EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Chris Evans
dblp:22/2651
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2010
—ORCID · unresolved
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Web and mobile security · 54% Network security · 23% Security and privacy of machine learning · 23% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Security and privacy of machine learning › federated learning defense
client-side defense |
0.1 | 1 | 2010 | Protecting browsers from cross-origin CSS attacks · CCS 2010 |
Network security › wireless network security › cognitive radio network security
cooperative spectrum sensing attack |
0.1 | 1 | 2010 | Protecting browsers from cross-origin CSS attacks · CCS 2010 |
Web and mobile security › web attacks
cross-origin attacks |
0.1 | 1 | 2010 | Protecting browsers from cross-origin CSS attacks · CCS 2010 |
Web and mobile security
web security |
0.1 | 1 | 2010 | Protecting browsers from cross-origin CSS attacks · CCS 2010 |
Web and mobile security › web security
session hijacking |
0.0 | 1 | 2010 | Protecting browsers from cross-origin CSS attacks · CCS 2010 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
style sheet import analysis · 0.1client-side defense · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | Protecting browsers from cross-origin CSS attacksabstractCross-origin CSS attacks use style sheet import to steal confidential information from a victim website, hijacking a user's existing authenticated session; existing XSS defenses are ineffective. We show how to conduct these attacks with any browser, even if JavaScript is disabled, and propose a client-side defense with little or no impact on the vast majority of web sites. We have implemented and deployed defenses in Firefox, Google Chrome, and Safari. Our defense proposal has also been adopted by Opera. Lin-Shung Huang, Zachary Weinberg, Chris Evans, Collin Jackson |
CCS | 3 |