Stacked intelligent metasurfaces (SIMs) represent a key enabler for next-generation wireless networks, offering beamforming gains while significantly reducing the number of radio-frequency chains. In conventional space-only (S-only) SIM architectures, the rate of reconfigurability of the SIM is equal to the inverse of the channel coherence time. This paper investigates a novel beamforming strategy for massive downlink connectivity using a randomized space-time (ST) SIM. In addition to conventional S-only metasurface layers, the proposed design integrates an ST metasurface layer at the input stage of the SIM that introduces random variations over each channel coherence interval. These artificial time variations enable opportunistic user scheduling and exploitation of multiuser diversity under slow channel dynamics. To mitigate the prohibitive overhead associated with full channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT), we propose a partial-CSIT-based beamforming scheme that leverages randomized steering vectors and limited user-side feedback based on signal quality measurements. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed ST-SIM architecture achieves satisfactory sum-rate performance while significantly reducing CSIT acquisition and feedback overhead, thereby enabling scalable downlink connectivity in dense networks.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can be integrated into wireless sensor networks (WSNs) for smart city applications in several ways. Among them, a UAV can be employed as a relay in a “store-carry and forward” fashion by uploading data from ground sensors and metering devices and, then, downloading it to a central unit. However, both the uploading and downloading phases can be prone to potential threats and attacks. As a legacy from traditional wireless networks, the jamming attack is still one of the major and serious threats to UAV-aided communications, especially when also the jammer is mobile, e.g., it is mounted on a UAV or inside a terrestrial vehicle. In this article, we investigate anti-jamming communications for UAV-aided WSNs operating over doubly selective channels in the downloading phase. In such a scenario, the signals transmitted by the UAV and the malicious mobile jammer undergo both time dispersion due to multipath propagation effects and frequency dispersion caused by their mobility. To suppress high-power jamming signals, we propose a blind physical-layer technique that jointly detects the UAV and jammer symbols through serial disturbance cancelation based on symbol-level post-sorting of the detector output. Amplitudes, phases, time delays, and Doppler shifts—required to implement the proposed detection strategy—are blindly estimated from data through the use of algorithms that exploit the almost-cyclostationarity properties of the received signal and the detailed structure of multicarrier modulation format. Simulation results corroborate the anti-jamming capabilities of the proposed method, for different mobility scenarios of the jammer.

In multiple antenna systems employing time-division duplexing, spatial precoder design at the base station (BS) leverages channel state information acquired through uplink pilot transmission, under the assumption of channel reciprocity. Malicious eavesdroppers can start pilot spoofing attacks to alter such design, in order to improve their eavesdropping performance in downlink. The aim of this paper is to study the effects of pilot spoofing attacks on uplink channel estimation, by assuming that the BS knows the angle of arrivals (AoAs) of the legitimate channels. Specifically, after assessing the performance of the simple least squares estimator (LSE), we consider more sophisticated estimators, such as the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) and different versions of the minimum mean square error estimator (MMSEE), involving different degrees of a priori information about the pilot spoofing attacks. Theoretical analysis and numerical simulations are used to compare the performance of such estimators. In particular, we analytically demonstrate that the spoofing effects in the high signal-to-noise ratio regime can be completely suppressed, under certain conditions involving the AoAs of the legitimate and spoofing channels. Moreover, we show that even an imperfect knowledge of the AoAs and of the average transmission power of the spoofing signals allows the MLE and MMSEE to achieve significant performance gains over the LSE.

This letter deals with second-order statistics (SOS) of continuous-phase modulated (CPM) signals. To overcome some mathematical inconsistencies emerging from the idealized assumption that the CPM signal evolves from t = -∞, we consider a one-sided model for the signal, which starts from t = 0, noting also that such a model emerges naturally when building practical SOS estimators. On the basis of such a model, we first evaluate the SOS of the pseudosymbols, which arise when expressing a CPM signal in terms of its Laurent representation, as well as closed-form expressions of the cyclic autocorrelation and conjugate correlation functions of one-sided CPM signals.