Leveraging side-channels enables zero-overhead detection of anomalies. These channels offer a non-instrumented program profiling capability by means of the distinct signatures generated by processing unintentional signals emitted during executions. In this paper, we propose a Markov based convolutional neural network (CNN) to monitor programs against anomalies on multi-core devices. We refer to the proposed framework as MarCNNet. In the model, the output of the CNN estimates the likelihood of the current state of the program, and the Markov Model tracks the process based on these estimates. If the estimates do not match the Markov model state diagram, it alerts anomaly, otherwise, it keeps monitoring. The framework also simplifies the training process because dependency among states is crucial for the Markov part of the model, but not for the CNN. Therefore, the neural network is trained by treating each state independent. However, for a test signal, both CNN and Markov parts of the framework are considered for malware detection to utilize the program flow. We tested the proposed model for various devices with different number of cores and threads of processes and demonstrated that the framework can detect malware with no false negatives, and a false positive rate less than 2%.

Recent proliferation of CPS and IoT devices has led to an increasing demand for analyzing performance and timing of event-driven computational activity, especially interrupts and exceptions. However, these devices typically lack hardware resources, power, and system-software infrastructure for profiling/monitoring such events. Even when feasible, the profiling/monitoring activity itself can perturb the performance and timing of the timing-sensitive activity to be analyzed, therefore producing misleading results. Thus, we present PRIMER, a novel approach for profiling interrupts. PRIMER leverages existing unintentional (side-channel) electromagnetic emanations of the profiled/monitored device to identify its asynchronous execution (e.g., interrupt handlers). PRIMER leaves the monitored system (and its behavior) completely unchanged, requires no system resources or support, and introduces neither overheads nor perturbation in the monitored system. We validate PRIMER by analyzing signals that correspond to five different types of interrupts on an IoT device (ARM Cortex-M), achieving 99.5% accuracy (with no false positives), and on an MSP430 microcontroller-based device with even better accuracy. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of PRIMER in analyzing page faults and network interrupts when executing real-world applications on a more sophisticated embedded device (ARM Cortex-A8), and show that the results provided by PRIMER can provide useful insights about an application's interaction with the system's virtual memory and network-oriented services.

The emergence of cyber-physical systems (CPS) and internet of things (IoT) devices impose significant security and privacy concerns that necessitate robust monitoring and malware detection systems. This paper proposes PITEM, a framework for instruction-level monitoring and malware detection using electromagnetic (EM) side-channels. PITEM identifiesinstruction typeswith similar EM emanations using hierarchical clustering. To track all combinations of theseinstruction types, we generate EM signatures for all permutations of them. In testing, we predict the permutation class of testing traces by a matched-filter-like predictor. We test the performance on two devices (FPGA-based and ARM-based) with 50 MHz and 1 GHz clock frequencies. We achieve 95.67 and 87.35 percent accuracies for these devices for single execution of permutations. We note that the accuracy increases to 100 percent when permutation blocks are repeated. Furthermore, we test the limits of the system by tracking permutations of instructions of the same type. With sufficient bandwidth and number of repetitions, individual instructions can be resolved with 87.5 and 95.78 percent accuracies for these devices. The performance is evaluated for different relative signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) levels and performance is stable for relative SNR values$>15$>15dB. Finally, we demonstrate PITEM's ability to detectfine-grainedmalware with 99.89 percent accuracy.

We present the first side-channel attack on full-fledged smartphones that recovers the elliptic curve secret scalar from the electromagnetic signal that corresponds to a single scalar-by-point multiplication in current versions of Libgcrypt, OpenSSL, HACL* and curve25519-donna. To avoid leaking information via side channels, these implementations follow the recommendations of RFC 7748 and use a constant-time conditional swap operation. Our attack targets signal differences created by systematic changes in operand values during this conditional swap operation. We deploy the attack, using low-cost equipment (<$800), against two Android-based mobile phones and against a Linux-based IoT development board. We repeat the attack 100 times, each time with a different scalar, on each device. In all of the implementations considered in this work, our attack successfully recovers the full secret key within seconds. To mitigate the attack we suggest randomizing the exclusive-or mask in the conditional swap operation. We show that this countermeasure is effective in preventing this and similar attacks.

Side-channel attacks have become a serious security concern for computing systems, especially for embedded devices, where the device is often located in, or in proximity to, a public place, and yet the system contains sensitive information. To design systems that are highly resilient to such attacks, an accurate and efficient design-stage quantitative analysis of side-channel leakage is needed. For many systems properties (e.g., performance, power, etc.), cycle-accurate simulation can provide such an efficient-yet-accurate design-stage estimate. Unfortunately, for an important class of side-channels, electromagnetic emanations, such a model does not exist, and there has not even been much quantitative evidence about what level of modeling detail (e.g., hardware, microarchitecture, etc.) would be needed for high accuracy. This paper presents EMSim, an approach that enables simulation of the electromagnetic (EM) side-channel signals cycle-by-cycle using a detailed micro-architectural model of the device. To evaluate EMSim, we compare its signals against actual EM signals emanated from real hardware (FPGA-based RISC-V processor), and find that they match very closely. To gain further insights, we also experimentally identify how the accuracy of the simulation degrades when key microarchitectural features (e.g., pipeline stall, cache-miss, etc.) and other hardware behaviors (e.g., data-dependent switching activity) are omitted from the simulation model. We further evaluate how robust the simulation-based results are, by comparing them to real signals collected in different conditions (manufacturing, distance, etc.). Finally, to show the applicability of EMSim, we demonstrate how it can be used to measure side-channel leakage through simulation at design-stage.

This paper presents a new micro-architectural vulnerability on the power management units of modern computers which creates an electromagnetic-based side-channel. The key observations that enable us to discover this sidechannel are: 1) in an effort to manage and minimize power consumption, modern microprocessors have a number of possible operating modes (power states) in which various sub-systems of the processor are powered down, 2) for some of the transitions between power states, the processor also changes the operating mode of the voltage regulator module (VRM) that supplies power to the affected sub-system, and 3) the electromagnetic (EM) emanations from the VRM are heavily dependent on its operating mode. As a result, these state-dependent EM emanations create a side-channel which can potentially reveal sensitive information about the current state of the processor and, more importantly, the programs currently being executed. To demonstrate the feasibility of exploiting this vulnerability, we create a covert channel by utilizing the changes in the processor's power states. We show how such a covert channel can be leveraged to exfiltrate sensitive information from a secured and completely isolated (air-gapped) laptop system by placing a compact, inexpensive receiver in proximity to that system. To further show the severity of this attack, we also demonstrate how such a covert channel can be established when the target and the receiver are several meters away from each other, including scenarios where the receiver and the target are separated by a wall. Compared to the state-of-the-art, the proposed covert channel has >3x higher bit-rate. Finally, to demonstrate that this new vulnerability is not limited to being used as a covert channel, we demonstrate how it can be used for attacks such as keystroke logging.

In this paper, we propose a methodology to identify both the brand of a cell-phone, and the status of its camera by exploiting electromagnetic (EM) emanations. The method is composed of two parts: Feature extraction and Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). We first extract features by averaging magnitudes of short-time Fourier transform (STFT) of the measured EM signal, which helps to reduce input dimension of the neural network, and to filter spurious emissions. The extracted features are fed into the proposed CNN, which contains two convolutional layers (followed by max-pooling layers), and four fully-connected layers. Finally, we provide experimental results which exhibit more than 99% classification accuracy for the test signals.

The side-channel leakage is a consequence of program execution in a computer processor, and understanding relationship between code execution and information leakage is a necessary step in estimating information leakage and its capacity limits. This paper proposes a methodology to relate program execution to electromagnetic side-channel emanations and estimates side-channel information capacity created by execution of series of instructions (e.g., a function, a procedure, or a program) in a processor. To model dependence among program instructions in a code, we propose to use Markov source model, which includes the dependencies among sequence of instructions as well as dependencies among instructions as they pass through a pipeline of the processor. The emitted electromagnetic (EM) signals during instruction executions are natural choice for the inputs into the model. To obtain the channel inputs for the proposed model, we derive a mathematical relationship between the emanated instruction signal power (ESP) and total emanated signal power while running a program. Then, we derive the leakage capacity of EM side channels created by execution of series of instructions in a processor. Finally, we provide experimental results to demonstrate that leakages could be severe and that a dedicated attacker could obtain important information.

It has been shown that digital and/or analog characteristics of electronic devices during executing programs can create a side-channel which an attacker can exploit to extract sensitive information such as cryptographic keys. When the attacker modifies the software application to exfiltrate sensitive information through a channel, this channel is called a covert channel. In this paper, we model this covert channel as a communication channel and derive upper and lower capacity bounds. Because the covert channels are not designed to transmit information, they are exposed not only to the errors created by the transmission, but also by varying the execution time of computer activities, and/or by insertions from other activities such as interrupts, stalls, etc. Combining all of these effects, we propose to model the covert channel as an insertion channel where the transmitted sequence is a pulse amplitude modulated signal with random pulse positions. Utilizing this model, we derive capacity bounds of the covert channel with random insertion and substitution due to the noise and jitter errors, and propose a receiver design that can correctly detect the computer-activity-created signals. To illustrate the severity of leakages, we perform experiments with high clock speed devices at some distance. Further, the theoretical derivations are compared to empirical results, and show good agreement.

A wireless communication created by a computer software activity is described and modelled. The generation of this communication link is a consequence of electromagnetic (EM) emanations emitted during computer activity. This wireless channel in addition to channel errors due to noise, also experiences jitter created by the software activity “transmitter” which lacks precise synchronization. Also, the “transmitter” gets interrupted with other (system) activity, and the transmitted signal goes through a channel obstructed by metal, plastic, etc. To capture all these effects, we have modelled transmitted sequence as a pulse amplitude modulated (PAM) signal with random varying pulse position. From the model, we have derived the power spectral density and the bit error rate of the transmitted signal and presented performance analysis of such a channel.

The goal of this paper is to answer how much information is “transmitted” by the execution of particular sequence of instructions in a processor. Introducing such a measure would provide quantitative guidance for designing programs and computer hardware that minimizes inadvertent (side channel) information leakage, and would also help detect parts of a program or hardware design that have unusually high leakage (i.e., were designed to function as covert channel “transmitters”). To answer this question, we propose a new method to estimate the maximum information leakage through EM signals generated by the execution of instructions in a processor. We start by deriving a mathematical relationship between electromagnetic side-channel energy of individual instructions and the measured pairwise side-channel signal power. Then, we use this measure to calculate the transition probabilities needed for estimating capacity. Finally, we propose a new method to estimate side/covert channel capacity created by the execution of instructions in a processor and illustrate our results in several computer systems.

We propose “compressed training adaptive equalization” as a novel framework to reduce the quantity of training symbols in a communication packet. It is a semi-blind approach for communication systems employing time-domain/frequency-domain equalizers, and founded upon the idea of exploiting the magnitude boundedness of digital communication symbols. The corresponding algorithms are derived by combining the least-squares-cost-function measuring the training symbol reconstruction performance and the infinity-norm of the equalizer outputs as the cost for enforcing the special constellation boundedness property along the whole packet. In addition to providing a framework for developing effective adaptive equalization algorithms based on convex optimization, the proposed method establishes a direct link with compressed sensing by utilizing the duality of the ℓ1and ℓ∞norms. This link enables the adaptation of recently emerged ℓ1-norm-minimization-based algorithms and their analysis to the channel equalization problem. In particular, we show for noiseless/low noise scenarios, the required training length is on the order of the logarithm of the channel spread. Furthermore, we provide approximate performance analysis by invoking the recent MSE results from the sparsity-based data processing literature. Provided examples illustrate the significant training reductions by the proposed approach and demonstrate its potential for high bandwidth systems with fast mobility.

We introduce compressed training adaptive equalization as a novel approach for reducing number of training symbols in a communication packet. The proposed semi-blind approach is based on the exploitation of the special magnitude bounded-ness of communication symbols. The algorithms are derived from a special convex optimization setting based on l∞norm. The corresponding framework has a direct link with the com-pressive sensing literature established by invoking the duality between l1and l∞norms. Through this Link, it is possible to adapt various research results in sparse signal processing literature to adaptive equalization problem. In fact, through utilization of such a link, we show that the amount of training data needed is in the order of the logarithm of the channel spread (or equalizer length) in the fractionally spaced equalization scenario. The numerical experiments provided validates the analytical results and the potentials of the proposed approach.