Link prediction, or the inference of future or missing connections between entities, is a well-studied problem in network analysis. A multitude of heuristics exist for link prediction in ordinary networks with a single type of connection. However, link prediction in multiplex networks, or networks with multiple types of connections, is not a well understood problem. We propose a novel general framework and three families of heuristics for multiplex network link prediction that are simple, interpretable, and take advantage of the rich connection type correlation structure that exists in many real world networks. We further derive a theoretical threshold for determining when to use a different connection type based on the number of links that overlap with an Erdos-Renyi random graph. Through experiments with simulated and real world scientific collaboration, transportation and global trade networks, we demonstrate that the proposed heuristics show increased performance with the richness of connection type correlation structure and significantly outperform their baseline heuristics for ordinary networks with a single connection type.

Training multi-agent systems (MAS) to achieve realistic equilibria gives us a useful tool to understand and model real-world systems. We consider a general sum partially observable Markov game where agents of different types share a single policy network, conditioned on agent-specific information. This paper aims at i) formally understanding equilibria reached by such agents, and ii) matching emergent phenomena of such equilibria to real-world targets. Parameter sharing with decentralized execution has been introduced as an efficient way to train multiple agents using a single policy network. However, the nature of resulting equilibria reached by such agents has not been yet studied: we introduce the novel concept of Shared equilibrium as a symmetric pure Nash equilibrium of a certain Functional Form Game (FFG) and prove convergence to the latter for a certain class of games using self-play. In addition, it is important that such equilibria satisfy certain constraints so that MAS are calibrated to real world data for practical use: we solve this problem by introducing a novel dual-Reinforcement Learning based approach that fits emergent behaviors of agents in a Shared equilibrium to externally-specified targets, and apply our methods to a n-player market example. We do so by calibrating parameters governing distributions of agent types rather than individual agents, which allows both behavior differentiation among agents and coherent scaling of the shared policy network to multiple agents.

An attractive approach to managing electricity demand in the Smart Grid relies on real-time pricing (RTP) tariffs, where customers are incentivized to quickly adapt to changes in the cost of supply. However, choosing amongst competitive RTP tariffs is difficult when tariff prices change rapidly. The problem is further complicated when we assume that the price changes for a tariff are published in real-time only to those customers who are currently subscribed to that tariff, thus making the prices partially observable. We present models and learning algorithms for autonomous agents that can address the tariff selection problem on behalf of customers. We introduce 'Negotiated Learning', a general algorithm that enables a self-interested sequential decision-making agent to periodically select amongst a variable set of 'entities' (e.g., tariffs) by negotiating with other agents in the environment to gather information about dynamic partially observable entity 'features' (e.g., tariff prices) that affect the entity selection decision. We also contribute a formulation of the tariff selection problem as a 'Negotiable Entity Selection Process', a novel representation. We support our contributions with intuitive justification and simulation experiments based on real data on an open Smart Grid simulation platform.

Active participation of customers in the management of demand, and renewable energy supply, is a critical goal of the Smart Grid vision. However, this is a complex problem with numerous scenarios that are difficult to test in field projects. Rich and scalable simulations are required to develop effective strategies and policies that elicit desirable behavior from customers. We present a versatile agent-based "factored model" that enables rich simulation scenarios across distinct customer types and varying agent granularity. We formally characterize the decisions to be made by Smart Grid customers as a multiscale decision-making problem and show how our factored model representation handles several temporal and contextual decisions by introducing a novel "utility optimizing agent." We further contribute innovative algorithms for (i) statistical learning-based hierarchical Bayesian timeseries simulation, and (ii) adaptive capacity control using decision-theoretic approximation of multiattribute utility functions over multiple agents. Prominent among the approaches being studied to achieve active customer participation is one based on offering customers financial incentives through variable-price tariffs; we also contribute an effective solution to the problem of "customer herding" under such tariffs. We support our contributions with experimental results from simulations based on real-world data on an open Smart Grid simulation platform.

One proposed approach to managing a large complex Smart Grid is through Broker Agents who buy electrical power from distributed producers, and also sell power to consumers, via a Tariff Market--a new market mechanism where Broker Agents publish concurrent bid and ask prices. A key challenge is the specification of the market strategy that the Broker Agents should use in order to earn profits while maintaining the market's balance of supply and demand. Interestingly, previous work has shown that a Broker Agent can learn its strategy, using Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) and Q-learning, and outperform other Broker Agents that use predetermined or randomized strategies. In this work, we investigate the more representative scenario in which multiple Broker Agents, instead of a single one, are independently learning their strategies. Using a simulation environment based on real data, we find that Broker Agents who employ periodic increases in exploration achieve higher rewards. We also find that varying levels of market dominance in customer allocation models result in remarkably distinct outcomes in market prices and aggregate Broker Agent rewards. The latter set of results can be explained by established economic principles regarding the emergence of monopolies in market-based competition, further validating our approach.

In this paper, we present our RS-SLAM algorithm for monocular camera where the proposal distribution is derived from the 5-point RANSAC algorithm and image feature measurement uncertainties instead of using the easily violated constant velocity model. We propose to do another RANSAC sampling within all the inliers that have the best RANSAC score to check for inlier misclassifications in the original correspondences and use all the hypotheses generated from these consensus sets in the proposal distribution. This is to mitigate data association errors (inlier misclassifications) caused by the observation that the consensus set from RANSAC that yields the highest score might not, in practice, contain all the true inliers due to noise on the feature measurements. Hypotheses which are less probable will eventually be eliminated in the particle filter resampling process. We also show in this paper that our monocular approach can be easily extended for stereo camera. Experimental results validate the potential of our approach.