We study a contextual version of the repeated brokerage problem. In each interaction, two traders with private valuations for an item seek to buy or sell based on the learner’s—a broker—proposed price, which is informed by some contextual information. The broker’s goal is to maximize the traders’ net utility—also known as the gain from trade—by minimizing regret compared to an oracle with perfect knowledge of traders’ valuation distributions. We assume that traders’ valuations are zero-mean perturbations of the unknown item’s current market value—which can change arbitrarily from one interaction to the next—and that similar contexts will correspond to similar market prices. We analyze two feedback settings: full-feedback, where after each interaction the traders’ valuations are revealed to the broker, and limited-feedback, where only transaction attempts are revealed. For both feedback types, we propose algorithms achieving tight regret bounds. We further strengthen our performance guarantees by providing a tight $1/2$-approximation result showing that the oracle that knows the traders’ valuation distributions achieves at least $1/2$ of the gain from trade of the omniscient oracle that knows in advance the actual realized traders’ valuations.

We consider a sequential decision-making setting where, at every round $t$, the learner (a market maker) posts a bid price $B_t$ and an ask price $A_t$ to an incoming trader (the taker) with a private valuation for some asset. If the trader’s valuation is lower than the bid price, or higher than the ask price, then a trade (sell or buy) occurs. Letting $M_t$ be the market price (observed only at the end of round $t$), the maker’s utility is $M_t-B_t$ if the maker bought the asset, it is $A_t-M_t$ if they sold it, and it is $0$ if no trade occurred. We characterize the maker’s regret with respect to the best fixed choice of bid and ask pairs under a variety of assumptions (adversarial, i.i.d., and their variants) on the sequence of market prices and valuations. Our upper bound analysis unveils an intriguing connection relating market making to first-price auctions and dynamic pricing. Our main technical contribution is a lower bound for the i.i.d. case with Lipschitz distributions and independence between market prices and takers’ valuations. The difficulty in the analysis stems from a unique relationship between the reward and feedback functions that allows learning algorithms to trade off reward for information in a continuous way.

We explore brokerage between traders in an online learning framework. At any round $t$, two traders meet to exchange an asset, provided the exchange is mutually beneficial. The broker proposes a trading price, and each trader tries to sell their asset or buy the asset from the other party, depending on whether the price is higher or lower than their private valuations. A trade happens if one trader is willing to sell and the other is willing to buy at the proposed price. Previous work provided guidance to a broker aiming at enhancing traders' total earnings by maximizing the *gain from trade*, defined as the sum of the traders' net utilities after each interaction. This classical notion of reward can be highly unfair to traders with small profit margins, and far from the real-life utility of the broker. For these reasons, we investigate how the broker should behave to maximize the trading volume, i.e., the *total number of trades*. We model the traders' valuations as an i.i.d. process with an unknown distribution. If the traders' valuations are revealed after each interaction (full-feedback), and the traders' valuations cumulative distribution function (cdf) is continuous, we provide an algorithm achieving logarithmic regret and show its optimality up to constants. If only their willingness to sell or buy at the proposed price is revealed after each interaction ($2$-bit feedback), we provide an algorithm achieving poly-logarithmic regret when the traders' valuations cdf is Lipschitz and show its near-optimality. We complement our results by analyzing the implications of dropping the regularity assumptions on the unknown traders' valuations cdf. If we drop the continuous cdf assumption, the regret rate degrades to $\Theta(\sqrt{T})$ in the full-feedback case, where $T$ is the time horizon. If we drop the Lipschitz cdf assumption, learning becomes impossible in the $2$-bit feedback case.

We study the role of contextual information in the online learning problem of brokerage between traders. In this sequential problem, at each time step, two traders arrive with secret valuations about an asset they wish to trade. The learner (a broker) suggests a trading (or brokerage) price based on contextual data about the asset and the market conditions. Then, the traders reveal their willingness to buy or sell based on whether their valuations are higher or lower than the brokerage price. A trade occurs if one of the two traders decides to buy and the other to sell, i.e., if the broker's proposed price falls between the smallest and the largest of their two valuations. We design algorithms for this problem and prove optimal theoretical regret guarantees under various standard assumptions.

Motivated by real-life supply chain management, we study a repeated newsvendor problem in which the learner is a mediator that facilitates trades between suppliers and retailers in a sequence of supplier/retailer interactions. At each time step, a new supplier and retailer join the mediator's platform with a private production cost and utility function, respectively, and the platform proposes a unitary trading price. The supplier accepts the proposed price if it meets or exceeds their unitary production cost and communicates their decision to the platform; simultaneously, the retailer decides the quantity to purchase at the proposed trading price based on their private utility function and sends their decision to the platform. If the supplier accepts the trading price, the transaction proceeds, and the retailer purchases their chosen quantity of units, paying the product of this quantity and the trading price to the supplier. The mediator's objective is to maximize social welfare. We design an online mediator's pricing strategy that features sharp regret rates under some natural assumptions, and we investigate the necessity of these assumptions, proving that relaxing any of them leads to unlearnability.

In online bilateral trade, a platform posts prices to incoming pairs of buyers and sellers that have private valuations for a certain good. If the price is lower than the buyers' valuation and higher than the sellers' valuation, then a trade takes place. Previous work focused on the platform perspective, with the goal of setting prices maximizing the *gain from trade* (the sum of sellers' and buyers' utilities). Gain from trade is, however, potentially unfair to traders, as they may receive highly uneven shares of the total utility. In this work we enforce fairness by rewarding the platform with the _fair gain from trade_, defined as the minimum between sellers' and buyers' utilities. After showing that any no-regret learning algorithm designed to maximize the sum of the utilities may fail badly with fair gain from trade, we present our main contribution: a complete characterization of the regret regimes for fair gain from trade when, after each interaction, the platform only learns whether each trader accepted the current price. Specifically, we prove the following regret bounds: $\Theta(\ln T)$ in the deterministic setting, $\Omega(T)$ in the stochastic setting, and $\tilde{\Theta}(T^{2/3})$ in the stochastic setting when sellers' and buyers' valuations are independent of each other. We conclude by providing tight regret bounds when, after each interaction, the platform is allowed to observe the true traders' valuations.

We study the problem of regret minimization for a single bidder in a sequence of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers the item’s value only if the auction is won. Our main contribution is a complete characterization, up to logarithmic factors, of the minimax regret in terms of the auction’s transparency, which controls the amount of information on competing bids disclosed by the auctioneer at the end of each auction. Our results hold under different assumptions (stochastic, adversarial, and their smoothed variants) on the environment generating the bidder’s valuations and competing bids. These minimax rates reveal how the interplay between transparency and the nature of the environment affects how fast one can learn to bid optimally in first-price auctions.

We study repeated bilateral trade where an adaptive $\sigma$-smooth adversary generates the valuations of sellers and buyers. We completely characterize the regret regimes for fixed-price mechanisms under different feedback models in the two cases where the learner can post the same or different prices to buyers and sellers. We begin by showing that, in the full-feedback scenario, the minimax regret after $T$ rounds is of order $\sqrt{T}$. Under partial feedback, any algorithm that has to post the same price to buyers and sellers suffers worst-case linear regret. However, when the learner can post two different prices at each round, we design an algorithm enjoying regret of order $T^{3/4}$, ignoring log factors. We prove that this rate is optimal by presenting a surprising $T^{3/4}$ lower bound, which is the paper's main technical contribution.

We study repeated bilateral trade where an adaptive $\sigma$-smooth adversary generates the valuations of sellers and buyers. We provide a complete characterization of the regret regimes for fixed-price mechanisms under different feedback models in the two cases where the learner can post either the same or different prices to buyers and sellers.We begin by showing that the minimax regret after $T$ rounds is of order $\sqrt{T}$ in the full-feedback scenario. Under partial feedback, any algorithm that has to post the same price to buyers and sellers suffers worst-case linear regret. However, when the learner can post two different prices at each round, we design an algorithm enjoying regret of order $T^{3/4}$ ignoring log factors.We prove that this rate is optimal by presenting a surprising $T^{3/4}$ lower bound, which is the main technical contribution of the paper.

In this work, we improve on the upper and lower bounds for the regret of online learning with strongly observable undirected feedback graphs. The best known upper bound for this problem is $\mathcal{O}\bigl(\sqrt{\alpha T\ln K}\bigr)$, where $K$ is the number of actions, $\alpha$ is the independence number of the graph, and $T$ is the time horizon. The $\sqrt{\ln K}$ factor is known to be necessary when $\alpha = 1$ (the experts case). On the other hand, when $\alpha = K$ (the bandits case), the minimax rate is known to be $\Theta\bigl(\sqrt{KT}\bigr)$, and a lower bound $\Omega\bigl(\sqrt{\alpha T}\bigr)$ is known to hold for any $\alpha$. Our improved upper bound $\mathcal{O}\bigl(\sqrt{\alpha T(1+\ln(K/\alpha))}\bigr)$ holds for any $\alpha$ and matches the lower bounds for bandits and experts, while interpolating intermediate cases. To prove this result, we use FTRL with $q$-Tsallis entropy for a carefully chosen value of $q \in [1/2, 1)$ that varies with $\alpha$. The analysis of this algorithm requires a new bound on the variance term in the regret. We also show how to extend our techniques to time-varying graphs, without requiring prior knowledge of their independence numbers. Our upper bound is complemented by an improved $\Omega\bigl(\sqrt{\alpha T(\ln K)/(\ln\alpha)}\bigr)$ lower bound for all $\alpha > 1$, whose analysis relies on a novel reduction to multitask learning. This shows that a logarithmic factor is necessary as soon as $\alpha < K$.

We investigate a nonstochastic bandit setting in which the loss of an action is not immediately charged to the player, but rather spread over the subsequent rounds in an adversarial way. The instantaneous loss observed by the player at the end of each round is then a sum of many loss components of previously played actions. This setting encompasses as a special case the easier task of bandits with delayed feedback, a well-studied framework where the player observes the delayed losses individually. Our first contribution is a general reduction transforming a standard bandit algorithm into one that can operate in the harder setting: We bound the regret of the transformed algorithm in terms of the stability and regret of the original algorithm. Then, we show that the transformation of a suitably tuned FTRL with Tsallis entropy has a regret of order $\sqrt{(d+1)KT}$, where $d$ is the maximum delay, $K$ is the number of arms, and $T$ is the time horizon. Finally, we show that our results cannot be improved in general by exhibiting a matching (up to a log factor) lower bound on the regret of any algorithm operating in this setting.

We study the problem of approximating the level set of an unknown function by sequentially querying its values. We introduce a family of algorithms called Bisect and Approximate through which we reduce the level set approximation problem to a local function approximation problem. We then show how this approach leads to rate-optimal sample complexity guarantees for Hölder functions, and we investigate how such rates improve when additional smoothness or other structural assumptions hold true.

We consider the problem of asynchronous online combinatorial optimization on a network of communicating agents. At each time step, some of the agents are stochastically activated, requested to make a prediction, and the system pays the corresponding loss. Then, neighbors of active agents receive semi-bandit feedback and exchange some succinct local information. The goal is to minimize the network regret, defined as the difference between the cumulative loss of the predictions of active agents and that of the best action in hindsight, selected from a combinatorial decision set. The main challenge in such a context is to control the computational complexity of the resulting algorithm while retaining minimax optimal regret guarantees. We introduce Coop-FTPL, a cooperative version of the well-known Follow The Perturbed Leader algorithm, that implements a new loss estimation procedure generalizing the Geometric Resampling of Neu and Bartók [2013] to our setting. Assuming that the elements of the decision set are $k$-dimensional binary vectors with at most $m$ non-zero entries and $\alpha_1$ is the independence number of the network, we show that the expected regret of our algorithm after $T$ time steps is of order $Q\sqrt{mkT\log(k) (k\alpha_1/Q+m)}$, where $Q$ is the total activation probability mass. Furthermore, we prove that this is only $\sqrt{k\log k}$-away from the best achievable rate and that Coop-FTPL has a state-of-the-art $T^{3/2}$ worst-case computational complexity.

We study the problem of zeroth-order (black-box) optimization of a Lipschitz function $f$ defined on a compact subset $\mathcal{X}$ of $\mathbb{R}^d$, with the additional constraint that algorithms must certify the accuracy of their recommendations. We characterize the optimal number of evaluations of any Lipschitz function $f$ to find and certify an approximate maximizer of $f$ at accuracy $\varepsilon$. Under a weak assumption on $\mathcal{X}$, this optimal sample complexity is shown to be nearly proportional to the integral $\int_{\mathcal{X}} \mathrm{d}\boldsymbol{x}/( \max(f) - f(\boldsymbol{x}) + \varepsilon )^d$. This result, which was only (and partially) known in dimension $d=1$, solves an open problem dating back to 1991. In terms of techniques, our upper bound relies on a packing bound by Bouttier et al. (2020) for the Piyavskii-Shubert algorithm that we link to the above integral. We also show that a certified version of the computationally tractable DOO algorithm matches these packing and integral bounds. Our instance-dependent lower bound differs from traditional worst-case lower bounds in the Lipschitz setting and relies on a local worst-case analysis that could likely prove useful for other learning tasks.

Bilateral trade, a fundamental topic in economics, models the problem of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. Despite the simplicity of this problem, a classical result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) affirms the impossibility of designing a mechanism that is simultaneously efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced. This impossibility result fostered an intense investigation of meaningful trade-offs between these desired properties. Much work has focused on approximately efficient fixed-price mechanisms, e.g., Blumrosen and Dobzinski (2014, 2016), Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2016), which have been shown to fully characterize strong budget balanced and ex-post individually rational direct revelation mechanisms. All these results, however, either assume some knowledge on the priors of the seller/buyer valuations, or black-box access to some samples of the distributions, as in Dütting et al. (2021). In this paper, we cast for the first time the bilateral trade problem in a regret minimization framework over T rounds of seller/buyer interactions, with no prior knowledge on their private valuations. Our main contribution is a complete characterization of the regret regimes for fixed-price mechanisms with different feedback models and private valuations, using as a benchmark the best fixed-price in hindsight. More precisely, we prove the following bounds on the regret ~Θ (√T) for full-feedback (i.e., direct revelation mechanisms); ~Θ(T2/3) for realistic feedback (i.e., posted-price mechanisms) and independent seller/buyer valuations with bounded densities; Θ(T) for realistic feedback and seller/buyer valuations with bounded densities; Θ(T) for realistic feedback and independent seller/buyer valuations; Θ(T) for the adversarial setting.

We study an asynchronous online learning setting with a network of agents. At each time step, some of the agents are activated, requested to make a prediction, and pay the corresponding loss. The loss function is then revealed to these agents and also to their neighbors in the network. Our results characterize how much knowing the network structure affects the regret as a function of the model of agent activations. When activations are stochastic, the optimal regret (up to constant factors) is shown to be of order $\sqrt{\alpha T}$, where $T$ is the horizon and $\alpha$ is the independence number of the network. We prove that the upper bound is achieved even when agents have no information about the network structure. When activations are adversarial the situation changes dramatically: if agents ignore the network structure, a $\Omega(T)$ lower bound on the regret can be proven, showing that learning is impossible. However, when agents can choose to ignore some of their neighbors based on the knowledge of the network structure, we prove a $O(\sqrt{\overline{\chi} T})$ sublinear regret bound, where $\overline{\chi} \ge \alpha$ is the clique-covering number of the network.

Motivated by posted price auctions where buyers are grouped in an unknown number of latent types characterized by their private values for the good on sale, we investigate regret minimization in stochastic dynamic pricing when the distribution of buyers’ private values is supported on an unknown set of points in $[0,1]$ of unknown cardinality $K$.