EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Sarah Scheffler
dblp:215/5730
· DBLP profile ↗
6ranked-venue papers
4as first author
4since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0003-1202-7502ORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 5 · 4 first-author · 4 since 2021Theory of computation · 1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Public Verification for Private Hash MatchingabstractEnd-to-end encryption (E2EE) prevents online services from accessing user content. This important security property is also an obstacle for content moderation methods that involve content analysis. The tension between E2EE and efforts to combat child sexual abuse material (CSAM) has become a global flashpoint in encryption policy, because the predominant method of detecting harmful content—server-side perceptual hash matching on plaintext images—is unavailable.Recent applied cryptography advances enable private hash matching (PHM), where a service can match user content against a set of known CSAM images without revealing the hash set to users or nonmatching content to the service. These designs, especially a 2021 proposal for identifying CSAM in Apple’s iCloud Photos service, have attracted widespread criticism for creating risks to security, privacy, and free expression.In this work, we aim to advance scholarship and dialogue about PHM by contributing new cryptographic methods for system verification by the general public. We begin with motivation, describing the rationale for PHM to detect CSAM and the serious societal and technical issues with its deployment. Verification could partially address shortcomings of PHM, and we systematize critiques into two areas for auditing: trust in the hash set and trust in the implementation. We explain how, while these two issues cannot be fully resolved by technology alone, there are possible cryptographic trust improvements.The central contributions of this paper are novel cryptographic protocols that enable three types of public verification for PHM systems: (1) certification that external groups approve the hash set, (2) proof that particular lawful content is not in the hash set, and (3) eventual notification to users of false positive matches. The protocols that we describe are practical, efficient, and compatible with existing PHM constructions. Sarah Scheffler, Anunay Kulshrestha, Jonathan R. Mayer |
SP | 1 |
| 2023 | SoK: Content Moderation for End-to-End EncryptionabstractPopular messaging applications now enable end-to-end-encryption (E2EE) by default, and E2EE data storage is becoming common. These important advances for security and privacy create new content moderation challenges for online services, because services can no longer directly access plaintext content. While ongoing public policy debates about E2EE and content moderation in the United States and European Union emphasize child sexual abuse material and misinformation in messaging and storage, we identify and synthesize a wealth of scholarship that goes far beyond those topics. We bridge literature that is diverse in both content moderation subject matter, such as malware, spam, hate speech, terrorist content, and enterprise policy compliance, as well as intended deployments, including not only privacy-preserving content moderation for messaging, email, and cloud storage, but also private introspection of encrypted web traffic by middleboxes. In this work, we systematize the study of content moderation in E2EE settings. We set out a process pipeline for content moderation, drawing on a broad interdisciplinary literature that is not specific to E2EE. We examine cryptography and policy design choices at all stages of this pipeline, and we suggest areas of future research to fill gaps in literature and better understand possible paths forward. Sarah Scheffler, Jonathan R. Mayer |
Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol. | 1 |
| 2021 | TurboIKOS: Improved Non-interactive Zero Knowledge and Post-quantum Signatures
Yaron Gvili, Julie Ha, Sarah Scheffler, Mayank Varia, Ziling Yang |
ACNS (2) | 3 |
| 2021 | Protecting Cryptography Against Compelled Self-Incrimination
Sarah Scheffler, Mayank Varia |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |
| 2020 | Arithmetic Expression ConstructionabstractWhen can $n$ given numbers be combined using arithmetic operators from a given subset of $\{+, -, \times, ÷\}$ to obtain a given target number? We study three variations of this problem of Arithmetic Expression Construction: when the expression (1) is unconstrained; (2) has a specified pattern of parentheses and operators (and only the numbers need to be assigned to blanks); or (3) must match a specified ordering of the numbers (but the operators and parenthesization are free). For each of these variants, and many of the subsets of $\{+,-,\times,÷\}$, we prove the problem NP-complete, sometimes in the weak sense and sometimes in the strong sense. Most of these proofs make use of a "rational function framework" which proves equivalence of these problems for values in rational functions with values in positive integers. Leo Alcock, Sualeh Asif, Jeffrey Bosboom, Josh Brunner, Charlotte Chen, Erik D. Demaine, Rogers Epstein, Adam Hesterberg, Lior Hirschfeld, William Hu, Jayson Lynch, Sarah Scheffler, Lillian Zhang |
ISAAC | 12 |
| 2018 | The Unintended Consequences of Email Spam Prevention
Sarah Scheffler, Yossi Gilad, Sharon Goldberg |
PAM | 1 |