Aone-message unilateral entity authentication schemeallows one party, called theprover, to authenticate himself, i.e., to prove his identity, to another party, called theverifier, by sending a singleauthentication message. We consider schemes where the prover and the verifier do not share any secret information, such as a password, in advance. We propose thefirst theoretical characterizationfor one-message unilateral entity authentication schemes, by formalizing the security requirements for such schemes with respect to different kinds ofpassiveandactiveadversarial behaviours. In particular, we consider bothstaticandadaptiveadversaries for each kind of attack (passive/active). Afterwards, we explore the relationships between the security notions resulting from different adversarial behaviours for one-message unilateral entity authentication schemes. Finally, we propose three different constructions for one-message unilateral entity authentication schemes and we analyze their security with respect to the different definitions introduced in this paper.

A one-message unilateral entity authentication scheme allows one party, called the prover, to authenticate himself, i.e., to prove his identity, to another party, called the verifier, by sending a single authentication message.