In aircraft engine monitoring, estimating performance indicators from observed measurement data has been an important and longstanding subject, as these indicators provide highly beneficial information to assist maintenance activities.The two main resolution approaches in tackling this problem are Bayesian inferences and machine learning methods, each having its own limitations: inferences are not robust against model-reality gap and non-linearity, while current implementations of machine learning algorithms do not take into account temporal information.In this work, we focus on a use case in estimating engine performance indicators from snapshot data.We explore several hybrid approaches, aiming to simultaneously leverage the advantages of Bayesian inferences and machine learning methods.We demonstrate that the estimation precision provided by one of our hybrid methods significantly improves upon that of state-of-the-art methods in the tested cases.

Universal methods achieve optimal convergence rate guarantees in convex optimization without any prior knowledge of the problem’s regularity parameters or the attributes of the gradient oracle employed by the method. In this regard, existing state-of-the-art algorithms achieve an $O(1/T^2)$ convergence rate in Lipschitz smooth problems with a perfect gradient oracle, and an $O(1/sqrt{T})$ convergence speed when the underlying problem is non-smooth and/or the gradient oracle is stochastic. On the downside, these methods do not take into account the dependence of these guarantees on the problem’s dimensionality, and this can have a catastrophic impact on a method’s convergence, in both theory and practice. Our paper aims to bridge this gap by providing a scalable universal method - dubbed UnDERGrad - which enjoys an almost dimension-free oracle complexity in problems with a favorable geometry (like the simplex, $\ell_1$-ball or trace-constraints), while retaining the order-optimal dependence on T described above. These "best of both worlds" guarantees are achieved via a primal-dual update scheme inspired by the dual exploration method for variational inequalities.

We examine an adaptive learning framework for nonatomic congestion games where the players' cost functions may be subject to exogenous fluctuations (e.g., due to disturbances in the network, variations in the traffic going through a link). In this setting, the popular multiplicative/ exponential weights algorithm enjoys an $\mathcal{O}(1/\sqrt{T})$ equilibrium convergence rate; however, this rate is suboptimal in static environments---i.e., when the network is not subject to randomness. In this static regime, accelerated algorithms achieve an $\mathcal{O}(1/T^{2})$ convergence speed, but they fail to converge altogether in stochastic problems. To fill this gap, we propose a novel, adaptive exponential weights method---dubbed AdaWeight---that seamlessly interpolates between the $\mathcal{O}(1/T^{2})$ and $\mathcal{O}(1/\sqrt{T})$ rates in the static and stochastic regimes respectively. Importantly, this "best-of-both-worlds" guarantee does not require any prior knowledge of the problem's parameters or tuning by the optimizer; in addition, the method's convergence speed depends subquadratically on the size of the network (number of vertices and edges), so it scales gracefully to large, real-life urban networks.

We introduce the Colonel Blotto game with favoritism, an extension of the famous Colonel Blotto game where the winner-determination rule is generalized to include pre-allocations and asymmetry of the players' resources effectiveness on each battlefield. Such favoritism is found in many classical applications of the Colonel Blotto game. We focus on the Nash equilibrium. First, we consider the closely related model of all-pay auctions with favoritism and completely characterize its equilibrium. Based on this result, we prove the existence of a set of optimal univariate distributions---which serve as candidate marginals for an equilibrium---of the Colonel Blotto game with favoritism and show an explicit construction thereof. In several particular cases, this directly leads to an equilibrium of the Colonel Blotto game with favoritism. In other cases, we use these optimal univariate distributions to derive an approximate equilibrium with well-controlled approximation error. Finally, we propose an algorithm---based on the notion of winding number in parametric curves---to efficiently compute an approximation of the proposed optimal univariate distributions with arbitrarily small error.

Resource allocation games such as the famous Colonel Blotto (CB) and Hide-and-Seek (HS) games are often used to model a large variety of practical problems, but only in their one-shot versions. Indeed, due to their extremely large strategy space, it remains an open question how one can efficiently learn in these games. In this work, we show that the online CB and HS games can be cast as path planning problems with side-observations (SOPPP): at each stage, a learner chooses a path on a directed acyclic graph and suffers the sum of losses that are adversarially assigned to the corresponding edges; and she then receives semi-bandit feedback with side-observations (i.e., she observes the losses on the chosen edges plus some others). We propose a novel algorithm, Exp3-OE, the first-of-its-kind with guaranteed efficient running time for SOPPP without requiring any auxiliary oracle. We provide an expected-regret bound of Exp3-OE in SOPPP matching the order of the best benchmark in the literature. Moreover, we introduce additional assumptions on the observability model under which we can further improve the regret bounds of Exp3-OE. We illustrate the benefit of using Exp3-OE in SOPPP by applying it to the online CB and HS games.

The Colonel Blotto game is a famous game commonly used to model resource allocation problems in many domains ranging from security to advertising. Two players distribute a fixed budget of resources on multiple battlefields to maximize the aggregate value of battlefields they win, each battlefield being won by the player who allocates more resources to it. The continuous version of the game---where players can choose any fractional allocation---has been extensively studied, albeit only with partial results to date. Recently, the discrete version---where allocations can only be integers---started to gain traction and algorithms were proposed to compute the equilibrium in polynomial time; but these remain computationally impractical for large (or even moderate) numbers of battlefields. In this paper, we propose an algorithm to compute very efficiently an approximate equilibrium for the discrete Colonel Blotto game with many battlefields. We provide a theoretical bound on the approximation error as a function of the game's parameters. We also propose an efficient dynamic programming algorithm in order to compute for each game instance the actual value of the error. We perform numerical experiments that show that the proposed strategy provides a fast and good approximation to the equilibrium even for moderate numbers of battlefields