A science gateway is a web portal that provides a convenient interface to data and applications in support of a research community. Standard security concerns apply to science gateways, including confidentiality of pre-publication research data, integrity of research results, and availability of services provided to researchers. In this paper we identify existing science gateway security recommendations and provide our own perspective.

In this paper we present our Virtual Organization (VO) Identity Management (IdM) Model, an overview of 14 interviews that informed it, and preliminary analysis of the factors that guide VOs and Resource Providers (RPs) to choose a particular IdM implementation. This model will serve both existing and future VOs and RPs to more effectively understand and implement their IdM relationships. The Virtual Organization has emerged as a fundamental way of structuring modern scientific collaborations and has shaped the computing infrastructure that supports those collaborations. One key aspect of this infrastructure is identity management, and the emergence of VOs introduces challenges regarding how much of the IdM process should be delegated from the RP to the VO. Many different implementation choices have been made, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 14 different VOs or RPs regarding their IdM choices and the bases behind those decisions. We analyzed the interview results to extract common parameters and values, which we used to inform our VO IdM Model.

Abstract Many production Grid and e‐Science infrastructures have begun to offer services to end‐users during the past several years with an increasing number of scientific applications that require access to a wide variety of resources and services in multiple Grids. Therefore, the Grid Interoperation Now—Community Group of the Open Grid Forum—organizes and manages interoperation efforts among those production Grid infrastructures to reach the goal of a world‐wide Grid vision on a technical level in the near future. This contribution highlights fundamental approaches of the group and discusses open standards in the context of production e‐Science infrastructures. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

We are designing and prototyping a generalized observatory middleware framework (OMF) to integrate existing and proposed technologies and reduce duplication of functionality across observatories. Our implementation consists of an enterprise service bus (ESB) architecture capable of integrating a wide variety of message-based technologies, a security proxy (SP) that uses X.509 credentials to sign and verify messages to and from the ESB, and an instrument proxy (IP) based on widely-accepted encoding and interface standards that provides common access to both MBARI-specific and native instruments. Our poster details the framework's architecture and the use case scenarios for which we are designing the prototype system. It will include a discussion of our assumptions, the choices we have made architecturally, and the implementation approach for the prototype we are producing.

In recent years, trust negotiation has been proposed as a novel authorization solution for use in open-system environments, in which resources are shared across organizational boundaries. Researchers have shown that trust negotiation is indeed a viable solution for these environments by developing a number of policy languages and strategies for trust negotiation that have desirable theoretical properties. Further, existing protocols, such as TLS, have been altered to interact with prototype trust negotiation systems, thereby illustrating the utility of trust negotiation. Unfortunately, modifying existing protocols is often a time-consuming and bureaucratic process that can hinder the adoption of this promising technology. In this paper, we present Traust, a third-party authorization service that leverages the strengths of existing prototype trust negotiation systems. Traust acts as an authorization broker that issues access tokens for resources in an open system after entities use trust negotiation to satisfy the appropriate resource access policies. The Traust architecture was designed to allow Traust to be integrated either directly with newer trust-aware applications or indirectly with existing legacy applications; this flexibility paves the way for the incremental adoption of trust negotiation technologies without requiring widespread software or protocol upgrades. We discuss the design and implementation of Traust, the communication protocol used by the Traust system, and its performance. We also discuss our experiences using Traust to broker access to legacy resources, our proposal for a Traust-aware version of the GridFTP protocol, and Traust's resilience to attack.

Abstract Science gateways have emerged as a concept for allowing large numbers of users in communities to easily access high‐performance computing resources which previously required a steep learning curve to utilize. In order to reduce the complexity of managing access for these communities, which can often be large and dynamic, the concept of community accounts is being considered. This paper proposes a security model for community accounts, organized by the four As of security: Authentication, Authorization, Auditing and Accounting. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Large collaborative infrastructures that span multiple organizations such as those that enable grid computing and scientific experimentation are being deployed and used today. In order to secure these infrastructures a comprehensive requirements study is needed that takes into account the novel risks, threats, and operational issues brought on by the large-scale, distributed nature of these systems. In this paper we argue that gaps in security policies and procedures combined with organizational autonomy are the primary drivers motivating a set of requirements that go beyond those observed today. With three example infrastructures in mind, namely, Teragrid, LHC Grid, and GEM, we explore the novel risks, threats, and operational issues to compose a set of operational security requirements; the satisfaction of which are essential for securing such large collaborative infrastructures

In recent years, trust negotiation (TN) has been proposed as a novel access control solution for use in open system environments in which resources are shared across organizational boundaries. Researchers have shown that TN is indeed a viable solution for these environments by developing a number of policy languages and strategies for TN which have desirable theoretical properties. Further, existing protocols, such as TLS, have been altered to interact with prototype TN systems, thereby illustrating the utility of TN. Unfortunately, modifying existing protocols is often a time-consuming and bureaucratic process which can hinder the adoption of this promising technology.In this paper, we present Traust, a third-party authorization service that leverages the strengths of existing proto-type TN systems. Traust acts as an authorization broker that issues access tokens for resources in an open system after entities use TN to satisfy the appropriate resource access policies. The Traust architecture was designed to allow Traust to be integrated either directly with newer trust-aware applications or indirectly with existing legacy applications; this exibility paves the way for the incremental adoption of TN technologies without requiring widespread software or protocol upgrades. We discuss the design and implementation of Traust, the communication protocol used by the Traust system, and its performance. We also discuss our experiences using Traust to broker access to legacy resources, our proposal for a Traust-aware version of the GridFTP protocol, and Traust's resilience to attack.

Abstract The MyProxy online credential repository has been used by the Grid computing community for over four years for managing security credentials in the Grid public key infrastructure. MyProxy improves usability by giving users access to their credentials over the network using password authentication, allowing users to delegate their credentials via Web browser interfaces to the Grid, and supporting credential renewal for long‐running jobs. MyProxy helps administrators secure users' private keys by providing an online service from which users retrieve short‐lived credentials without distributing long‐lived keys to potentially vulnerable end‐systems. This paper describes the MyProxy system and its use. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Abstract In this paper, we describe our work on enabling fine‐grained authorization for resource usage and management. We address the need of virtual organizations to enforce their own polices in addition to those of the resource owners, with regards to both resource consumption and job management. To implement this design, we propose changes and extensions to the Globus Toolkit's version 2 resource management mechanism. We describe the prototype and policy language that we have designed to express fine‐grained policies and present an analysis of our solution. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Grid computing is concerned with the sharing and coordinated use of diverse resources in distributed "virtual organizations." The dynamic and multiinstitutional nature of these environments introduces challenging security issues that demand new technical approaches. In particular, one must deal with diverse local mechanisms, support dynamic creation of services, and enable dynamic creation of trust domains. We describe how these issues are addressed in two generations of the Globus Toolkit/spl reg/. First, we review the Globus Toolkit version 2 (GT2) approach; then we describe new approaches developed to support the Globus Toolkit version 3 (GT3) implementation of the Open Grid Services Architecture, an initiative that is recasting Grid concepts within a service-oriented framework based on Web services. GT3's security implementation uses Web services security mechanisms for credential exchange and other purposes, and introduces a tight least-privilege model that avoids the need for any privileged network service.

Grid portals, based on standard Web technologies, are increasingly used to provide user interfaces for computational and data grids. However, such Grid portals do not integrate cleanly with existing Grid security systems such as the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI), due to lack of delegation capabilities in Web security mechanisms. We solve this problem using an online credentials repository system, called MyProxy. MyProxy allows Grid portals to use the GSI to interact with Grid resources in a standard, secure manner. We examine the requirements of Grid portals, give an overview of the GSI, and demonstrate how MyProxy enables them to function together. The architecture and security of the MyProxy system are described in detail.