With continuing advances in the development of low-power electronics, including sensors and actuators, we anticipate a rapid expansion of pervasive computing. Wearable devices, in particular, require new modes for interaction -- many have no keyboard or touchscreen. In this work, we focus on user authentication on wearable devices. For an entertainment device, such as a VR headset, it can recognize the user and load the right game profile or music playlist. For a house climate-control system, it can adjust the environment to the wearer's preference. Most compellingly, for a health-monitoring device, it can label the sensor data with the correct identity so that the data can be stored in the correct health record. (A mix-up of sensor data could lead to incorrect decisions, with harm to the patient.) Because not all devices are personal devices -- my phone, your fitness sensor -- many devices will need to automatically recognize their wearer. They may have no interface for user identification (or PIN or password for authentication). Thus, we need a simple, wearable biometric technique to identify the user -- which could be embedded in one authentication device that shares the identity with a body-area network of other devices (earlier confirmed to be on the same body). This device should be trained once, for each user that might wear it, but thenceforth be completely automatic. Although a wristband could use a physiological biometric to recognize its wearer; we seek an alternative biometric, notably, one that might work for devices mounted on the head, neck, or chest.

Body-area networks of pervasive wearable devices are increasingly used for health monitoring, personal assistance, entertainment, and home automation. In an ideal world, a user would simply wear their desired set of devices with no configuration necessary: the devices would discover each other, recognize that they are on the same person, construct a secure communications channel, and recognize the user to which they are attached. In this paper we address a portion of this vision by offering a wearable system that unobtrusively recognizes the person wearing it. Because it can recognize the user, our system can properly label sensor data or personalize interactions.

Common authentication methods based on passwords, tokens, or fingerprints perform one-time authentication and rely on users to log out from the computer terminal when they leave. Users often do not log out, however, which is a security risk. The most common solution, inactivity timeouts, inevitably fail security (too long a timeout) or usability (too short a timeout) goals. One solution is to authenticate users continuously while they are using the terminal and automatically log them out when they leave. Several solutions are based on user proximity, but these are not sufficient: they only confirm whether the user is nearby but not whether the user is actually using the terminal. Proposed solutions based on behavioral biometric authentication (e.g., keystroke dynamics) may not be reliable, as a recent study suggests. To address this problem we propose Zero-Effort Bilateral Recurring Authentication (ZEBRA). In ZEBRA, a user wears a bracelet (with a built-in accelerometer, gyroscope, and radio) on her dominant wrist. When the user interacts with a computer terminal, the bracelet records the wrist movement, processes it, and sends it to the terminal. The terminal compares the wrist movement with the inputs it receives from the user (via keyboard and mouse), and confirms the continued presence of the user only if they correlate. Because the bracelet is on the same hand that provides inputs to the terminal, the accelerometer and gyroscope data and input events received by the terminal should correlate because their source is the same - the user's hand movement. In our experiments ZEBRA performed continuous authentication with 85% accuracy in verifying the correct user and identified all adversaries within 11s. For a different threshold that trades security for usability, ZEBRA correctly verified 90% of users and identified all adversaries within 50s.

Anonymizing networks such as Tor allow users to access Internet services privately by using a series of routers to hide the client's IP address from the server. The success of such networks, however, has been limited by users employing this anonymity for abusive purposes such as defacing popular Web sites. Web site administrators routinely rely on IP-address blocking for disabling access to misbehaving users, but blocking IP addresses is not practical if the abuser routes through an anonymizing network. As a result, administrators block all known exit nodes of anonymizing networks, denying anonymous access to misbehaving and behaving users alike. To address this problem, we present Nymble, a system in which servers can “blacklist” misbehaving users, thereby blocking users without compromising their anonymity. Our system is thus agnostic to different servers' definitions of misbehavior-servers can blacklist users for whatever reason, and the privacy of blacklisted users is maintained.

We present Darwin, an enabling technology for mobile phone sensing that combines collaborative sensing and classification techniques to reason about human behavior and context on mobile phones. Darwin advances mobile phone sensing through the deployment of efficient but sophisticated machine learning techniques specifically designed to run directly on sensor-enabled mobile phones (i.e., smartphones). Darwin tackles three key sensing and inference challenges that are barriers to mass-scale adoption of mobile phone sensing applications: (i) the human-burden of training classifiers, (ii) the ability to perform reliably in different environments (e.g., indoor, outdoor) and (iii) the ability to scale to a large number of phones without jeopardizing the "phone experience" (e.g., usability and battery lifetime). Darwin is a collaborative reasoning framework built on three concepts: classifier/model evolution, model pooling, and collaborative inference. To the best of our knowledge Darwin is the first system that applies distributed machine learning techniques and collaborative inference concepts to mobile phones. We implement the Darwin system on the Nokia N97 and Apple iPhone. While Darwin represents a general framework applicable to a wide variety of emerging mobile sensing applications, we implement a speaker recognition application and an augmented reality application to evaluate the benefits of Darwin. We show experimental results from eight individuals carrying Nokia N97s and demonstrate that Darwin improves the reliability and scalability of the proof-of-concept speaker recognition application without additional burden to users.

In people-centric opportunistic sensing, people offer their mobile nodes (such as smart phones) as platforms for collecting sensor data. A sensing application distributes sensing 'tasks', which specify what sensor data to collect and under what conditions to report the data back to the application. To perform a task, mobile nodes may use on-board sensors, a body-area network of personal sensors, or sensors from neighboring nodes that volunteer to contribute their sensing resources. In all three cases, continuous sensor monitoring can drain a node's battery. We propose DEAMON (Distributed Energy-Aware MONitoring), an energy-efficient distributed algorithm for long-term sensor monitoring. Our approach assumes only that mobile nodes are tasked to report sensor data under conditions specified by a Boolean expression, and that a network of nearby sensor nodes contribute to monitoring subsets of the task's sensors. Our algorithm to select sensor nodes and to monitor the sensing condition conserves energy of all nodes by limiting sensing and communication operations. We evaluate DEAMON with a stochastic analysis and with simulation results, and show that it should significantly reduce energy consumption.

Personal mobile devices are increasingly equipped with the capability to sense the physical world (through cameras, microphones, and accelerometers, for example) and the, network world (with Wi-Fi and Bluetooth interfaces). Such devices offer many new opportunities for cooperative sensing applications. For example, users' mobile phones may contribute data to community-oriented information services, from city-wide pollution monitoring to enterprise-wide detection of unauthorized Wi-Fi access points. This people-centric mobile-sensing model introduces a new security challenge in the design of mobile systems: protecting the privacy of participants while allowing their devices to reliably contribute high-quality data to these large-scale applications.

We propose a simple active method for discovering facts about the chipset, the firmware or the driver of an 802.11 wireless device by observing its responses (or lack thereof) to a series of crafted non-standard or malformed 802.11 frames. We demonstrate that such responses can differ significantly enough to distinguish between a number of popular chipsets and drivers. We expect to significantly expand the number of recognized device types through community contributions of signature data for the proposed open fingerprinting framework. Our method complements known fingerprinting approaches, and can be used to interrogate and spot devices that may be spoofing their MAC addresses in order to conceal their true architecture from other stations, such as a fake AP seeking to engage clients in complex protocol frame exchange (e.g., in order to exploit a driver vulnerability). In particular, it can be used to distinguish rogue APs from legitimate APs before association.