Opponent modeling methods typically involve two crucial steps: building a belief distribution over opponents' strategies, and exploiting this opponent model by playing a best response. However, existing approaches typically require domain-specific heurstics to come up with such a model, and algorithms for approximating best responses are hard to scale in large, imperfect information domains. In this work, we introduce a scalable and generic multiagent training regime for opponent modeling using deep game-theoretic reinforcement learning. We first propose Generative Best Respoonse (GenBR), a best response algorithm based on Monte-Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) with a learned deep generative model that samples world states during planning. This new method scales to large imperfect information domains and can be plug and play in a variety of multiagent algorithms. We use this new method under the framework of Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), to automate the generation of an offline opponent model via iterative game-theoretic reasoning and population-based training. We propose using solution concepts based on bargaining theory to build up an opponent mixture, which we find identifying profiles that are near the Pareto frontier. Then GenBR keeps updating an online opponent model and reacts against it during gameplay. We conduct behavioral studies where human participants negotiate with our agents in Deal-or-No-Deal, a class of bilateral bargaining games. Search with generative modeling finds stronger policies during both training time and test time, enables online Bayesian co-player prediction, and can produce agents that achieve comparable social welfare and Nash bargaining score negotiating with humans as humans trading among themselves.

Human participants play a central role in the development of modern artificial intelligence (AI) technology, in psychological science, and in user research. Recent advances in generative AI have attracted growing interest to the possibility of replacing human participants in these domains with AI surrogates. We survey several such “substitution proposals” to better understand the arguments for and against substituting human participants with modern generative AI. Our scoping review indicates that the recent wave of these proposals is motivated by goals such as reducing the costs of research and development work and increasing the diversity of collected data. However, these proposals ignore and ultimately conflict with foundational values of work with human participants: representation, inclusion, and understanding. This paper critically examines the principles and goals underlying human participation to help chart out paths for future work that truly centers and empowers participants.

Abstract Interaction and cooperation with humans are overarching aspirations of artificial intelligence research. Recent studies demonstrate that AI agents trained with deep reinforcement learning are capable of collaborating with humans. These studies primarily evaluate human compatibility through “objective” metrics such as task performance, obscuring potential variation in the levels of trust and subjective preference that different agents garner. To better understand the factors shaping subjective preferences in human-agent cooperation, we train deep reinforcement learning agents in Coins, a two-player social dilemma. We recruit $$N = 501$$ N = 501 participants for a human-agent cooperation study and measure their impressions of the agents they encounter. Participants’ perceptions of warmth and competence predict their stated preferences for different agents, above and beyond objective performance metrics. Drawing inspiration from social science and biology research, we subsequently implement a new “partner choice” framework to elicit revealed preferences: after playing an episode with an agent, participants are asked whether they would like to play the next episode with the same agent or to play alone. As with stated preferences, social perception better predicts participants’ revealed preferences than does objective performance. Given these results, we recommend human-agent interaction researchers routinely incorporate the measurement of social perception and subjective preferences into their studies.

Abstract Generalization is a major challenge for multi-agent reinforcement learning. How well does an agent perform when placed in novel environments and in interactions with new co-players? In this paper, we investigate and quantify the relationship between generalization and diversity in the multi-agent domain. Across the range of multi-agent environments considered here, procedurally generating training levels significantly improves agent performance on held-out levels. However, agent performance on the specific levels used in training sometimes declines as a result. To better understand the effects of co-player variation, our experiments introduce a new environment-agnostic measure of behavioral diversity. Results demonstrate that population size and intrinsic motivation are both effective methods of generating greater population diversity. In turn, training with a diverse set of co-players strengthens agent performance in some (but not all) cases.

Advances in algorithmic fairness have largely omitted sexual orientation and gender identity. We explore queer concerns in privacy, censorship, language, online safety, health, and employment to study the positive and negative effects of artificial intelligence on queer communities. These issues underscore the need for new directions in fairness research that take into account a multiplicity of considerations, from privacy preservation, context sensitivity and process fairness, to an awareness of sociotechnical impact and the increasingly important role of inclusive and participatory research processes. Most current approaches for algorithmic fairness assume that the target characteristics for fairness---frequently, race and legal gender---can be observed or recorded. Sexual orientation and gender identity are prototypical instances of unobserved characteristics, which are frequently missing, unknown or fundamentally unmeasurable. This paper highlights the importance of developing new approaches for algorithmic fairness that break away from the prevailing assumption of observed characteristics.

Collaborating with humans requires rapidly adapting to their individual strengths, weaknesses, and preferences. Unfortunately, most standard multi-agent reinforcement learning techniques, such as self-play (SP) or population play (PP), produce agents that overfit to their training partners and do not generalize well to humans. Alternatively, researchers can collect human data, train a human model using behavioral cloning, and then use that model to train "human-aware" agents ("behavioral cloning play", or BCP). While such an approach can improve the generalization of agents to new human co-players, it involves the onerous and expensive step of collecting large amounts of human data first. Here, we study the problem of how to train agents that collaborate well with human partners without using human data. We argue that the crux of the problem is to produce a diverse set of training partners. Drawing inspiration from successful multi-agent approaches in competitive domains, we find that a surprisingly simple approach is highly effective. We train our agent partner as the best response to a population of self-play agents and their past checkpoints taken throughout training, a method we call Fictitious Co-Play (FCP). Our experiments focus on a two-player collaborative cooking simulator that has recently been proposed as a challenge problem for coordination with humans. We find that FCP agents score significantly higher than SP, PP, and BCP when paired with novel agent and human partners. Furthermore, humans also report a strong subjective preference to partnering with FCP agents over all baselines.

Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able to explain this phenomenon for unrealistic stateless matrix games. Recently, multi-agent reinforcement learning has been applied to generalize social dilemma problems to temporally and spatially extended Markov games. However, this has not yet generated an agent that learns to cooperate in social dilemmas as humans do. A key insight is that many, but not all, human individuals have inequity averse social preferences. This promotes a particular resolution of the matrix game social dilemma wherein inequity-averse individuals are personally pro-social and punish defectors. Here we extend this idea to Markov games and show that it promotes cooperation in several types of sequential social dilemma, via a profitable interaction with policy learnability. In particular, we find that inequity aversion improves temporal credit assignment for the important class of intertemporal social dilemmas. These results help explain how large-scale cooperation may emerge and persist.