Parameter-efficient transfer learning (PETL) has emerged as a pivotal paradigm for adapting pre-trained foundation models to downstream tasks, significantly reducing trainable parameters yet suffering from substantial memory overhead caused by gradient backpropagation during fine-tuning. While memory-efficient transfer learning (METL) circumvents this challenge by bypassing backbone gradient computation via lightweight small side networks, its stringent memory constraint severely limits learning capacity of side networks, thereby significantly compromising performance. To address these limitations, we propose a novel Mixed-Precision Interactive Side Mixture-of-Experts framework (MP-ISMoE). Specifically, we first propose an Gaussian Noise Perturbed Iterative Quantization (GNP-IQ) scheme to quantize weights into lower-bits while effectively decreasing quantization errors. By leveraging memory conserved from GNP-IQ, we subsequently employ Interactive Side Mixture-of-Experts (ISMoE) to scale up side networks without sacrificing overall memory efficiency. Different from conventional mixture-of-experts, ISMoE learns to select optimal experts by interacting with salient features from frozen backbones, thus suppressing knowledge forgetting and boosting performance. Extensive experiments across diverse vision-language and language-only tasks demonstrate that MP-ISMoE remarkably promotes accuracy compared to state-of-the-art METL approaches, while maintaining comparable parameter and memory efficiency.

While advertising has become commonplace in today's online interactions, there is a notable dearth of research investigating the extent to which browser fingerprinting is harnessed for user tracking and targeted advertising. Prior studies only measured whether fingerprinting-related scripts are being run on the websites but that in itself does not necessarily mean that fingerprinting is being used for the privacy-invasive purpose of online tracking because fingerprinting might be deployed for the defensive purposes of bot/fraud detection and user authentication. It is imperative to address the mounting concerns regarding the utilization of browser fingerprinting in the realm of online advertising.

Timing attacks have been a continuous threat to users' privacy in modern browsers. To mitigate such attacks, existing approaches, such as Tor Browser and Fermata, add jitters to the browser clock so that an attacker cannot accurately measure an event. However, such defenses only raise the bar for an attacker but do not fundamentally mitigate timing attacks, i.e., it just takes longer than previous to launch a timing attack. In this paper, we propose a novel approach, called deterministic browser, which can provably prevent timing attacks in modern browsers. Borrowing from Physics, we introduce several concepts, such as an observer and a reference frame. Specifically, a snippet of JavaScript, i.e., an observer in JavaScript reference frame, will always obtain the same, fixed timing information so that timing attacks are prevented; at contrast, a user, i.e., an oracle observer, will perceive the JavaScript differently and do not experience the performance slowdown. We have implemented a prototype called DeterFox and our evaluation shows that the prototype can defend against browser-related timing attacks.