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Chris McMahon Stone

dblp:210/4141 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
3as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 3 · 3 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Network security · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program analysis · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security
protocol security
0.612022
The Closer You Look, The More You Learn: A Grey-box Approach to Protocol State Machine Learning · CCS 2022
Network security › protocol reverse engineering
protocol state machine inference
0.612022
The Closer You Look, The More You Learn: A Grey-box Approach to Protocol State Machine Learning · CCS 2022
Program analysis
dynamic analysis
0.612022
The Closer You Look, The More You Learn: A Grey-box Approach to Protocol State Machine Learning · CCS 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

state machine learning · 1.1grey-box analysis · 1.1execution monitoring · 1.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 The Closer You Look, The More You Learn: A Grey-box Approach to Protocol State Machine Learning
abstract
We propose a new approach to infer state machine models from protocol implementations. Our new tool, StateInspector, learns protocol states by using novel program analyses to combine observations of run-time memory and I/O. It requires no access to source code and only lightweight execution monitoring of the implementation under test. We demonstrate and evaluate StateInspector's effectiveness on numerous TLS and WPA/2 implementations. In the process, we show StateInspector enables deeper state discovery, increased learning efficiency, and more insight compared to existing approaches. Our method led us to discover several concerning deviations from the standards and vulnerabilities in IWD and WolfSSL, both of which were assigned CVEs.
Chris McMahon Stone, Sam L. Thomas, Mathy Vanhoef, Nicolas Bailluet, Tom Chothia
CCS1
2018 Extending Automated Protocol State Learning for the 802.11 4-Way Handshake
Chris McMahon Stone, Tom Chothia, Joeri de Ruiter
ESORICS (1)1
2017 Spinner: Semi-Automatic Detection of Pinning without Hostname Verification
abstract
Certificate verification is a crucial stage in the establishment of a TLS connection. A common security flaw in TLS implementations is the lack of certificate hostname verification but, in general, this is easy to detect. In security-sensitive applications, the usage of certificate pinning is on the rise. This paper shows that certificate pinning can (and often does) hide the lack of proper hostname verification, enabling MITM attacks. Dynamic (black-box) detection of this vulnerability would typically require the tester to own a high security certificate from the same issuer (and often same intermediate CA) as the one used by the app. We present Spinner, a new tool for black-box testing for this vulnerability at scale that does not require purchasing any certificates. By redirecting traffic to websites which use the relevant certificates and then analysing the (encrypted) network traffic we are able to determine whether the hostname check is correctly done, even in the presence of certificate pinning. We use Spinner to analyse 400 security-sensitive Android and iPhone apps. We found that 9 apps had this flaw, including two of the largest banks in the world: Bank of America and HSBC. We also found that TunnelBear, one of the most popular VPN apps was also vulnerable. These apps have a joint user base of tens of millions of users.
Chris McMahon Stone, Tom Chothia, Flavio D. Garcia
ACSAC1