Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Lorenz Breidenbach
dblp:216/6355
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2020
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 3 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
3 papers |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 78% Hardware security and side channels · 12% Systems and software security · 10% | |
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% |
Topics — the 9 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › decentralized finance
decentralized exchange |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning in Decentralized Exchanges, Miner Extractable Value, and Consensus Instability · SP 2020 |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › maximal extractable value
frontrunning |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning in Decentralized Exchanges, Miner Extractable Value, and Consensus Instability · SP 2020 |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security
maximal extractable value |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning in Decentralized Exchanges, Miner Extractable Value, and Consensus Instability · SP 2020 |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › blockchain interoperability
cross-chain exchange |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Tesseract: Real-Time Cryptocurrency Exchange Using Trusted Hardware · CCS 2019 |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security
cryptocurrency exchange |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Tesseract: Real-Time Cryptocurrency Exchange Using Trusted Hardware · CCS 2019 |
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | Tesseract: Real-Time Cryptocurrency Exchange Using Trusted Hardware · CCS 2019 |
Systems and software security › vulnerability management
bug bounty programs |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Enter the Hydra: Towards Principled Bug Bounties and Exploit-Resistant Smart Contracts · USENIX Security Symposium 2018 |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security
smart contract security |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Enter the Hydra: Towards Principled Bug Bounties and Exploit-Resistant Smart Contracts · USENIX Security Symposium 2018 |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security
smart contract |
0.1 | 1 | 2019 | Tesseract: Real-Time Cryptocurrency Exchange Using Trusted Hardware · CCS 2019 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
game-theoretic modeling · 0.9empirical measurement · 0.9trusted execution environment · 0.4all-or-nothing fairness · 0.4mechanism design · 0.3game theory · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning in Decentralized Exchanges, Miner Extractable Value, and Consensus InstabilityabstractBlockchains, and specifically smart contracts, have promised to create fair and transparent trading ecosystems.Unfortunately, we show that this promise has not been met. We document and quantify the widespread and rising deployment of arbitrage bots in blockchain systems, specifically in decentralized exchanges (or "DEXes"). Like high-frequency traders on Wall Street, these bots exploit inefficiencies in DEXes, paying high transaction fees and optimizing network latency to frontrun, i.e., anticipate and exploit, ordinary users' DEX trades.We study the breadth of DEX arbitrage bots in a subset of transactions that yield quantifiable revenue to these bots. We also study bots' profit-making strategies, with a focus on blockchain-specific elements. We observe bots engage in what we call priority gas auctions (PGAs), competitively bidding up transaction fees in order to obtain priority ordering, i.e., early block position and execution, for their transactions. PGAs present an interesting and complex new continuous-time, partial-information, game-theoretic model that we formalize and study. We release an interactive web portal, frontrun.me, to provide the community with real-time data on PGAs. We additionally show that high fees paid for priority transaction ordering poses a systemic risk to consensus-layer security. We explain that such fees are just one form of a general phenomenon in DEXes and beyond-what we call miner extractable value (MEV)-that poses concrete, measurable, consensus-layer security risks. We show empirically that MEV poses a realistic threat to Ethereum today. Our work highlights the large, complex risks created by transaction-ordering dependencies in smart contracts and the ways in which traditional forms of financial-market exploitation are adapting to and penetrating blockchain economies. Philip Daian, Steven Goldfeder, Tyler Kell, Yunqi Li 0002, Xueyuan Zhao, Iddo Bentov, Lorenz Breidenbach, Ari Juels |
SP | 7 |
| 2019 | Tesseract: Real-Time Cryptocurrency Exchange Using Trusted HardwareabstractWe propose Tesseract, a secure real-time cryptocurrency exchange service. Existing centralized exchange designs are vulnerable to theft of funds, while decentralized exchanges cannot offer real-time cross-chain trades. All currently deployed exchanges are also vulnerable to frontrunning attacks. Tesseract overcomes these flaws and achieves a best-of-both-worlds design by using a trusted execution environment. The task of committing the recent trade data to independent cryptocurrency systems presents an all-or-nothing fairness problem, to which we present ideal theoretical solutions, as well as practical solutions. Tesseract supports not only real-time cross-chain cryptocurrency trades, but also secure tokenization of assets pegged to cryptocurrencies. For instance, Tesseract-tokenized bitcoins can circulate on the Ethereum blockchain for use in smart contracts. We provide a demo implementation of Tesseract that supports Bitcoin, Ethereum, and similar cryptocurrencies. Iddo Bentov, Yan Ji 0001, Fan Zhang 0022, Lorenz Breidenbach, Philip Daian, Ari Juels |
CCS | 4 |
| 2018 | Enter the Hydra: Towards Principled Bug Bounties and Exploit-Resistant Smart Contracts
Lorenz Breidenbach, Philip Daian, Florian Tramèr, Ari Juels |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |