EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Aliakbar Sadeghi
dblp:217/1229 · also AliAkbar Sadeghi
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0005-0451-9621ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 3 · 3 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | KubeKeeper: Protecting Kubernetes Secrets Against Excessive PermissionsabstractKubernetes has become the dominant platform for managing containerized applications, but its native Secrets management mechanisms introduce security vulnerabilities, especially in environments where third-party applications may have excessive permissions. In this paper, we present KubeKeeper, a comprehensive solution for protecting Kubernetes Secrets against leakage due to excessive permissions. KubeKeeper automatically encrypts Secrets and ensures that only explicitly authorized Pods can access their decrypted form. This is achieved by integrating with Kubernetes’ admission control framework to transparently enforce access policies, without requiring changes to application code and with minimal integration effort into existing cluster infrastructure. We evaluated KubeKeeper on a diverse set of 498 Kubernetes applications and demonstrate that it successfully protects Secrets against all identified excessive permissions, without introducing performance degradation during execution or any significant overhead during Pod creation and deployment. Maryam Rostamipoor, Aliakbar Sadeghi, Michalis Polychronakis |
EuroS&P | 2 |
| 2025 | Saecred: A State-Aware, Over-the-Air Protocol Testing Approach for Discovering Parsing Bugs in SAE Handshake Implementations of COTS Wi-Fi Access PointsabstractWPA3-Personal introduced the stateful Simultane-ous Authentication of Equals (SAE) handshake protocol to achieve forward secrecy and resistance to passphrase guessing attacks during Wi-Fi connection bootstrapping, guarantees that are lacking in WPA2-Personal. However, the initial design of WPA3-Personal with SAE was susceptible to connection downgrade and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. The current, enhanced version introduces mechanisms to mitigate these vulnerabilities. Enabling these security-enhancing mechanisms, however, results in a variable-structured, context-sensitive packet format that can be challenging to parse and interpret correctly. Misparsing SAE handshake packets can negatively impact Wi-Fi protocol security. To uncover SAE handshake packet misparsing in commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Wi-Fi access points (APs), we present Saecred,a packet-structure-guided, SAE-state-aware black-box fuzzer. Saecredreduces the underlying problem of misparsing discovery to a two-dimensional search problem, where the dimensions are the packet structure and the underlying SAE protocol state. It solves this search problem by combining Iterative Deepening Search (IDS) with a context-sensitive grammar-based fuzzing approach, where the latter relies on a Syntax-Guided Synthesis (SyGuS) solver. Saecred'seffectiveness is demonstrated by evaluating it on 6 COTS APs and the widely used open-source hostapd. Our evaluation discovered several instances of 4 classes of bugs. Bugs in two of these classes violate the two fundamental guarantees SAE expects to achieve (i.e., resistance to downgrade and DoS attacks). We reported our findings to the relevant stakeholders, which resulted in patches and security advisories. Muhammad Daniyal Pirwani Dar, Robert Lorch, Aliakbar Sadeghi, Vincenzo Sorcigli, Héloïse Gollier, Cesare Tinelli, Mathy Vanhoef, Omar Chowdhury |
SP | 3 |
| 2025 | On the Performance and Consistency Trade-off of the eSIM M2M Remote Provisioning ProtocolabstractThis paper analyzes the Embedded SIM card's Machine-to-Machine Remote Provisioning Protocol's (eSIM M2M RSP) design. The eSIM M2M RSP simplifies 5G connectivity for IoT devices by securely delivering connection bootstrapping information over the air without human intervention. As IoT adoption with 5G connectivity surges, the eSIM infrastructure must handle a growing number of concurrent remote SIM provisioning requests. The statefulness and shared states of the RSP make it challenging and error-prone to implement concurrency without data races. The GSMA eSIM standard does not explicitly define any atomicity assumptions required for concurrent execution. A formal analysis of the standard-prescribed M2M RSP design reveals that explicit atomicity assumptions are necessary; without them, 31 data races can violate key invariants. During the responsible disclosure process, discussions with the standards body revealed that the M2M RSP design relies on unstated and implicit atomicity assumptions. However, we find that the standard prescribed implicit assumptions are not strong enough to maintain all the invariants. The identified race conditions can be exploited by third-party eSIM management platforms to defraud network operators. To mitigate these risks, we developed a fine-grained synchronization mechanism that we formally verified for correctness and empirically evaluated for performance. Empirical evaluations show that our synchronization mechanism ensures correctness while outperforming a baseline with a 6× speed up. Mitziu Echeverria, Aliakbar Sadeghi, G. M. Tasnim Alam, Omar Chowdhury |
WISEC | 2 |