Fake base stations (FBSs) can carry out attacks against mobile devices and user equipment (UE). We tackle the problem of localizing an FBS after its existence has been detected. Karaçay et al. (2021) have presented a localization method based on the values of the Reference Signal Received Power (RSRP), reported in the standardized measurement reports of the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) and sent by the UEs. We show that the method they have proposed fails if the FBS uses a directional antenna (instead of an omnidirectional antenna). The localization method by Karaçay et al. is based on half-planes. We propose a new method that localizes FBSs using a directional antenna by first employing a half-plane method and then applying a method based on convex hulls. Our tests for the new method on data derived from Network Simulator 3 (ns-3) show that it significantly outperforms the previous method for a directional FBS antenna.

We introduce PQ 5G AKA, a prototype for possible extensions of the current 5G authentication and key agreement protocol to the post-quantum setting, we further analyse the computational and communication complexities of our prototype using potential post-quantum KEMs

The design of lattice coset codes for wiretap channels is considered. Bounds on the eavesdropper's correct decoding probability and information leakage are first revisited. From these bounds, it is explicit that both the information leakage and error probability are controlled by the average flatness factor of the eavesdropper's lattice, which we further interpret geometrically. It is concluded that the minimization of the (average) flatness factor of the eavesdropper's lattice leads to the study of well-rounded lattices, which are shown to be among the optimal in order to achieve these minima. Constructions of some well-rounded lattices are also provided.