Physical unclonable function (PUF) is a promising security-based primitive, which provides an extremely large number of responses for key generation and authentication applications. Various PUFs have been developed as central building blocks in cryptographic protocols and security architectures, however, the existing PUFs and their improvements are still vulnerable to modeling attacks (MA) with refined machine learning algorithms. In this article, a configurable butterfly delay chain-based PUF design framework is proposed to meet the requirements of randomness, reliability, uniqueness, and MA-resistance metrics. A configurable butterfly delay chain is introduced to create multiple pairs of symmetric paths and a strong PUF relying on the intrinsic delay fluctuations of two identical paths is built. Furthermore, a secure hash function is used to insert non-linearities into the PUF, and a BCH-based error correction algorithm is utilized to recover the actual responses under noisy environments. The proposed PUF is implemented on Xilinx FPGAs and three machine learning algorithms are used to evaluate the resistance against MA. Experimental results show that the randomness, reliability, and uniqueness of the proposed PUF are close to the ideal value (49.6%, 99.9%, and 49.9%, respectively), and the prediction accuracy reaches 50% that indicating a desirable resilient to MA.

Side-channel attack (SCA) is one of the physical attacks, which will reveal the confidential information from cryptographic circuits by statistically analyzing physical manifestations. Various circuit-level countermeasures have been proposed as fundamental solutions to eliminate the correlations between side-channel information and circuit’s internal operations. The existing solutions, however, will introduce nonnegligible power and area overheads, making them difficult to be deployed in resource-constrained applications. In this article, a novel three-independent-gate silicon nanowire field effect transistor (TIGFET) with the intrinsic SCA-resilience characteristics is introduced to balance the tradeoffs among cost, performance, and security of cryptographic implementations. We construct six TIGFET-based current mode logic (CML) gates that can retain lower power variation under all possible transitions compared to the CMOS counterparts. As a proof of concept, advanced encryption standard (AES), SM4 block cipher algorithm (SM4), and lightweight cryptographic algorithm PRESENT are implemented utilizing the TIGFET-based CML gates. Correlation power attack is performed to evaluate the improvement of SCA resilience. Simulation results verify that the TIGFET-based cryptographic implementations decrease 42.37% area usage, lower 61.16% energy efficiency, reduce$5.35\times $power variation, and achieve a similar level of SCA resistance compared to the CMOS counterpart, which is applicable for the resource-constrained applications.

Side-channel attack (SCA) reveals confidential information by statistically analyzing physical manifestations, which is the serious threat to cryptographic circuits. Various SCA circuit-level countermeasures have been proposed as fundamental solutions to reduce the side-channel vulnerabilities of cryptographic implementations; however, such approaches introduce non-negligible power and area overheads. Among all of the circuit components, flip-flops are the main source of information leakage. This article proposes a three-phase single-rail pulse register (TSPR) based on the three-independent-gate field effect transistor (TIGFET) to achieve all desired properties with improved metrics of area and security. TIGFET-based TSPR consumes a constant power (MCV is 0.25%), has a low delay (12 ps), and employs only 10 TIGFET devices, which is applicable for the low-overhead and high-security cryptographic circuit design compared to the existing flip-flops. In addition, a set of TIGFET-based combinational basic gates are designed to reduce the area occupation and power consumption as much as possible. As a proof of concept, a simplified advanced encryption algorithm (AES), SM4 block cipher algorithm (SM4), and light-weight cryptographic algorithm (PRESENT) are built with the TIGFET-based library. SCA is implemented on the cryptographic implementations to prove its SCA resilience, and the SCA results show that the correct key of cryptographic circuits with TIGFET-based TSPRs is not guessed within 2,000 power traces.

Password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) allows participants sharing low-entropy passwords to agree on cryptographically strong session keys over insecure networks. In this paper, we present two PAKE protocols from lattices in the two-party and three-party settings, respectively, which can resist quantum attacks and achieve mutual authentication. The protocols in this paper achieve two rounds of communication by carefully utilizing the splittable properties of the underlying primitive, a CCA (Chosen-Ciphertext Attack)-secure public key encryption (PKE) scheme with associated nonadaptive approximate smooth projection hash (NA-ASPH) system. Compared with other related protocols, the proposed two-round PAKE protocols have relatively less communication and computation overhead. In particular, the two-round 3PAKE is more practical in large-scale communication systems.