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Pawel Batko

dblp:216/7543 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-authorGraphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › social choice › computational social choice › multiwinner voting
approval-based committee voting
0.512021
An Analysis of Approval-Based Committee Rules for 2D-Euclidean Elections · AAAI 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › social choice
computational social choice
0.512021
An Analysis of Approval-Based Committee Rules for 2D-Euclidean Elections · AAAI 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › social choice › computational social choice
computational complexity of voting rules
0.112021
An Analysis of Approval-Based Committee Rules for 2D-Euclidean Elections · AAAI 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › social choice › computational social choice
spatial voting
0.112021
An Analysis of Approval-Based Committee Rules for 2D-Euclidean Elections · AAAI 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 An Analysis of Approval-Based Committee Rules for 2D-Euclidean Elections
abstract
We study approval-based committee elections for the case where the voters' preferences come from a 2D-Euclidean model. We consider two main issues: First, we ask for the complexity of computing election results. Second, we evaluate election outcomes experimentally, following the visualization technique of Elkind et al., (AAAI-2017). Regarding the first issue, we find that many NP-hard rules remain intractable for 2D-Euclidean elections. For the second one, we observe that the behavior and nature of many rules strongly depends on the exact protocol for choosing the approved candidates.
Michal Tomasz Godziszewski, Pawel Batko, Piotr Skowron 0001, Piotr Faliszewski
AAAI2
2018 Actor model of Anemone functional language
abstract
This paper describes actor system of a new functional language called Anemone and compares it with actor systems of Scala and Erlang. Implementation details of the actor system are described. Performance evaluation is provided on sequential and concurrent programs.
Pawel Batko, Marcin Kuta
J. Supercomput.1