training data, and therefore represent a potent yet previously unrecognised threat to redistributed foundation models. Extensive experimental results illustrate and support our methods and their theoretical underpinnings. Demos and source code are available at https://github.com/qinghua-zhou/stealth-edits.
Oliver J. Sutton, Wei Wang 0357, Desmond J. Higham, Alexander N. Gorban, Alexander Bastounis, Ivan Tyukin
NeurIPS1
2024 Coping with AI errors with provable guarantees
abstract
AI errors pose a significant challenge, hindering real-world applications. This work introduces a novel approach to cope with AI errors using weakly supervised error correctors that guarantee a specific level of error reduction. Our correctors have low computational cost and can be used to decide whether to abstain from making an unsafe classification. We provide new upper and lower bounds on the probability of errors in the corrected system. In contrast to existing works, these bounds are distribution agnostic, non-asymptotic, and can be efficiently computed just using the corrector training data. They also can be used in settings with concept drifts when the observed frequencies of separate classes vary. The correctors can easily be updated, removed, or replaced in response to changes in distributions within each class without retraining the underlying classifier. The application of the approach is illustrated with two relevant challenging tasks: (i) an image classification problem with scarce training data, and (ii) moderating responses of large language models without retraining or otherwise fine-tuning.
Ivan Tyukin, Tatiana Tyukina, Daniël P. van Helden, Zedong Zheng, Eugenij Moiseevich Mirkes, Oliver J. Sutton, Alexander N. Gorban, Penelope M. Allison
Inf. Sci.6
2024 How adversarial attacks can disrupt seemingly stable accurate classifiers
abstract
Adversarial attacks dramatically change the output of an otherwise accurate learning system using a seemingly inconsequential modification to a piece of input data. Paradoxically, empirical evidence indicates that even systems which are robust to large random perturbations of the input data remain susceptible to small, easily constructed, adversarial perturbations of their inputs. Here, we show that this may be seen as a fundamental feature of classifiers working with high dimensional input data. We introduce a simple generic and generalisable framework for which key behaviours observed in practical systems arise with high probability-notably the simultaneous susceptibility of the (otherwise accurate) model to easily constructed adversarial attacks, and robustness to random perturbations of the input data. We confirm that the same phenomena are directly observed in practical neural networks trained on standard image classification problems, where even large additive random noise fails to trigger the adversarial instability of the network. A surprising takeaway is that even small margins separating a classifier's decision surface from training and testing data can hide adversarial susceptibility from being detected using randomly sampled perturbations. Counter-intuitively, using additive noise during training or testing is therefore inefficient for eradicating or detecting adversarial examples, and more demanding adversarial training is required.
Oliver J. Sutton, Ivan Tyukin, Alexander N. Gorban, Alexander Bastounis, Desmond J. Higham
Neural Networks1
2023 The Boundaries of Verifiable Accuracy, Robustness, and Generalisation in Deep Learning
Alexander Bastounis, Alexander N. Gorban, Anders C. Hansen, Desmond J. Higham, Danil V. Prokhorov, Oliver J. Sutton, Ivan Tyukin
ICANN (1)6
2023 Relative Intrinsic Dimensionality Is Intrinsic to Learning
Oliver J. Sutton, Alexander N. Gorban, Ivan Tyukin
ICANN (1)1
2023 Neuromorphic tuning of feature spaces to overcome the challenge of low-sample high-dimensional data
abstract
For learning algorithms, accessing large volumes of annotated data is highly desirable but not always available, especially in real-world scenarios. Accordingly, learning in the high-dimensional and low-sample size (HDLS) domain is recognised as one of the core challenges for modern AI systems. In this work, we consider a particular but very practical scenario in the HDLS domain where the number of training samples is not limited to mere few observations but yet it is not large enough to reliably build models with high degrees of expressivity. To address the problem, we present a new neuromorphic algorithm capable of fine-tuning existing feature spaces via learning relevant associations in high dimensional data with high probability. The algorithm is based on the idea of Concept Cells [1] and mimics properties attributed to memory and learning inherent to live neural systems. We demonstrate, through numerous numerical experiments, that the algorithm can “fine-tune” and “adapt” the feature space of pre-trained neural networks for better performance on new tasks in the HDLS domain. In addition, we study the impact of this “tuning” on quasi-orthogonal measures, which correlates with classification and calibration metrics.
Oliver J. Sutton, Yudong Zhang 0001, Alexander N. Gorban, Valeri A. Makarov, Ivan Tyukin
IJCNN2