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Rigas T. Ioannides

dblp:225/9501 · also Rigas Themistoklis Ioannides · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2016
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Network security · 77% Cyber-physical and IoT security · 23%
Computer networks
1 paper
Wireless sensing and localization · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Wireless sensing and localization
satellite navigation
0.212016
Known Vulnerabilities of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, Status, and Potential Mitigation Techniques · Proc. IEEE 2016
Cyber-physical and IoT security
critical infrastructure protection
0.112016
Known Vulnerabilities of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, Status, and Potential Mitigation Techniques · Proc. IEEE 2016

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

signal authentication · 0.5interference detection · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2016 Known Vulnerabilities of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, Status, and Potential Mitigation Techniques
abstract
Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) like GPS but also Galileo, GLONASS, and Beidou represent an important infrastructure to our society. They provide position and timing for numerous applications. A GNSS is a rather complex system consisting of around 30 satellites, a number of monitor stations, plus a control center. Billions of GNSS receivers represent the user segment. The receivers and the monitor stations receive a weak satellite radio signal and thus are susceptible to interference like jamming or spoofing. This paper outlines the core operation principles of satellite navigation to describe those kind of interference and to analyze the impacts. Different types of interference attacks result in different effects at the target receiver. The attack schemes are categorized within this paper. Reported incidents are summarized as well as the potential impact of GNSS vulnerability on critical infrastructure. Well known countermeasures at user receiver level or at system level are outlined and discussed for their suitability. The political and socioeconomic context of GNSS vulnerability is described emphasizing the large impact of a potential disruption of the GNSS service.
Rigas T. Ioannides, Thomas Pany, Glen Gibbons
Proc. IEEE1