Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Surabhi Gujar
dblp:221/2873 · also Surabhi Satyajit Gujar
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2018
0000-0002-8827-7076ORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Systems, architecture and hardware · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Hardware security and side channels · 100% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper |
Processor architecture and microarchitecture · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Hardware security and side channels › fault attacks › fault injection attack
electromagnetic fault injection |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Inducing local timing fault through EM injection · DAC 2018 |
Hardware security and side channels
fault attacks |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Inducing local timing fault through EM injection · DAC 2018 |
Processor architecture and microarchitecture › instruction set architecture › RISC
RISC processor |
0.1 | 1 | 2018 | Inducing local timing fault through EM injection · DAC 2018 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
wire-level analysis · 0.7gate-level analysis · 0.7electromagnetic injection · 0.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | Inducing local timing fault through EM injectionabstractElectromagnetic fault injection (EMFI) is an efficient class of physical attacks that can compromise the immunity of secure cryptographic algorithms. Despite successful EMFI attacks, the effects of electromagnetic injection (EM) on a processor are not well understood. This paper presents a bottom-up analysis of EMFI effects on a RISC microprocessor. We study these effects at three levels: at the wire-level, at the chip-network level, and at the gate-level considering parameters such as EM-injection location and timing. We conclude that EMFI induces local timing errors implying current timing attack detection and prevention techniques can be adapted to overcome EMFI. Marjan Ghodrati, Bilgiday Yuce, Surabhi Gujar, Chinmay Deshpande, Leyla Nazhandali, Patrick Schaumont |
DAC | 3 |