The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of language models as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both a language model and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for a language model to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that a small language model pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining language models on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that language models used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

Human cognition is fundamentally noisy. While routinely regarded as a nuisance in experimental investigation, the few studies investigating properties of cognitive noise have found surprising structure. A first line of research has shown that inter-response-time distributions are heavy-tailed. That is, response times between subsequent trials usually change only a small amount, but with occasional large changes. A second, separate, line of research has found that participants' estimates and response times both exhibit long-range autocorrelations (i.e., 1/f noise). Thus, each judgment and response time not only depends on its immediate predecessor but also on many previous responses. These two lines of research use different tasks and have distinct theoretical explanations: models that account for heavy-tailed response times do not predict 1/f autocorrelations and vice versa. Here, we find that 1/f noise and heavy-tailed response distributions co-occur in both types of tasks. We also show that a statistical sampling algorithm, developed to deal with patchy environments, generates both heavy-tailed distributions and 1/f noise, suggesting that cognitive noise may be a functional adaptation to dealing with a complex world.

Both resources in the natural environment and concepts in a semantic space are distributed "patchily", with large gaps in between the patches. To describe people's internal and external foraging behavior, various random walk models have been proposed. In particular, internal foraging has been modeled as sampling: in order to gather relevant information for making a decision, people draw samples from a mental representation using random-walk algorithms such as Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). However, two common empirical observations argue against people using simple sampling algorithms such as MCMC for internal foraging. First, the distance between samples is often best described by a Levy flight distribution: the probability of the distance between two successive locations follows a power-law on the distances. Second, humans and other animals produce long-range, slowly decaying autocorrelations characterized as 1/f-like fluctuations, instead of the 1/f^2 fluctuations produced by random walks. We propose that mental sampling is not done by simple MCMC, but is instead adapted to multimodal representations and is implemented by Metropolis-coupled Markov chain Monte Carlo (MC3), one of the first algorithms developed for sampling from multimodal distributions. MC3 involves running multiple Markov chains in parallel but with target distributions of different temperatures, and it swaps the states of the chains whenever a better location is found. Heated chains more readily traverse valleys in the probability landscape to propose moves to far-away peaks, while the colder chains make the local steps that explore the current peak or patch. We show that MC3 generates distances between successive samples that follow a Levy flight distribution and produce 1/f-like autocorrelations, providing a single mechanistic account of these two puzzling empirical phenomena of internal foraging.