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Surabhi Gujar

dblp:221/2873 · also Surabhi Satyajit Gujar · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2018
0000-0002-8827-7076ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 100%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Processor architecture and microarchitecture · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels › fault attacks › fault injection attack
electromagnetic fault injection
0.312018
Inducing local timing fault through EM injection · DAC 2018
Hardware security and side channels
fault attacks
0.312018
Inducing local timing fault through EM injection · DAC 2018
Processor architecture and microarchitecture › instruction set architecture › RISC
RISC processor
0.112018
Inducing local timing fault through EM injection · DAC 2018

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

wire-level analysis · 0.7gate-level analysis · 0.7electromagnetic injection · 0.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2018 Inducing local timing fault through EM injection
abstract
Electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI) is an efficient class of physical attacks that can compromise the immunity of secure cryptographic algorithms. Despite successful EMFI attacks, the effects of electromagnetic injection (EM) on a processor are not well understood. This paper presents a bottom-up analysis of EMFI effects on a RISC microprocessor. We study these effects at three levels: at the wire-level, at the chip-network level, and at the gate-level considering parameters such as EM-injection location and timing. We conclude that EMFI induces local timing errors implying current timing attack detection and prevention techniques can be adapted to overcome EMFI.
Marjan Ghodrati, Bilgiday Yuce, Surabhi Gujar, Chinmay Deshpande, Leyla Nazhandali, Patrick Schaumont
DAC3