EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Seyed Mohammadjavad Seyed Talebi
dblp:224/9374
· DBLP profile ↗
5ranked-venue papers
3as first author
3since 2021 · last 2023
0009-0009-4255-0776ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-author · 1 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
3 papers |
Operating systems · 68% Program analysis · 22% Debugging and program repair · 10% | |
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Hardware security and side channels · 57% Cyber-physical and IoT security · 43% | |
| Human-computer interaction and pervasive computing
1 paper |
Human-AI interaction · 100% |
Topics — the 6 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Minimizing a Smartphone's TCB for Security-Critical Programs with Exclusively-Used, Physically-Isolated, Statically-Partitioned Hardware · MobiSys 2023 |
Cyber-physical and IoT security
voice assistant security |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | MegaMind: a platform for security & privacy extensions for voice assistants · MobiSys 2021 |
Operating systems › i/o › i/o subsystem
device drivers |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Charm: Facilitating Dynamic Analysis of Device Drivers of Mobile Systems · USENIX Security Symposium 2018 |
Program analysis
dynamic analysis |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Charm: Facilitating Dynamic Analysis of Device Drivers of Mobile Systems · USENIX Security Symposium 2018 |
Human-AI interaction
voice assistants |
0.1 | 1 | 2021 | MegaMind: a platform for security & privacy extensions for voice assistants · MobiSys 2021 |
Debugging and program repair
fault localization |
0.1 | 1 | 2021 | Undo Workarounds for Kernel Bugs · USENIX Security Symposium 2021 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
formal verification · 1.3CPU-FPGA prototyping · 1.3permission enforcement · 1.0noninterference · 0.5non-interference · 0.5
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Minimizing a Smartphone's TCB for Security-Critical Programs with Exclusively-Used, Physically-Isolated, Statically-Partitioned HardwareabstractSmartphone owners often need to run security-critical programs on the same device as other untrusted and potentially malicious programs. This requires users to trust hardware and system software to correctly sandbox malicious programs, trust that is often misplaced. Our goal is to minimize the number and complexity of hardware and software components that a smartphone owner needs to trust. We present a split-trust hardware design composed of statically-partitioned, physically-isolated trust domains. We introduce a few simple, formally-verified hardware components to enable a program to gain provably exclusive and simultaneous access to both computation and I/O on a temporary basis. To manage this hardware, we present OctopOS, an OS composed of mutually distrustful subsystems. We present a prototype of this machine (hardware and OS) on a CPU-FPGA board and show that it incurs a small hardware cost compared to modern smartphone SoCs. For security-critical programs, we show that this machine significantly reduces the required trust compared to mainstream TEEs while achieving usable performance. For normal programs, performance is similar to a legacy machine. Zhihao Yao 0001, Seyed Mohammadjavad Seyed Talebi, Ardalan Amiri Sani, Thomas E. Anderson |
MobiSys | 2 |
| 2021 | MegaMind: a platform for security & privacy extensions for voice assistantsabstractVoice assistants raise serious security and privacy concerns because they use always-on microphones in sensitive locations (e.g., inside a home) and send audio recordings to the cloud for processing. The cloud transcribes these recordings and interprets them as user requests, and sometimes even shares these requests with third-party services. These steps may result in unintended or malicious voice data leaks and in unauthorized actions, such as a purchase. This paper presents MegaMind, a novel extensible platform that lets a user deploy security and privacy extensions locally on their voice assistant. MegaMind's extensions interpose on requests before sending them to the cloud and on responses before delivering them to the user. MegaMind's programming model enables writing powerful extensions with ease, such as one for secure conversations. Additionally, MegaMind protects against malicious extensions by providing two important guarantees, namely permission enforcement and non-interference. We implement MegaMind and integrate it with Amazon Alexa Service SDK. Our evaluation shows that MegaMind achieves a small conversation latency on platforms with adequate compute power, such as a Raspberry Pi 4 and an x86-based laptop. Seyed Mohammadjavad Seyed Talebi, Ardalan Amiri Sani, Stefan Saroiu, Alec Wolman |
MobiSys | 1 |
| 2021 | Undo Workarounds for Kernel Bugs
Seyed Mohammadjavad Seyed Talebi, Zhihao Yao 0001, Ardalan Amiri Sani, Zhiyun Qian, Daniel Austin |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |
| 2019 | A Radiation Hard Sense Circuit for Spin Transfer Torque Random Access MemoryabstractSpin transfer torque (STT-RAM) is a fast, scalable and non-volatile memory technology. These characteristics make STT-RAM one of the best candidates among memories that can be used for space applications. Although STT-RAM cell itself is immune to high energy particles, its sensing circuit might be severely affected by radiation. In this work, we first extensively analyze the effect of radiation on the STT-RAM sense circuit and then propose a radiation hardened circuit. Using a dual modular redundancy and a voting scheme, radiation susceptibility of the sense circuit is eliminated. The sense circuit is implemented in 45 nm CMOS technology. Simulation results show that the proposed circuit is immune to radiation pulses up to 400 Krad. Saba Mohammadi, Masoomeh Jasemi, Seyed Mohammadjavad Seyed Talebi, Nader Bagherzadeh, Michael M. Green |
ISCAS | 3 |
| 2018 | Charm: Facilitating Dynamic Analysis of Device Drivers of Mobile Systems
Seyed Mohammadjavad Seyed Talebi, Hamid Tavakoli, Hang Zhang 0012, Zheng Zhang 0058, Ardalan Amiri Sani, Zhiyun Qian |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |