In-context learning, the ability to adapt based on a few examples in the input prompt, is a ubiquitous feature of large language models (LLMs). However, as LLMs' in-context learning abilities continue to improve, understanding this phenomenon mechanistically becomes increasingly important. In particular, it is not well-understood how LLMs learn to solve specific classes of problems, such as reinforcement learning (RL) problems, in-context. Through three different tasks, we first show that Llama $3$ $70$B can solve simple RL problems in-context. We then analyze the residual stream of Llama using Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) and find representations that closely match temporal difference (TD) errors. Notably, these representations emerge despite the model only being trained to predict the next token. We verify that these representations are indeed causally involved in the computation of TD errors and $Q$-values by performing carefully designed interventions on them. Taken together, our work establishes a methodology for studying and manipulating in-context learning with SAEs, paving the way for a more mechanistic understanding.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become models of human cognition, which opens up future research directions toward building more general cognitive models.

Large language models (LLMs) have significantly advanced the field of artificial intelligence. Yet, evaluating them comprehensively remains challenging. We argue that this is partly due to the predominant focus on performance metrics in most benchmarks. This paper introduces *CogBench*, a benchmark that includes ten behavioral metrics derived from seven cognitive psychology experiments. This novel approach offers a toolkit for phenotyping LLMs’ behavior. We apply *CogBench* to 40 LLMs, yielding a rich and diverse dataset. We analyze this data using statistical multilevel modeling techniques, accounting for the nested dependencies among fine-tuned versions of specific LLMs. Our study highlights the crucial role of model size and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) in improving performance and aligning with human behavior. Interestingly, we find that open-source models are less risk-prone than proprietary models and that fine-tuning on code does not necessarily enhance LLMs' behavior. Finally, we explore the effects of prompt-engineering techniques. We discover that chain-of-thought prompting improves probabilistic reasoning, while take-a-step-back prompting fosters model-based behaviors.

Ecological rationality refers to the notion that humans are rational agents adapted to their environment. However, testing this theory remains challenging due to two reasons: the difficulty in defining what tasks are ecologically valid and building rational models for these tasks. In this work, we demonstrate that large language models can generate cognitive tasks, specifically category learning tasks, that match the statistics of real-world tasks, thereby addressing the first challenge. We tackle the second challenge by deriving rational agents adapted to these tasks using the framework of meta-learning, leading to a class of models called ecologically rational meta-learned inference (ERMI). ERMI quantitatively explains human data better than seven other cognitive models in two different experiments. It additionally matches human behavior on a qualitative level: (1) it finds the same tasks difficult that humans find difficult, (2) it becomes more reliant on an exemplar-based strategy for assigning categories with learning, and (3) it generalizes to unseen stimuli in a human-like way. Furthermore, we show that ERMI’s ecologically valid priors allow it to achieve state-of-the-art performance on the OpenML-CC18 classification benchmark.

We study the in-context learning dynamics of large language models (LLMs) using three instrumental learning tasks adapted from cognitive psychology. We find that LLMs update their beliefs in an asymmetric manner and learn more from better-than-expected outcomes than from worse-than-expected ones. Furthermore, we show that this effect reverses when learning about counterfactual feedback and disappears when no agency is implied. We corroborate these findings by investigating idealized in-context learning agents derived through meta-reinforcement learning, where we observe similar patterns. Taken together, our results contribute to our understanding of how in-context learning works by highlighting that the framing of a problem significantly influences how learning occurs, a phenomenon also observed in human cognition.

Humans represent scenes and objects in rich feature spaces, carrying information that allows us to generalise about category memberships and abstract functions with few examples. What determines whether a neural network model generalises like a human? We tested how well the representations of $86$ pretrained neural network models mapped to human learning trajectories across two tasks where humans had to learn continuous relationships and categories of natural images. In these tasks, both human participants and neural networks successfully identified the relevant stimulus features within a few trials, demonstrating effective generalisation. We found that while training dataset size was a core determinant of alignment with human choices, contrastive training with multi-modal data (text and imagery) was a common feature of currently publicly available models that predicted human generalisation. Intrinsic dimensionality of representations had different effects on alignment for different model types. Lastly, we tested three sets of human-aligned representations and found no consistent improvements in predictive accuracy compared to the baselines. In conclusion, pretrained neural networks can serve to extract representations for cognitive models, as they appear to capture some fundamental aspects of cognition that are transferable across tasks. Both our paradigms and modelling approach offer a novel way to quantify alignment between neural networks and humans and extend cognitive science into more naturalistic domains.

As children grow older, they develop an intuitive understanding of the physical processes around them. Their physical understanding develops in stages, moving along developmental trajectories which have been mapped out extensively in previous empirical research. Here, we investigate how the learning trajectories of deep generative neural networks compare to children’s developmental trajectories using physical understanding as a testbed. We outline an approach that allows us to examine two distinct hypotheses of human development – stochastic optimization and complexity increase. We find that while our models are able to accurately predict a number of physical processes, their learning trajectories under both hypotheses do not follow the developmental trajectories of children.

Large language models have shown tremendous performance in a variety of tasks. In-context learning -- the ability to improve at a task after being provided with a number of demonstrations -- is seen as one of the main contributors to their success. In the present paper, we demonstrate that the in-context learning abilities of large language models can be recursively improved via in-context learning itself. We coin this phenomenon meta-in-context learning. Looking at two idealized domains, a one-dimensional regression task and a two-armed bandit task, we show that meta-in-context learning adaptively reshapes a large language model's priors over expected tasks. Furthermore, we find that meta-in-context learning modifies the in-context learning strategies of such models. Finally, we broaden the scope of our investigation to encompass two diverse benchmarks: one focusing on real-world regression problems and the other encompassing multiple NLP tasks. In both cases, we observe competitive performance comparable to that of traditional learning algorithms. Taken together, our work improves our understanding of in-context learning and paves the way toward adapting large language models to the environment they are applied purely through meta-in-context learning rather than traditional finetuning.

In reinforcement learning (RL), simplicity is typically quantified on an action-by-action basis -- but this timescale ignores temporal regularities, like repetitions, often present in sequential strategies. We therefore propose an RL algorithm that learns to solve tasks with sequences of actions that are compressible. We explore two possible sources of simple action sequences: Sequences that can be learned by autoregressive models, and sequences that are compressible with off-the-shelf data compression algorithms. Distilling these preferences into sequence priors, we derive a novel information-theoretic objective that incentivizes agents to learn policies that maximize rewards while conforming to these priors. We show that the resulting RL algorithm leads to faster learning, and attains higher returns than state-of-the-art model-free approaches in a series of continuous control tasks from the DeepMind Control Suite. These priors also produce a powerful information-regularized agent that is robust to noisy observations and can perform open-loop control.

Equipping artificial agents with useful exploration mechanisms remains a challenge to this day. Humans, on the other hand, seem to manage the trade-off between exploration and exploitation effortlessly. In the present article, we put forward the hypothesis that they accomplish this by making optimal use of limited computational resources. We study this hypothesis by meta-learning reinforcement learning algorithms that sacrifice performance for a shorter description length (defined as the number of bits required to implement the given algorithm). The emerging class of models captures human exploration behavior better than previously considered approaches, such as Boltzmann exploration, upper confidence bound algorithms, and Thompson sampling. We additionally demonstrate that changing the description length in our class of models produces the intended effects: reducing description length captures the behavior of brain-lesioned patients while increasing it mirrors cognitive development during adolescence.