Emerging applications, like cloud services, are demanding more computational power, while also giving rise to various security and privacy challenges. Current multi-/many-core chip designs boost performance by using Networks-on-Chip (NoC) based architectures. Although NoC-based architectures significantly improve communication concurrency, they have thus far lack adequate security mechanisms such as enforceable process isolation. On the other hand, new security-aware architectures that protect applications and sensitive services in isolated execution environments, i.e., enclaves, have not been extended to provide comprehensive protection for NoC platforms. These enclave-based architectures (i) lack secure enclave-device interaction, (ii) cannot include unmodifiable third-party IP, or (iii) provide flexible enclave memory management.To address these design challenges, we introduce a new hardware security primitive, the Distributed Memory Guard, and design the first security architecture that protects sensitive services in NoC-based enclaves. We provide evaluation of this reference architecture and highlight the fact that one can design a scalable (i.e., NoC-based) and secure (i.e., enclave-based) architecture with minimal hardware complexity and system performance overhead.

The tremendous expansion of data volume has driven the transition from monolithic architectures towards systems integrated with discrete and distributed subcomponents in modern scalable high performance computing (HPC) systems. As such, multi-layered software infrastructures have become essential to bridge the gap between heterogeneous commodity devices. However, operations across synthesized components with divergent interfaces inevitably lead to redundant software footprints and undesired latency. Therefore, a scalable and unified computing platform, capable of supporting efficient interactions between individual components, is desirable for largescale data-intensive applications. In this work, we introduce the Extended Base Global Address Space, or xBGAS, microarchitecture extension to the RISC-V instruction set architecture (ISA) for scalable high performance computing. The xBGAS extension provides native ISA-level support for direct accesses to remote shared memory by mapping remote data objects into a system's extended address space. We perform both software and hardware evaluations of the xBGAS design. The results show that xBGAS reduces instruction count generated by interprocess communication by 69.26% on average. Overall, xBGAS achieves an average performance gain of 21.96% (up to 37.29%) across the tested workloads.

Approximate computing (AC) represents a paradigm shift from conventional precise processing to inexact computation but still satisfying the system requirement on accuracy. The rapid progress on the development of diverse AC techniques allows us to apply approximate computing to many computation-intensive applications. However, the utilization of AC techniques could bring in new unique security threats to computing systems. This work does a survey on existing circuit-, architecture-, and compiler-level approximate mechanisms/algorithms, with special emphasis on potential security vulnerabilities. Qualitative and quantitative analyses are performed to assess the impact of the new security threats on AC systems. Moreover, this work proposes four unique visionary attack models, which systematically cover the attacks that build covert channels, compensate approximation errors, terminate normal error resilience mechanisms, and propagate additional errors. To thwart those attacks, this work further offers the guideline of countermeasure designs. Several case studies are provided to illustrate the implementation of the suggested countermeasures.