Digital labor markets are increasingly used to procure diverse forms of human input, from data annotation to food delivery. A central concern in such markets is the ability of platforms to suppress wages by exploiting the abundance of low-cost labor. To better understand labor outcomes, we introduce a novel posted-price procurement model with coverage objectives. In our model a platform seeks to acquire a set of M tasks while minimizing wait time, as well as total spending. Workers are sampled from a population and complete a task if the posted price is higher than their estimated cost of labor. First, we show that with a simple pricing strategy the platform can cover all categories in time O(M), while paying only a O(log(M)/M) fraction of the total cost of labor by exploiting high worker uncertainty about their costs. Then, we study the impact of collective action to prevent the exploitation of workers. We show how a small, strategically chosen coalition of workers that commits to a price floor forces the platform's total spending from logarithmic to linear in M, substantially reducing the power of the platform to suppress wages. In contrast, a randomly sampled coalition of equal size remains largely ineffective. We complement our theory with synthetic experiments that demonstrate the benefit of targeted recruitment for collective action across different market regimes. More broadly, our results provide a theoretical foundation for understanding how to organize collective bargaining for promoting welfare in digital labor markets.

Improving social welfare is a complex challenge requiring policymakers to optimize objectives across multiple time horizons. Evaluating the impact of such policies presents a fundamental challenge, as those that appear suboptimal in the short run may yield significant long-term benefits. We tackle this challenge by analyzing the long-term dynamics of two prominent policy frameworks: Rawlsian policies, which prioritize those with the greatest need, and utilitarian policies, which maximize immediate welfare gains. Conventional wisdom suggests these policies are at odds, as Rawlsian policies are assumed to come at the cost of reducing the average social welfare, which their utilitarian counterparts directly optimize. We challenge this assumption by analyzing these policies in a sequential decision-making framework where individuals' welfare levels stochastically decay over time, and policymakers can intervene to prevent this decay. Under reasonable assumptions, we prove that interventions following Rawlsian policies can outperform utilitarian policies in the long run, even when the latter dominate in the short run. We characterize the exact conditions under which Rawlsian policies can outperform utilitarian policies. We further illustrate our theoretical findings using simulations, which highlight the risks of evaluating policies based solely on their short-term effects. Our results underscore the necessity of considering long-term horizons in designing and evaluating welfare policies; the true efficacy of even well-established policies may only emerge over time.

Many applications of RCTs involve the presence of multiple treatment administrators—from field experiments to online advertising—that compete for the subjects’ attention. In the face of competition, estimating a causal effect becomes difficult, as the position at which a subject sees a treatment influences their response, and thus the treatment effect. In this paper, we build a game-theoretic model of agents who wish to estimate causal effects in the presence of competition, through a bidding system and a utility function that minimizes estimation error. Our main technical result establishes an approximation with a tractable objective that maximizes the sample value obtained through strategically allocating budget on subjects. This allows us to find an equilibrium in our model: we show that the tractable objective has a pure Nash equilibrium, and that any Nash equilibrium is an approximate equilibrium for our general objective that minimizes estimation error under broad conditions. Conceptually, our work successfully combines elements from causal inference and game theory to shed light on the equilibrium behavior of experimentation under competition.

We study fairness in social influence maximization, whereby one seeks to select seeds that spread a given information throughout a network, ensuring balanced outreach among different communities (e.g. demographic groups). In the literature, fairness is often quantified in terms of the expected outreach within individual communities. In this paper, we demonstrate that such fairness metrics can be misleading since they overlook the stochastic nature of information diffusion processes. When information diffusion occurs in a probabilistic manner, multiple outreach scenarios can occur. As such, outcomes such as “In 50% of the cases, no one in group 1 gets the information, while everyone in group 2 does, and in the other 50%, it is the opposite”, which always results in largely unfair outcomes, are classified as fair by a variety of fairness metrics in the literature. We tackle this problem by designing a new fairness metric, mutual fairness, that captures variability in outreach through optimal transport theory. We propose a new seed- selection algorithm that optimizes both outreach and mutual fairness, and we show its efficacy on several real datasets. We find that our algorithm increases fairness with only a minor decrease (and at times, even an increase) in efficiency.

Fairness in clustering has been considered extensively in the past; however, the trade-off between the two objectives --- e.g., can we sacrifice just a little in the quality of the clustering to significantly increase fairness, or vice-versa? --- has rarely been addressed. We introduce novel algorithms for tracing the complete trade-off curve, or Pareto front, between quality and fairness in clustering problems; that is, computing all clusterings that are not dominated in both objectives by other clusterings. Unlike previous work that deals with specific objectives for quality and fairness, we deal with all objectives for fairness and quality in two general classes encompassing most of the special cases addressed in previous work. Our algorithm must take exponential time in the worst case as the Parero front itself can be exponential. Even when the Pareto front is polynomial, our algorithm may take exponential time, and we prove that this is inevitable unless P = NP. However, we also present a new polynomial-time algorithm for computing the entire Pareto front when the cluster centers are fixed, and for perhaps the most natural fairness objective: minimizing the sum, over all clusters, of the imbalance between the two groups in each cluster.

In this paper, we investigate the conditions under which link analysis algorithms prevent minority groups from reaching high ranking slots. We find that the most common link-based algorithms using centrality metrics, such as PageRank and HITS, can reproduce and even amplify bias against minority groups in networks. Yet, their behavior differs: one one hand, we empirically show that PageRank mirrors the degree distribution for most of the ranking positions and it can equalize representation of minorities among the top ranked nodes; on the other hand, we find that HITS amplifies pre-existing bias in homophilic networks through a novel theoretical analysis, supported by empirical results. We find the root cause of bias amplification in HITS to be the level of homophily present in the network, modeled through an evolving network model with two communities. We illustrate our theoretical analysis on both synthetic and real datasets and we present directions for future work.

The problem of social influence maximization is widely applicable in designing viral campaigns, news dissemination, or medical aid. State-of-the-art algorithms often select “early adopters” that are most central in a network unfortunately mirroring or exacerbating historical biases and leaving under-represented communities out of the loop. Through a theoretical model of biased networks, we characterize the intricate relationship between diversity and efficiency, which sometimes may be at odds but may also reinforce each other. Most importantly, we find a mathematically proven analytical condition under which more equitable choices of early adopters lead simultaneously to fairer outcomes and larger outreach. Analysis of data on the DBLP network confirms that our condition is often met in real networks. We design and test a set of algorithms leveraging the network structure to optimize the diffusion of a message while avoiding to create disparate impact among participants based on their demographics, such as gender or race.

As social recommendations such as friend suggestions and people to follow become increasingly popular and influential on the growth of social media, we find that prominent social recommendation algorithms can exacerbate the under-representation of certain demographic groups at the top of the social hierarchy. To study this imbalance in online equal opportunities, we leverage new Instagram data and offer for the first time an analysis that studies the effect of gender, homophily and growth dynamics under social recommendations. Our mathematical analysis demonstrates the existence of an algorithmic glass ceiling that exhibits all the properties of the metaphorical social barrier that hinders groups like women or people of color from attaining equal representation. What raises concern is that our proof shows that under fixed minority and homophily parameters the algorithmic effect is systematically larger than the glass ceiling generated by the spontaneous growth of social networks. We discuss ways to address this concern in future design.