Cache timing channel attacks exploit the inherent properties of cache memories: hit and miss time along with the shared nature of the cache to leak secret information. The side channel and covert channel are the two well-known cache timing channel attacks. In this article, we propose Restricted Static Pseudo-Partitioning (RSPP), an effective partition-based mitigation mechanism that restricts the cache access of only the adversaries involved in the attack. It has an insignificant impact of only 1% in performance, as the benign processes have access to the full cache and restrictions are limited only to the suspicious processes and cache sets. It can be implemented with a maximum storage overhead of 1.45% of the total Last-Level Cache (LLC) size. This article presents three variations of the proposed attack mitigation mechanism: RSPP, simplified-RSPP (S-RSPP) and corewise-RSPP (C-RSPP) with different hardware overheads. A full system simulator is used for evaluating the performance impact of RSPP. A detailed experimental analysis with different LLC and attack parameters is also discussed. RSPP is also compared with the existing defense mechanisms effective against cross-core covert channel attacks.

Dynamic cache partitioning for shared Last Level Caches (LLC) is deployed in most modern multicore systems to achieve process isolation and fairness among the applications and avoid security threats. Since LLC has visibility of all cache blocks requested by several applications running on a multicore system, a malicious application can potentially threaten the system that can leverage the dynamic partitioning schemes applied to the LLCs by creating a timing-based covert channel attack. We call it as Cache Partitioned Covert Channel (CPCC) attack. The malicious applications may contain a trojan and a spy and use the underlying shared memory to create the attack. Through this attack, secret pieces of information like encryption keys or any secret information can be transmitted between the intended parties. We have observed that CPCC can target single or multiple cache sets to achieve a higher transmission rate with a maximum error rate of 5% only. The paper also addresses a few defense strategies that can avoid such cache partitioning based covert channel attacks.

The force histogram is a quantitative representation of relative position between two objects. For 2D data, two algorithms are defined: a well-functioning line-based algorithm, and Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) based algorithm that has a high computational cost. The line-based algorithm has previously been extended to the 3D case, but found to be unstable, and affected by a variety of factors. This thesis presents an extension of the FFT-based algorithm to the 3D case along with an analysis that demonstrates that, with the exception of a few special cases, the computational time of the 3D FFT-based algorithm is less than the line-based version. In addition, the results included here shown that the FFT-based algorithm is independent of the number of directions, the types of forces, and the shapes of the objects (convex, concave, disjoint or overlapping).