Privacy-preserving machine learning has become an important long-term pursuit in this era of artificial intelligence (AI). Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is a uniquely promising solution, offering provable privacy and security guarantees. Unfortunately, computational cost is impeding its mass adoption. Modern solutions are up to six orders of magnitude slower than plaintext execution. Understanding and reducing this overhead is essential to the advancement of FHE, particularly as the underlying algorithms evolve rapidly. This paper presents a detailed characterization of OpenFHE, a comprehensive open-source library for FHE, with a particular focus on the CKKS scheme due to its significant potential for AI and machine learning applications. We introduce CryptOracle, a modular evaluation framework comprising (1) a benchmark suite, (2) a hardware profiler, and (3) a predictive performance model. The benchmark suite encompasses OpenFHE kernels at three abstraction levels: workloads, microbenchmarks, and primitives. The profiler is compatible with standard and user-specified security parameters. CryptOracle monitors application performance, captures microarchitectural events, and logs power and energy usage for AMD and Intel systems. These metrics are consumed by a modeling engine to estimate runtime and energy efficiency across different configuration scenarios, with prediction error ranging from $-7.02 \% \sim 8.40 \%$ for runtime and $-9.74 \% \sim 15.67 \%$ for energy (geomean). CryptOracle is open source, fully modular, and serves as a shared platform to facilitate the collaborative advancements of applications, algorithms, software, and hardware in FHE. The CryptOracle code can be accessed at https://github.com/UnaryLab/CryptOracle.

Trace-based simulation is a widely used methodology for system design exploration. It relies on realistic traces that represent a range of behaviors necessary to be evaluated, containing a lot of information about the application, its inputs and the underlying system on which it was generated. Consequently, generating traces from real-world executions risks leakage of sensitive information. To prevent this, traces can be obfuscated before release. However, this can undermine their ideal utility, i.e., how realistically a program behavior was captured. To address this, we propose Camouflage, a novel obfuscation framework, designed with awareness of the necessary architectural properties required to preserve trace utility , while ensuring secrecy of the inputs used to generate the trace. Focusing on memory access traces, our extensive evaluation on various benchmarks shows that camouflaged traces preserve the performance measurements of the original execution, with an average τ correlation of 0.66. We model input secrecy as an input indistinguishability problem and show that the average security loss is 7.8%, which is better than traces generated from the state-of-the-art.

Although approximate computing promises better performance for applications allowing marginal errors, dearth of hardware support and lack of run-time accuracy guarantees makes it difficult to adopt. We present As-Is, an Anytime Speculative Interruptible System that takes an approximate program and executes it with time-proportional approximations. That is, an approximate version of the program output is generated early and is gradually refined over time, thus providing the run-time guarantee of eventually reaching 100% accuracy. The novelty of our As-Is architecture is in its ability to conceptually marry approximate computing and speculative computing. We show how existing innovations in speculative architectures can be repurposed for anytime, best-effort approximation, facilitating the design efforts and overheads needed for approximate hardware support. As-Is provides a platform for real-time constraints and interactive users to interrupt programs early and accept their current approximate results as is. 100% accuracy is always guaranteed if more time can be spared. Our evaluations demonstrate favorable performance-accuracy tradeoffs for a range of approximate applications.

SRAM-based PUFs (SPUFs) have emerged as promising security primitives for low-power devices. However, operating 8T-SPUFs at Near-Threshold Computing (NTC) realm is plagued by exacerbated process variation (PV) sensitivity which thwarts their reliable operation. In this paper, we demonstrate the massive degradation in the reliability and uniformity characteristics of 8T-SPUF. By exploiting the opportunities bestowed by schematic asymmetry of 8T-SPUF cells, we propose biasing and sizing based design strategies. Our techniques achieve an immense improvement of more than 55% in the percentage of unreliable cells and improves the proximity to ideal uniformity by 82%, over a baseline NTC 8T-SPUF with no enhancement.