Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Logan Engstrom
dblp:207/7298
· DBLP profile ↗
19ranked-venue papers
4as first author
7since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 19 · 4 first-author · 7 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
18 papers |
Trustworthy machine learning · 56% Efficient and distributed learning · 13% Reinforcement learning · 8% | |
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% |
Topics — the 30 heaviest of 37, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial robustness |
2.8 | 7 | 2021 | Unadversarial Examples: Designing Objects for Robust Vision · NeurIPS 2021 Do Adversarially Robust ImageNet Models Transfer Better? · NeurIPS 2020 Image Synthesis with a Single (Robust) Classifier · NeurIPS 2019 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
interpretability |
2.0 | 4 | 2022 | 3DB: A Framework for Debugging Computer Vision Models · NeurIPS 2022 Datamodels: Understanding Predictions with Data and Data with Predictions · ICML 2022 From ImageNet to Image Classification: Contextualizing Progress on Benchmarks · ICML 2020 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness |
1.9 | 4 | 2022 | 3DB: A Framework for Debugging Computer Vision Models · NeurIPS 2022 Noise or Signal: The Role of Image Backgrounds in Object Recognition · ICLR 2021 From ImageNet to Image Classification: Contextualizing Progress on Benchmarks · ICML 2020 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
data selection |
1.6 | 2 | 2025 | Small-to-Large Generalization: Training Data Influences Models Consistently Across Scale · ICLR 2025 DsDm: Model-Aware Dataset Selection with Datamodels · ICML 2024 |
Computer vision › Image recognition and object detection
object recognition |
1.0 | 2 | 2021 | Unadversarial Examples: Designing Objects for Robust Vision · NeurIPS 2021 Noise or Signal: The Role of Image Backgrounds in Object Recognition · ICLR 2021 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › Data-centric AI
data influence |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Small-to-Large Generalization: Training Data Influences Models Consistently Across Scale · ICLR 2025 |
Machine learning › Deep learning architectures and training
scaling laws |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Small-to-Large Generalization: Training Data Influences Models Consistently Across Scale · ICLR 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › large language model training
data selection for language model training |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | DsDm: Model-Aware Dataset Selection with Datamodels · ICML 2024 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model training |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | DsDm: Model-Aware Dataset Selection with Datamodels · ICML 2024 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial examples |
0.7 | 2 | 2019 | Adversarial Examples Are Not Bugs, They Are Features · NeurIPS 2019 Synthesizing Robust Adversarial Examples · ICML 2018 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack |
0.7 | 2 | 2019 | Prior Convictions: Black-box Adversarial Attacks with Bandits and Priors · ICLR (Poster) 2019 Black-box Adversarial Attacks with Limited Queries and Information · ICML 2018 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
distributed training |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | FFCV: Accelerating Training by Removing Data Bottlenecks · CVPR 2023 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › interpretability › training data attribution
datamodels |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Datamodels: Understanding Predictions with Data and Data with Predictions · ICML 2022 |
Machine learning and data management
training data attribution |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Datamodels: Understanding Predictions with Data and Data with Predictions · ICML 2022 |
Computer vision › Image recognition and object detection
image classification |
0.5 | 2 | 2020 | Exploring the Landscape of Spatial Robustness · ICML 2019 Do Adversarially Robust ImageNet Models Transfer Better? · NeurIPS 2020 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › dataset bias
background bias |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Noise or Signal: The Role of Image Backgrounds in Object Recognition · ICLR 2021 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
dataset bias |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | From ImageNet to Image Classification: Contextualizing Progress on Benchmarks · ICML 2020 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
deep reinforcement learning |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | A Closer Look at Deep Policy Gradients · ICLR 2020 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning › policy optimization
policy gradient |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | A Closer Look at Deep Policy Gradients · ICLR 2020 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
policy optimization |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Implementation Matters in Deep RL: A Case Study on PPO and TRPO · ICLR 2020 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning › policy optimization
proximal policy optimization |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Implementation Matters in Deep RL: A Case Study on PPO and TRPO · ICLR 2020 |
Machine learning › Representation and self-supervised learning › representation learning › robust representation learning
robust feature learning |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Do Adversarially Robust ImageNet Models Transfer Better? · NeurIPS 2020 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness evaluation |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Identifying Statistical Bias in Dataset Replication · ICML 2020 |
Empirical software engineering
benchmarking |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Identifying Statistical Bias in Dataset Replication · ICML 2020 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › adversarial attack
black-box adversarial attack |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Prior Convictions: Black-box Adversarial Attacks with Bandits and Priors · ICLR (Poster) 2019 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › interpretability
feature shaping |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Image Synthesis with a Single (Robust) Classifier · NeurIPS 2019 |
Machine learning › Generative modeling
image generation |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Image Synthesis with a Single (Robust) Classifier · NeurIPS 2019 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › adversarial machine learning
non-robust features |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Adversarial Examples Are Not Bugs, They Are Features · NeurIPS 2019 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › robust learning
robust classification |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Image Synthesis with a Single (Robust) Classifier · NeurIPS 2019 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › adversarial robustness › adversarially robust generalization
robustness-accuracy trade-off |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Robustness May Be at Odds with Accuracy · ICLR (Poster) 2019 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
linear datamodels · 1.1dataset counterfactuals · 1.1proxy model · 0.9data attribution · 0.9adversarial training · 0.8optimization-based subset selection · 0.8datamodels · 0.8just-in-time compilation · 0.7caching · 0.7asynchronous data transfer · 0.7statistical bias correction · 0.4selection frequency remeasurement · 0.4prior information · 0.4bandit optimization · 0.4black-box optimization · 0.3adversarial examples · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Small-to-Large Generalization: Training Data Influences Models Consistently Across ScaleabstractChoice of training data distribution greatly influences model behavior. Yet, in
large-scale settings, precisely characterizing *how* changes in training
data affects predictions is often difficult due to model training costs. Current
practice is to instead extrapolate from scaled down, inexpensive-to-train proxy
models. However, changes in data do not influence smaller and larger models
identically. Therefore, understanding how choice of data affects large-scale
models raises the question: how does training data distribution influence model
behavior across compute scale? We find that small- and large-scale language
model predictions (generally) *do* highly correlate across choice of
training data. Equipped with these findings, we characterize how proxy scale
affects effectiveness in two downstream proxy model applications: data
attribution and dataset selection. Alaa Khaddaj, Logan Engstrom, Aleksander Madry |
ICLR | 2 |
| 2024 | DsDm: Model-Aware Dataset Selection with DatamodelsabstractWhen selecting data for training large-scale models, standard practice is to filter for examples that match human notions of data quality. Such filtering yields qualitatively clean datapoints that intuitively should improve model behavior. However, in practice the opposite can often happen: we find that selecting according to similarity with "high quality" data sources may not increase (and can even hurt) performance compared to randomly selecting data. To develop better methods for selecting data, we start by framing dataset selection as an optimization problem that we can directly solve for: given target tasks, a learning algorithm, and candidate data, select the subset that maximizes model performance. This framework thus avoids handpicked notions of data quality, and instead models explicitly how the learning process uses train datapoints to predict on the target tasks. Our resulting method greatly improves language model (LM) performance on both pre-specified tasks and previously unseen tasks. Specifically, choosing target tasks representative of standard LM problems and evaluating on diverse held-out benchmarks, our selected datasets provide a 2x compute multiplier over baseline methods. Logan Engstrom, Axel Feldmann, Aleksander Madry |
ICML | 1 |
| 2023 | FFCV: Accelerating Training by Removing Data BottlenecksabstractWe present FFCV, a library for easy and fast machine learning model training. FFCV speeds up model training by eliminating (often subtle) data bottlenecks from the training process. In particular, we combine techniques such as an efficient file storage format, caching, data pre-loading, asynchronous data transfer, and just-in-time compilation to (a) make data loading and transfer significantly more efficient, ensuring that GPUs can reach full utilization; and (b) offload as much data processing as possible to the CPU asynchronously, freeing GPU cycles for training. Using FFCV, we train ResNet-18 and ResNet-50 on the ImageNet dataset with a state-of-the-art tradeoff between accuracy and training time. For example, across the range of ResNet-50 models we test, we obtain the same accuracy as the best baselines in half the time. We demonstrate FFCV's performance, ease-of-use, extensibility, and ability to adapt to resource constraints through several case studies. Detailed installation instructions, documentation, and Slack support channel are available at https://ffcv.io/. Guillaume Leclerc, Andrew Ilyas, Logan Engstrom, Hadi Salman, Aleksander Madry |
CVPR | 3 |
| 2022 | Datamodels: Understanding Predictions with Data and Data with PredictionsabstractWe present a conceptual framework, datamodeling, for analyzing the behavior of a model class in terms of the training data. For any fixed “target” example $x$, training set $S$, and learning algorithm, a datamodel is a parameterized function $2^S \to \mathbb{R}$ that for any subset of $S’ \subset S$—using only information about which examples of $S$ are contained in $S’$—predicts the outcome of training a model on $S’$ and evaluating on $x$. Despite the complexity of the underlying process being approximated (e.g. end-to-end training and evaluation of deep neural networks), we show that even simple linear datamodels successfully predict model outputs. We then demonstrate that datamodels give rise to a variety of applications, such as: accurately predicting the effect of dataset counterfactuals; identifying brittle predictions; finding semantically similar examples; quantifying train-test leakage; and embedding data into a well-behaved and feature-rich representation space. Andrew Ilyas, Logan Engstrom, Guillaume Leclerc, Aleksander Madry |
ICML | 3 |
| 2022 | 3DB: A Framework for Debugging Computer Vision ModelsabstractWe introduce 3DB: an extendable, unified framework for testing and debugging vision models using photorealistic simulation. We demonstrate, through a wide range of use cases, that 3DB allows users to discover vulnerabilities in computer vision systems and gain insights into how models make decisions. 3DB captures and generalizes many robustness analyses from prior work, and enables one to study their interplay. Finally, we find that the insights generated by the system transfer to the physical world. 3DB will be released as a library alongside a set of examples and documentation. We attach 3DB to the submission. Guillaume Leclerc, Hadi Salman, Andrew Ilyas, Sai Vemprala, Logan Engstrom, Vibhav Vineet, Kai Yuanqing Xiao, Pengchuan Zhang, Shibani Santurkar, Greg Yang, Ashish Kapoor, Aleksander Madry |
NeurIPS | 5 |
| 2021 | Noise or Signal: The Role of Image Backgrounds in Object Recognition
Kai Yuanqing Xiao, Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, Aleksander Madry |
ICLR | 2 |
| 2021 | Unadversarial Examples: Designing Objects for Robust VisionabstractWe study a class of computer vision settings wherein one can modify the design of the objects being recognized. We develop a framework that leverages this capability---and deep networks' unusual sensitivity to input perturbations---to design ``robust objects,'' i.e., objects that are explicitly optimized to be confidently classified. Our framework yields improved performance on standard benchmarks, a simulated robotics environment, and physical-world experiments. Hadi Salman, Andrew Ilyas, Logan Engstrom, Sai Vemprala, Aleksander Madry, Ashish Kapoor |
NeurIPS | 3 |
| 2020 | Implementation Matters in Deep RL: A Case Study on PPO and TRPO
Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Firdaus Janoos, Larry Rudolph, Aleksander Madry |
ICLR | 1 |
| 2020 | A Closer Look at Deep Policy Gradients
Andrew Ilyas, Logan Engstrom, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Firdaus Janoos, Larry Rudolph, Aleksander Madry |
ICLR | 2 |
| 2020 | Identifying Statistical Bias in Dataset ReplicationabstractDataset replication is a useful tool for assessing whether improvements in test accuracy on a specific benchmark correspond to improvements in models’ ability to generalize reliably. In this work, we present unintuitive yet significant ways in which standard approaches to dataset replication introduce statistical bias, skewing the resulting observations. We study ImageNet-v2, a replication of the ImageNet dataset on which models exhibit a significant (11-14%) drop in accuracy, even after controlling for selection frequency, a human-in-the-loop measure of data quality. We show that after remeasuring selection frequencies and correcting for statistical bias, only an estimated 3.6% of the original 11.7% accuracy drop remains unaccounted for. We conclude with concrete recommendations for recognizing and avoiding bias in dataset replication. Code for our study is publicly available: https://git.io/data-rep-analysis. Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Jacob Steinhardt, Aleksander Madry |
ICML | 1 |
| 2020 | From ImageNet to Image Classification: Contextualizing Progress on BenchmarksabstractBuilding rich machine learning datasets in a scalable manner often necessitates a crowd-sourced data collection pipeline. In this work, we use human studies to investigate the consequences of employing such a pipeline, focusing on the popular ImageNet dataset. We study how specific design choices in the ImageNet creation process impact the fidelity of the resulting dataset—including the introduction of biases that state-of-the-art models exploit. Our analysis pinpoints how a noisy data collection pipeline can lead to a systematic misalignment between the resulting benchmark and the real-world task it serves as a proxy for. Finally, our findings emphasize the need to augment our current model training and evaluation toolkit to take such misalignment into account. Dimitris Tsipras, Shibani Santurkar, Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, Aleksander Madry |
ICML | 3 |
| 2020 | Do Adversarially Robust ImageNet Models Transfer Better?abstractTransfer learning is a widely-used paradigm in deep learning, where models pre-trained on standard datasets can be efficiently adapted to downstream tasks. Typically, better pre-trained models yield better transfer results, suggesting that initial accuracy is a key aspect of transfer learning performance. In this work, we identify another such aspect: we find that adversarially robust models, while less accurate, often perform better than their standard-trained counterparts when used for transfer learning. Specifically, we focus on adversarially robust ImageNet classifiers, and show that they yield improved accuracy on a standard suite of downstream classification tasks. Further analysis uncovers more differences between robust and standard models in the context of transfer learning. Our results are consistent with (and in fact, add to) recent hypotheses stating that robustness leads to improved feature representations. Code and models is available in the supplementary material. Hadi Salman, Andrew Ilyas, Logan Engstrom, Ashish Kapoor, Aleksander Madry |
NeurIPS | 3 |
| 2019 | Prior Convictions: Black-box Adversarial Attacks with Bandits and Priors
Andrew Ilyas, Logan Engstrom, Aleksander Madry |
ICLR (Poster) | 2 |
| 2019 | Robustness May Be at Odds with Accuracy
Dimitris Tsipras, Shibani Santurkar, Logan Engstrom, Alexander Turner 0001, Aleksander Madry |
ICLR (Poster) | 3 |
| 2019 | Exploring the Landscape of Spatial RobustnessabstractThe study of adversarial robustness has so far largely focused on perturbations bound in $\ell_p$-norms. However, state-of-the-art models turn out to be also vulnerable to other, more natural classes of perturbations such as translations and rotations. In this work, we thoroughly investigate the vulnerability of neural network–based classifiers to rotations and translations. While data augmentation offers relatively small robustness, we use ideas from robust optimization and test-time input aggregation to significantly improve robustness. Finally we find that, in contrast to the $\ell_p$-norm case, first-order methods cannot reliably find worst-case perturbations. This highlights spatial robustness as a fundamentally different setting requiring additional study. Logan Engstrom, Brandon Tran, Dimitris Tsipras, Ludwig Schmidt, Aleksander Madry |
ICML | 1 |
| 2019 | Adversarial Examples Are Not Bugs, They Are FeaturesabstractAdversarial examples have attracted significant attention in machine learning, but the reasons for their existence and pervasiveness remain unclear. We demonstrate that adversarial examples can be directly attributed to the presence of non-robust features: features (derived from patterns in the data distribution) that are highly predictive, yet brittle and (thus) incomprehensible to humans. After capturing these features within a theoretical framework, we establish their widespread existence in standard datasets. Finally, we present a simple setting where we can rigorously tie the phenomena we observe in practice to a {\em misalignment} between the (human-specified) notion of robustness and the inherent geometry of the data. Andrew Ilyas, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Logan Engstrom, Brandon Tran, Aleksander Madry |
NeurIPS | 4 |
| 2019 | Image Synthesis with a Single (Robust) ClassifierabstractWe show that the basic classification framework alone can be used to tackle some of the most challenging tasks in image synthesis. In contrast to other state-of-the-art approaches, the toolkit we develop is rather minimal: it uses a single, off-the-shelf classifier for all these tasks. The crux of our approach is that we train this classifier to be adversarially robust. It turns out that adversarial robustness is precisely what we need to directly manipulate salient features of the input. Overall, our findings demonstrate the utility of robustness in the broader machine learning context. Shibani Santurkar, Andrew Ilyas, Dimitris Tsipras, Logan Engstrom, Brandon Tran, Aleksander Madry |
NeurIPS | 4 |
| 2018 | Synthesizing Robust Adversarial ExamplesabstractStandard methods for generating adversarial examples for neural networks do not consistently fool neural network classifiers in the physical world due to a combination of viewpoint shifts, camera noise, and other natural transformations, limiting their relevance to real-world systems. We demonstrate the existence of robust 3D adversarial objects, and we present the first algorithm for synthesizing examples that are adversarial over a chosen distribution of transformations. We synthesize two-dimensional adversarial images that are robust to noise, distortion, and affine transformation. We apply our algorithm to complex three-dimensional objects, using 3D-printing to manufacture the first physical adversarial objects. Our results demonstrate the existence of 3D adversarial objects in the physical world. Anish Athalye, Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, Kevin Kwok |
ICML | 2 |
| 2018 | Black-box Adversarial Attacks with Limited Queries and InformationabstractCurrent neural network-based classifiers are susceptible to adversarial examples even in the black-box setting, where the attacker only has query access to the model. In practice, the threat model for real-world systems is often more restrictive than the typical black-box model where the adversary can observe the full output of the network on arbitrarily many chosen inputs. We define three realistic threat models that more accurately characterize many real-world classifiers: the query-limited setting, the partial-information setting, and the label-only setting. We develop new attacks that fool classifiers under these more restrictive threat models, where previous methods would be impractical or ineffective. We demonstrate that our methods are effective against an ImageNet classifier under our proposed threat models. We also demonstrate a targeted black-box attack against a commercial classifier, overcoming the challenges of limited query access, partial information, and other practical issues to break the Google Cloud Vision API. Andrew Ilyas, Logan Engstrom, Anish Athalye, Jessy Lin |
ICML | 2 |