In this paper, we study regret minimization in repeated games with \emph{adaptive} opponents whose strategies may depend on the histories of play. The classical online learning metric of \emph{external regret} does not fully capture such adaptivity, since it compares against decisions while treating the loss sequence as fixed. To account for the counterfactual reasoning of the players, we introduce a new metric, \texttt{Repeated Policy Regret (RP-Regret)}, specific to this game-theoretic setting, which measures the difference between the \emph{realized} and the \emph{best-in-hindsight} accumulated utility when all players can \emph{respond} to the history of play. Compared with existing regret notions in adaptive environments, \texttt{RP-Regret} allows stronger dynamic comparators and less restricted opponents, while still enabling the learning of better equilibria when all players minimize it. We first identify necessary conditions for achieving sublinear \texttt{RP-Regret}. The comparator strategies must have sublinear accumulated variation, and both the comparator and the opponents must have imperfect recall. Without these conditions, sublinear \texttt{RP-Regret} is impossible to achieve in general. We then provide additional sufficient conditions and algorithms for minimizing \texttt{RP-Regret}. A key challenge is that \texttt{RP-Regret} is \emph{nonconvex} in the strategy space by definition. We address this challenge through three approaches. The first approach uses a nonconvex optimization oracle, as in prior work on online nonconvex learning. The second approach minimizes a convex \emph{linearized} surrogate at each iteration, which yields the minimization of a local variant of \texttt{RP-Regret}. The third approach directly minimizes \texttt{RP-Regret} when the opponents change their strategies slowly, by reformulating the repeated game as a Markov game and optimizing over occupancy measures. Finally, we show that when all players can run algorithms to minimize the \texttt{RP-Regret} or its linearized variant, certain subgame-perfect equilibria of the repeated game can be learned. We also provide experiments to show that these regret notions can lead to more cooperative outcomes with higher utility in games such as the Stag Hunt.

This paper resolves the open question of designing near-optimal algorithms for learning imperfect-information extensive-form games from bandit feedback. We present the first line of algorithms that require only $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}((XA+YB)/\varepsilon^2)$ episodes of play to find an $\varepsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games, where $X,Y$ are the number of information sets and $A,B$ are the number of actions for the two players. This improves upon the best known sample complexity of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}((X^2A+Y^2B)/\varepsilon^2)$ by a factor of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\max\{X, Y\})$, and matches the information-theoretic lower bound up to logarithmic factors. We achieve this sample complexity by two new algorithms: Balanced Online Mirror Descent, and Balanced Counterfactual Regret Minimization. Both algorithms rely on novel approaches of integrating balanced exploration policies into their classical counterparts. We also extend our results to learning Coarse Correlated Equilibria in multi-player general-sum games.

Modern reinforcement learning (RL) commonly engages practical problems with large state spaces, where function approximation must be deployed to approximate either the value function or the policy. While recent progresses in RL theory address a rich set of RL problems with general function approximation, such successes are mostly restricted to the single-agent setting. It remains elusive how to extend these results to multi-agent RL, especially in the face of new game-theoretical challenges. This paper considers two-player zero-sum Markov Games (MGs). We propose a new algorithm that can provably find the Nash equilibrium policy using a polynomial number of samples, for any MG with low multi-agent Bellman-Eluder dimension—a new complexity measure adapted from its single-agent version (Jin et al., 2021). A key component of our new algorithm is the exploiter, which facilitates the learning of the main player by deliberately exploiting her weakness. Our theoretical framework is generic, which applies to a wide range of models including but not limited to tabular MGs, MGs with linear or kernel function approximation, and MGs with rich observations.

A conceptually appealing approach for learning Extensive-Form Games (EFGs) is to convert them to Normal-Form Games (NFGs). This approach enables us to directly translate state-of-the-art techniques and analyses in NFGs to learning EFGs, but typically suffers from computational intractability due to the exponential blow-up of the game size introduced by the conversion. In this paper, we address this problem in natural and important setups for the \emph{$\Phi$-Hedge} algorithm---A generic algorithm capable of learning a large class of equilibria for NFGs. We show that $\Phi$-Hedge can be directly used to learn Nash Equilibria (zero-sum settings), Normal-Form Coarse Correlated Equilibria (NFCCE), and Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibria (EFCE) in EFGs. We prove that, in those settings, the \emph{$\Phi$-Hedge} algorithms are equivalent to standard Online Mirror Descent (OMD) algorithms for EFGs with suitable dilated regularizers, and run in polynomial time. This new connection further allows us to design and analyze a new class of OMD algorithms based on modifying its log-partition function. In particular, we design an improved algorithm with balancing techniques that achieves a sharp $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{XAT})$ EFCE-regret under bandit-feedback in an EFG with $X$ information sets, $A$ actions, and $T$ episodes. To our best knowledge, this is the first such rate and matches the information-theoretic lower bound.

Model-based algorithms—algorithms that explore the environment through building and utilizing an estimated model—are widely used in reinforcement learning practice and theoretically shown to achieve optimal sample efficiency for single-agent reinforcement learning in Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). However, for multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games, the current best known sample complexity for model-based algorithms is rather suboptimal and compares unfavorably against recent model-free approaches. In this paper, we present a sharp analysis of model-based self-play algorithms for multi-agent Markov games. We design an algorithm \emph{Optimistic Nash Value Iteration} (Nash-VI) for two-player zero-sum Markov games that is able to output an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash policy in $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(H^3SAB/\epsilon^2)$ episodes of game playing, where $S$ is the number of states, $A,B$ are the number of actions for the two players respectively, and $H$ is the horizon length. This significantly improves over the best known model-based guarantee of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(H^4S^2AB/\epsilon^2)$, and is the first that matches the information-theoretic lower bound $\Omega(H^3S(A+B)/\epsilon^2)$ except for a $\min\{A,B\}$ factor. In addition, our guarantee compares favorably against the best known model-free algorithm if $\min\{A,B\}=o(H^3)$, and outputs a single Markov policy while existing sample-efficient model-free algorithms output a nested mixture of Markov policies that is in general non-Markov and rather inconvenient to store and execute. We further adapt our analysis to designing a provably efficient task-agnostic algorithm for zero-sum Markov games, and designing the first line of provably sample-efficient algorithms for multi-player general-sum Markov games.

We study online learning in unknown Markov games, a problem that arises in episodic multi-agent reinforcement learning where the actions of the opponents are unobservable. We show that in this challenging setting, achieving sublinear regret against the best response in hindsight is statistically hard. We then consider a weaker notion of regret by competing with the \emph{minimax value} of the game, and present an algorithm that achieves a sublinear $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(K^{2/3})$ regret after $K$ episodes. This is the first sublinear regret bound (to our knowledge) for online learning in unknown Markov games. Importantly, our regret bound is independent of the size of the opponents’ action spaces. As a result, even when the opponents’ actions are fully observable, our regret bound improves upon existing analysis (e.g., (Xie et al., 2020)) by an exponential factor in the number of opponents.

We study multi-objective reinforcement learning (RL) where an agent’s reward is represented as a vector. In settings where an agent competes against opponents, its performance is measured by the distance of its average return vector to a target set. We develop statistically and computationally efficient algorithms to approach the associated target set. Our results extend Blackwell’s approachability theorem \citep{blackwell1956analog} to tabular RL, where strategic exploration becomes essential. The algorithms presented are adaptive; their guarantees hold even without Blackwell’s approachability condition. If the opponents use fixed policies, we give an improved rate of approaching the target set while also tackling the more ambitious goal of simultaneously minimizing a scalar cost function. We discuss our analysis for this special case by relating our results to previous works on constrained RL. To our knowledge, this work provides the first provably efficient algorithms for vector-valued Markov games and our theoretical guarantees are near-optimal.

We consider the task of learning in episodic finite-horizon Markov decision processes with an unknown transition function, bandit feedback, and adversarial losses. We propose an efficient algorithm that achieves $\mathcal{\tilde{O}}(L|X|\sqrt{|A|T})$ regret with high probability, where $L$ is the horizon, $|X|$ the number of states, $|A|$ the number of actions, and T the number of episodes. To our knowledge, our algorithm is the first to ensure $\mathcal{\tilde{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ regret in this challenging setting; in fact, it achieves the same regret as (Rosenberg & Mansour, 2019a) who consider the easier setting with full-information. Our key contributions are two-fold: a tighter confidence set for the transition function; and an optimistic loss estimator that is inversely weighted by an "upper occupancy bound".

Exploration is widely regarded as one of the most challenging aspects of reinforcement learning (RL), with many naive approaches succumbing to exponential sample complexity. To isolate the challenges of exploration, we propose the following “reward-free RL” framework. In the exploration phase, the agent first collects trajectories from an MDP $M$ without a pre-specified reward function. After exploration, it is tasked with computing a near-policies under the transitions of $\mathcal{M}$ for a collection of given reward functions. This framework is particularly suitable where there are many reward functions of interest, or where the reward function is shaped by an external agent to elicit desired behavior. We give an efficient algorithm that conducts $\widetilde{O}(S^2A\mathrm{poly}(H)/\epsilon^2)$ episodes of exploration, and returns $\epsilon$-suboptimal policies for an arbitrary number of reward functions. We achieve this by finding exploratory policies that jointly visit each “significant” state with probability proportional to its maximum visitation probability under any possible policy. Moreover, our planning procedure can be instantiated by any black-box approximate planner, such as value iteration or natural policy gradient. Finally, we give a nearly-matching $\Omega(S^2AH^2/\epsilon^2)$ lower bound, demonstrating the near-optimality of our algorithm in this setting.

This paper considers the problem of designing optimal algorithms for reinforcement learning in two-player zero-sum games. We focus on self-play algorithms which learn the optimal policy by playing against itself without any direct supervision. In a tabular episodic Markov game with S states, A max-player actions and B min-player actions, the best existing algorithm for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium requires \tlO(S^2AB) steps of game playing, when only highlighting the dependency on (S,A,B). In contrast, the best existing lower bound scales as \Omega(S(A+B)) and has a significant gap from the upper bound. This paper closes this gap for the first time: we propose an optimistic variant of the Nash Q-learning algorithm with sample complexity \tlO(SAB), and a new Nash V-learning algorithm with sample complexity \tlO(S(A+B)). The latter result matches the information-theoretic lower bound in all problem-dependent parameters except for a polynomial factor of the length of each episode. In addition, we present a computational hardness result for learning the best responses against a fixed opponent in Markov games---a learning objective different from finding the Nash equilibrium.

Ultra-Wide Band (UWB) radio is capable of providing sufficient information for high accuracy localization. However, its actual performance is degraded due to the non-line-of-sight (NLOS) propagation. This paper introduces a probabilistic learning approach to mitigate the ranging error and yield uncertainties which correlate with the mitigation results. By combining variational inference with probabilistic neural networks, we propose a new probabilistic deep learning architecture, which can improve the accuracy significantly especially when the training data is limited. Results show that the proposed model can reduce the root mean square error (RMSE) of UWB ranging by 16%~56% compared with existing support vector machine approach in practical environment.

Entropy estimation is one of the prototypical problems in distribution property testing. To consistently estimate the Shannon entropy of a distribution on $S$ elements with independent samples, the optimal sample complexity scales sublinearly with $S$ as $\Theta(\frac{S}{\log S})$ as shown by Valiant and Valiant \cite{Valiant--Valiant2011}. Extending the theory and algorithms for entropy estimation to dependent data, this paper considers the problem of estimating the entropy rate of a stationary reversible Markov chain with $S$ states from a sample path of $n$ observations. We show that \begin{itemize} \item Provided the Markov chain mixes not too slowly, \textit{i.e.}, the relaxation time is at most $O(\frac{S}{\ln^3 S})$, consistent estimation is achievable when $n \gg \frac{S^2}{\log S}$. \item Provided the Markov chain has some slight dependency, \textit{i.e.}, the relaxation time is at least $1+\Omega(\frac{\ln^2 S}{\sqrt{S}})$, consistent estimation is impossible when $n \lesssim \frac{S^2}{\log S}$. \end{itemize} Under both assumptions, the optimal estimation accuracy is shown to be $\Theta(\frac{S^2}{n \log S})$. In comparison, the empirical entropy rate requires at least $\Omega(S^2)$ samples to be consistent, even when the Markov chain is memoryless. In addition to synthetic experiments, we also apply the estimators that achieve the optimal sample complexity to estimate the entropy rate of the English language in the Penn Treebank and the Google One Billion Words corpora, which provides a natural benchmark for language modeling and relates it directly to the widely used perplexity measure.