In many applications, software protection can not be sufficient to provide high security needed by some critical applications. A noteworthy example are the bitcoin wallets. Designed the most secure piece of software, their security can be compromised by a simple piece of malware infecting the device storing keys used for signing transactions. Secure hardware devices such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM) offers the ability to create a piece of code that can run unmolested by the rest of software applications hosted in the same machine. This has turned out to be a valuable approach for preventing several malware threats. Unfortunately, their restricted functionalities make them inconsistent with the use of multi and threshold signature mechanisms which are in the heart of real world cryptocurrency wallets implementation. This paper proposes an efficient multi-signature scheme that fits the requirement of the TPM. Based on discrete logarithm and pairings, our scheme does not require any interaction between signers and provide the same benefits as the well established BLS signature scheme. Furthermore, we proposed a formal model of our design and proved it security in a semi-honest model. Finally, we implemented a prototype of our design and studied its performance. From our experimental analysis, the proposed design is highly efficient and can serve as a groundwork for using TPM in future cryptocurrency wallets.