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Rob Shields

dblp:21/2031 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2010
—ORCID · unresolved

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
2 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design
0.222010
Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions · AAAI 2010
Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions · AAAI 2004
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory
advertising auctions
0.112010
Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions · AAAI 2010
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory
combinatorial auction
0.012004
Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions · AAAI 2004

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

mixed-integer programming · 0.1linear programming · 0.1column generation · 0.1preference elicitation · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2010 Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions
abstract
The use of simple auction mechanisms like the GSP in online advertising can lead to significant loss of efficiency and revenue when advertisers have rich preferences — even simple forms of expressiveness like budget constraints can lead to suboptimal outcomes. While the optimal allocation of inventory can provide greater efficiency and revenue, natural formulations of the underlying optimization problems grow exponentially in the number of features of interest, presenting a key practical challenge. To address this problem, we propose a means for automatically partitioning inventory into abstract channels so that the least relevant features are ignored. Our approach, based on LP/MIP column and constraint generation, dramatically reduces the size of the problem, thus rendering optimization computationally feasible at practical scales. Our algorithms allow for principled tradeoffs between tractability and solution quality. Numerical experiments demonstrate the computational practicality of our approach as well as the quality of the resulting abstractions.
William E. Walsh, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields, George L. Nemhauser, David C. Parkes
AAAI4
2004 Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions
Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields
AAAI3