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Max Aliapoulios

dblp:222/3040 · also Maxwell Aliapoulios, Maxwell Matthaios Aliapoulios · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
3as first author
4since 2021 · last 2022
0000-0002-8581-8914ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Computer networks · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Malware analysis · 50% Digital forensics and information hiding · 50%
Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper
Web and social media mining · 100%
Computer networks
2 papers
Network measurement and analytics · 100%
Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper
Computational social science and digital humanities · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Digital forensics and information hiding
cryptocurrency forensics
0.312018
Tracking Ransomware End-to-end · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2018
Malware analysis › ransomware
ransomware analysis
0.312018
Tracking Ransomware End-to-end · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2018

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

text filtering pipeline · 1.0measurement study · 0.7ground-truth data analysis · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 The Gospel according to Q: Understanding the QAnon Conspiracy from the Perspective of Canonical Information
Antonis Papasavva, Max Aliapoulios, Cameron Ballard, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Gianluca Stringhini, Savvas Zannettou, Jeremy Blackburn
ICWSM2
2021 A Large Open Dataset from the Parler Social Network
Max Aliapoulios, Emmi Bevensee, Jeremy Blackburn, Barry Bradlyn, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Gianluca Stringhini, Savvas Zannettou
ICWSM1
2021 A large-scale characterization of online incitements to harassment across platforms
abstract
Attack strategies used by online harassers have evolved over time to inflict increasing harm to their targets. In addition to scaling harassment through incitement and coordination, online communities that commonly engage in harassment are likely a source of "innovation" for harassment attack strategies. We use the incitements or calls to harassment posted by members of these communities as a lens through which to holistically measure and understand this ecosystem. We create a filtering pipeline to discover 14,679 incitements to harassment within four large-scale data sets of messages and posts that span multiple platforms.
Max Aliapoulios, Kejsi Take, Prashanth Ramakrishna, Daniel Borkan, Beth Goldberg, Jeffrey S. Sorensen, Anna Turner, Rachel Greenstadt, Tobias Lauinger, Damon McCoy
Internet Measurement Conference1
2021 Swiped: Analyzing Ground-truth Data of a Marketplace for Stolen Debit and Credit Cards
Max Aliapoulios, Cameron Ballard, Rasika Bhalerao, Tobias Lauinger, Damon McCoy
USENIX Security Symposium1
2018 Tracking Ransomware End-to-end
abstract
Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts the files of infected hosts and demands payment, often in a crypto-currency like Bitcoin. In this paper, we create a measurement framework that we use to perform a large-scale, two-year, end-to-end measurement of ransomware payments, victims, and operators. By combining an array of data sources, including ransomware binaries, seed ransom payments, victim telemetry from infections, and a large database of bitcoin addresses annotated with their owners, we sketch the outlines of this burgeoning ecosystem and associated third-party infrastructure. In particular, we are able to trace the financial transactions, from the acquisition of bitcoins by victims, through the payment of ransoms, to the cash out of bitcoins by the ransomware operators. We find that many ransomware operators cashed out using BTC-e, a now-defunct Bitcoin exchange. In total we are able to track over $16 million USD in likely ransom payments made by 19,750 potential victims during a two-year period. While our study focuses on ransomware, our methods are potentially applicable to other cybercriminal operations that have similarly adopted Bitcoin as their payment channel.
Danny Yuxing Huang, Max Aliapoulios, Vector Guo Li, Luca Invernizzi, Elie Bursztein, Kylie McRoberts, Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy2