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Anter Faree

dblp:221/1601 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
0000-0002-9356-3827ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 1Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 67% Systems and software security · 33%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Cloud and datacenter computing · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › software protection › code obfuscation
control flow obfuscation
0.412019
CFHider: Control Flow Obfuscation with Intel SGX · INFOCOM 2019
Hardware security and side channels › trusted execution environments
Intel SGX
0.412019
CFHider: Control Flow Obfuscation with Intel SGX · INFOCOM 2019
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments
0.412019
CFHider: Control Flow Obfuscation with Intel SGX · INFOCOM 2019
Cloud and datacenter computing › cloud security
untrusted cloud
0.112019
CFHider: Control Flow Obfuscation with Intel SGX · INFOCOM 2019

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

program transformation · 0.8SGX · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2019 CFHider: Control Flow Obfuscation with Intel SGX
abstract
When a program is executed on an untrusted cloud, the confidentiality of the program's logics needs to be protected. Control flow obfuscation is a direct approach to obtain this goal. However, existing methods in this direction cannot achieve both high confidentiality and low overhead. In this paper, we propose CFHider, a hardware-assisted method to protect the control flow confidentiality. By combining program transformation and Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) technology, CFHider moves branch statement conditions to an opaque and trusted memory space, i.e., the enclave, thereby offering a guaranteed control flow confidentiality. Based on the design of CFHider, we developed a prototype system targeting on Java applications. Our analysis and experimental results indicate that CFHider is effective in protecting the control flow confidentiality and incurs a much reduced performance overhead than existing software-based solutions (by a factor of 8.8).
Yongzhi Wang 0001, Yulong Shen 0001, Cuicui Su, Ke Cheng 0001, Anter Faree, Yao Liu 0007
INFOCOM6
2019 Selfholding: A combined attack model using selfish mining with block withholding attack
Xuewen Dong, Anter Faree, Deke Guo, Yulong Shen 0001, Jianfeng Ma 0001
Comput. Secur.3