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Abhiram Balasubramanian

dblp:204/3567 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 1Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Operating systems · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Operating systems › system security › operating system security › protection mechanism › isolation
kernel isolation
0.412019
LXDs: Towards Isolation of Kernel Subsystems · USENIX ATC 2019
Systems and software security
operating system security
0.112019
LXDs: Towards Isolation of Kernel Subsystems · USENIX ATC 2019

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

isolation · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2019 LXDs: Towards Isolation of Kernel Subsystems
Vikram Narayanan, Abhiram Balasubramanian, Charlie Jacobsen, Sarah Spall, Scotty Bauer, Michael Quigley, Aftab Hussain 0001, Abdullah Younis, Junjie Shen 0001, Moinak Bhattacharyya, Anton Burtsev
USENIX ATC2
2017 System Programming in Rust: Beyond Safety
abstract
Rust is a new system programming language that offers a practical and safe alternative to C. Rust is unique in that it enforces safety without runtime overhead, most importantly, without the overhead of garbage collection. While zero-cost safety is remarkable on its own, we argue that the superpowers of Rust go beyond safety. In particular, Rust's linear type system enables capabilities that cannot be implemented efficiently in traditional languages, both safe and unsafe, and that dramatically improve security and reliability of system software. We show three examples of such capabilities: zero-copy software fault isolation, efficient static information flow analysis, and automatic checkpointing. While these capabilities have been in the spotlight of systems research for a long time, their practical use is hindered by high cost and complexity. We argue that with the adoption of Rust these mechanisms will become commoditized.
Abhiram Balasubramanian, Marek S. Baranowski, Anton Burtsev, Aurojit Panda, Zvonimir Rakamaric, Leonid Ryzhyk
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